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The Political Economies  
of Immigration Law 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar* 
A largely dysfunctional American immigration system is only poorly explained by simple 
depictions of the political economy of lawmaking on this issue, blaming factors such as deliberate 
economic policy choices, longstanding public attitudes, explicit presidential decisions, or general 
gridlock. Instead, the structure of immigration law emerges from intersecting effects of three 
separate dynamics—statutory compromises rooted in the political economy of lawmaking, 
organizational practices reflecting the political economy of implementation, and public reactions 
implicating the responses of policy elites and the larger public to each other. Together, these factors 
help constitute an immigration status quo characterized by intense public concern, continuing legal 
controversies, and powerful obstacles to change. (1) Particularly since 1986, American 
immigration statutes have created a legal arrangement essentially built to fail, giving authorities 
regulatory responsibilities that were all but impossible to achieve under existing law. (2) 
Implementation has been characterized by organizational fragmentation, with policy changes 
involving one agency producing externalities not owned by that agency, and limited presidential 
power to change enforcement or implementation. And (3) the interplay of unrealistic statutory 
goals, enforcement, and growing public concern engenders a polarizing implementation dynamic, 
where agencies’ incapacity to enforce existing law tends to spur polarized political responses 
producing legislation that further exacerbates agency difficulties in meeting public expectations.  
The resulting process over the last few decades persistently favored expansion in the 
provision of border enforcement resources. This development is widely supported or at least 
tolerated by most political actors, even though it fails to address the core institutional problems of 
the status quo. Beyond what these developments tell us about immigration, they also reveal much 
about (a) how statutory entrenchment in the United States is affected by political cycles capable of 
eroding the legitimacy of public agencies, and (b) how powerful nation-states control, in limited 
but nonetheless significant ways, the transnational flows affecting their well-being and security. 
 
* Professor and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School and Co-Director, Stanford 
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). I am grateful for support from CISAC, 
Stanford Law School, and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. For their thoughtful feedback, I 
am indebted to Wayne Cornelius, Gerald Neuman, Stephen Legomsky, Rebecca Bernhardt, Peter 
Andreas, John Skrentny, Marc Rosenblum, Tomás Jimenez, Jake Shapiro, and participants in the UC 
Irvine Law Symposium: “Persistent Puzzles in Immigration Law.” Warner Sallman, Kyle Maurer, 
Andy Parker, and Gina Cardenas provided superb research assistance. Needless to say, what errors or 
shortcomings remain are mine alone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 American immigration law rarely appears as a coherent body of legal 
doctrine. Instead of creating a defensible prescriptive scheme for regulating 
national membership, the day-to-day realities of immigration law are more often 
defined by a long list of controversial disputes sprawling across federal 
courtrooms, state legislative chambers, congressional committees, and federal 
agencies. Immigration cases reaching the Courts of Appeal frequently engender 
growing skepticism about specialized immigration adjudicators, and showcase 
appellate judges’ increasing reluctance regarding deference to factual or legal 
judgments of administrative adjudicators making wildly inconsistent decisions.1 
Many of the same appellate judges have long wrestled with the perennially divisive 
problem of immigration federalism,2 each dispute underscoring the depth of state-
level frustration with a system that simultaneously tolerates the presence of over 
 
1. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 
1679–80 (2007). 
2. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999). 
Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete) 4/17/2012  1:22 PM 
2012] POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF IMMIGRATION LAW 3 
 
ten million undocumented immigrants while it spends billions of dollars to avoid 
such migration.3 Another doctrinal corner features agencies subject to growing 
pressure for strict interior immigration enforcement, even as agencies face stark 
limits on federal power to punish employers harboring “constructive knowledge” 
of their workers’ illegal status.4 Still other cases provoke controversy by declining 
to extend labor law protections to unauthorized immigrants whose presence 
affects broader labor market conditions.5 
Indeed, because these immigration disputes involve matters ranging from 
labor markets to judicial deference, they often appear to implicate fundamentally 
distinct legal, cultural, and economic disagreements. Yet closer scrutiny reveals 
instead a curious measure of convergence. In fact, most of these controversies 
constitute the gnarled, partially occluded roots of a single statutory compromise 
shaped by decades of legislative accretion: the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA). Within the text of the INA are enshrined difficult-to-prove state-of-mind 
requirements governing employer liability for hiring unauthorized workers.6 The 
statute’s provisions helped generate the contested relationship between 
immigration laws and labor-related statutory protections for workers.7 They define 
the discretionary powers of immigration courts and produce their vast caseloads.8 
Perhaps more than any other aspect of American law, the statute defines how the 
country addresses the extent of unlawful migration galvanizing state and local 
interest in immigration regulation.9 As federal agencies have sought to implement 
the statutory scheme in recent years, moreover, rising numbers of concerned 
Americans have derided the process through which the United States appears (or 
fails) to govern immigration.10 
 
3. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 
(9th Cir. 2011) (“Against a backdrop of rampant illegal immigration, escalating drug and human 
trafficking crimes, and serious public safety concerns, the Arizona Legislature enacted a set of statutes 
and statutory amendments in the form of Senate Bill 1070.”). 
4. Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1991). 
5. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002); see also Rivera v. 
NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “most undocumented workers are 
reluctant to report abusive . . . [labor] practices”). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. New El Rey Sausage Co., 1 O.C.A.H.O. 78 (1989), aff’d, 925 F.2d 
1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 
7. See generally Annie Decker, Comment, Suspending Employers’ Immigration-Related Duties During 
Labor Disputes: A Statutory Proposal, 115 YALE L.J. 2193 (2006) (proposing statutory changes to clarify 
the importance of labor law responsibilities in relation to immigration requirements). 
8. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 
(2006) (discussing statutory changes restricting the discretion of immigration judges); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010) (discussing the chronic 
problems with immigration adjudication, and the changing scope of discretion for immigration 
judges). 
9. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 567, 571–76 (2008); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008). 
10. See Randal C. Archibold & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Serious Concerns Among Americans 
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But how exactly does the United States govern immigration? It is a thesis of 
this Article that the answer lies not only in the content of statutory provisions, but 
in the distinctive relationships between statutes, public organizations, and the 
larger public. Describing these relationships, and particularly how they can drive 
immigration policy outcomes, is the major purpose of this Article. In the process, 
I elucidate how current immigration law persists even in the face of widespread 
public scorn. I also explore what this state of affairs tells us about the broader 
process of statutory entrenchment in a changing world of organized interests, 
complex regulatory challenges, and transnational flows. Immigration officials may 
shoulder the unique responsibility for administering laws that shape the character 
of a nation and, as we shall see, face an often unforgiving institutional context. But 
in a larger sense, they share with food safety inspectors, transportation security 
supervisors, and countless other civil servants a role in feedback loops that 
connect statutory schemes to public reactions and legal outcomes in a world of 
difficult-to-control transnational flows. 
A focus on institutions can tell us much about statutory implementation in a 
pluralist system. But it can be particularly illuminating in the immigration context. 
In immigration, a complex overlay of distinct bureaucracies and political cross-
currents exists in an uncertain relationship to elaborate statutory language.11 It is 
important to scrutinize the interplay of statutes, implementing institutions, and 
public reactions in this context because simpler explanations for the law’s 
development come up short. As explained in Part I, the content and persistence of 
the nation’s broad immigration architecture is only partially and incompletely 
explained by accounts focusing on the general difficulty of achieving major 
statutory changes in any domain, public attitudes, or rational economic 
policymaking. Because statutes come alive (or die) through the implementation 
process, we should look there for some of the answers missing from simpler 
accounts. We will therefore need to understand the implementation trajectory of a 
scheme that, by most accounts, took its present form around the mid-1980s when 
lawmakers enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) that 
promised to rationalize immigration through a combination of enforcement and 
legalization of undocumented individuals.  
That promise was never realized. In some cases, of course, the 
implementation process can smooth out statutory contradictions, as when 
administrative agencies and even courts have sometimes brought coherence in 
statutory domains involving civil rights12 or public health.13 Not so with 
 
About Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A15. 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 
(2010) (discussing the harmonization and development of statutory schemes in a variety of contexts, 
including civil rights). 
13. See generally LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW (2008). 
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immigration. Here, statutory contradictions involving a domain fertile for social, 
cultural, and economic concerns have grown ever more toxic because of 
organizational problems, and agencies lack the flexibility to better align regulatory 
activity and public expectations. In this environment, formidable cross-winds 
arising from statutory limitations, implementation problems, and public reactions 
have engendered a cycle of increasingly polarized public attitudes and legislative 
responses. Properly understood, this dynamic goes a long way toward revealing 
the terrain in which legal disputes about immigration arise.  
In Part II, I lay the groundwork for understanding that terrain. In addition to 
reviewing some often-neglected economic and political factors affecting complex 
regulatory schemes, I explain how those forces interact. Scholars and observers 
with some interest in the institutional dynamics affecting American immigration 
have occasionally devoted valuable attention to understanding discrete features of 
immigration law, such as the history of the President’s role,14 the implications of 
state and local action in this area,15 and the swelling importance of border or 
criminal enforcement.16 Though each of these areas alone merits scrutiny, one 
recurring challenge in unpacking the system is the entanglements among these and 
other institutional realities of immigration, including the reactions of organized 
interests and the public as agencies struggle to implement an intricate statutory 
scheme amidst growing national concerns about the issue.  
Immigration regulation thus presents policymakers with unusually severe 
dilemmas. Even as policymakers pursue relatively distinct agendas at opposite 
ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, they share a surfeit of technical challenges, growing 
public scrutiny, and competing pressures from factions seeking to protect, 
exclude, or exploit immigrants. Accordingly, in Part III, I train attention on how 
those realities fuel the existence of three interlocking political economies that 
shape modern immigration law: statutory compromises rooted in the political 
economy of lawmaking, organizational practices reflecting the political economy 
of implementation, and public reactions implicating the responses of policy elites 
and the larger public to each other.17 All three are necessary to assess the law as 
implemented and perceived by the public. The first political economy implicates 
the major statutory features of immigration law, particularly the modern, post-
 
14. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 
458 (2009). 
15. See generally Rodríguez, supra note 9 (discussing the implications of and interactions between 
state and local government actions in immigration law). 
16. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime 
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007); Kevin R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement: 
Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of Law, 47 VILL. L. REV. 897 (2002). 
17. The reference to “political economy” describes the process through which individuals and 
organizations manage scarce resources and political capital and make trade-offs in an environment 
that is difficult to control. Cf. Alberto Alesina, Program Report: Political Economy, 3 NBER REP. 1, 1–3 
(2007), http://www.nber.org/reporter/2007number3. 
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IRCA Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Here, interested parties feature 
prominently, often having done their work against the backdrop of relatively 
limited public attention.18 The second dynamic implicates public organizations and 
their incentives, which share control over immigration and respond to a 
presidency with surprisingly limited capacity to drastically change the immigration 
status quo through executive action. Finally, the third political economy implicates 
the process through which policymakers and stakeholders decide on their strategy 
to capture, shape, and respond to public attention about immigration.  
Together, these multiple political economies reveal the relationship between 
a complicated statutory law and its larger institutional context. They define the 
subtleties of a “policy feedback” process that partly reflects the insights of the 
established literature on the subject and partly showcases some underappreciated 
dynamics allowing much-maligned legal regimes to persist in the face of eroding 
public legitimacy for the agencies and the statutes they implement. By taking these 
factors into account, a more useful picture emerges of the immigration law status 
quo—as well as some of the powerful constraints that keep it in place. We can 
thus better understand how resource constraints on interior enforcement counter-
intuitively coexist with and even encourage some forms of aggressive 
enforcement,19 and why statutory changes justified in the name of empowering 
agencies and restoring public confidence are more likely to have precisely the 
opposite effect.20 
The resulting picture is not merely one of statutory dysfunction. It portrays 
instead a cluster of responses driven by entanglements between statutory 
provisions, organizational fragmentation, and political backlash. Those 
entanglements exist because of the overlapping political economies of immigration 
law, where statutes affect agency actions, and these actions in turn impact politics 
as well as the durability of an important piece of the nation’s legal architecture. 
Because the modern immigration system avoided difficult trade-offs (such as the 
consequences of actually enforcing statutory requirements in the domestic labor 
market) and originated in a policymaking process that needed to satisfy multiple 
stakeholders (perpetrating a system that kept domestic enforcement limited and 
blocked or deferred changes in lawful immigration), it lacked the essential legal 
attributes that would have made it more feasible for administrators to align the 
system’s outputs with its putative goals.21 That is, IRCA’s regulation of the labor 
market is rarely enforced and harbors virtually no flexibility to address changing 
 
18. See infra Part III.A. The “modern” immigration system means the statutes, rules, and 
enforcement practices that have emerged in light of the passage of two landmark pieces of legislation 
that (respectively) created the foundations of the modern immigration enforcement system and visa 
allocation scheme governing American immigration law: the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986, and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. 
19. See infra Part III.D. 
20. See id.  
21. See infra Part III.A. 
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U.S. economic rationales for migration. Meanwhile, the mix of labor market 
incentives and limited legal immigration opportunities all but ensures a vast, long-
term undocumented population in the United States which has been increasingly 
discouraged from leaving because of a build-up in border security that has proven 
an easier sell than the alternative policy solutions.22 Agencies thus struggled with 
modern immigration law from the outset as they implemented statutory changes 
in 1965 and 1986, and the agencies’ missions grew more difficult amidst rising 
political frustration and organizational fragmentation.  
Political reactions from lawmakers and the public have compounded these 
structural weaknesses. Those reactions subject the system to increasing derision 
while simultaneously fomenting a slew of barriers to change arising from growing 
public concern about immigration, public skepticism that authorities will enforce 
legal requirements, and risk-aversion to more dramatic changes from some 
stakeholders who have adapted to the status quo. The result has been substantial 
difficulties in both implementation and achieving change to the status quo—
difficulties greater than those encountered in a variety of regulatory domains less 
prone to trigger deep cultural conflict, such as disease surveillance or tax 
enforcement.23 Those difficulties have persisted even in the face of support for 
reform from Presidents, many economic stakeholders, and the public. Instead, the 
institutional realities of modern immigration law have served up a constant 
ratcheting up of border security resources and changes in agency authority 
incapable of resolving broader immigration problems. In short, the system was 
built to fail, and because it does, immigration law engenders growing public 
skepticism and political incentives for piecemeal changes that exacerbate some of 
the daunting problems in immigration policy. In contrast, earlier reforms benefited 
from lower public salience, a more supportive interest group context, and a 
policymaking process not burdened by the legacy of a major immigration scheme 
essentially built to fail.  
Plainly, such institutional failure does not explain everything about the 
complicated history of immigration in the United States. The patterns of migration 
that produced the modern United States owe much to the politics of language and 
race, the long-term structure of labor markets, and the interplay of geography and 
economic history. Instead the point is to highlight how these and other forces 
capable of driving immigration law in recent decades operate through a pattern of 
institutional relationships, organizational problems, and public reactions that 
shape the meaning and entrenchment of statutes and regulatory rules. The 
resulting institutional challenges and political responses inevitably constrict the 
range of options, and change the costs and benefits of alternatives. Consider: if 
 
22. See, e.g., Kevin Thom, Repeated Circular Migration: Theory and Evidence from Undocumented 
Migrants (June 25, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://files.nyu.edu/kt44/public/ 
RepeatedCircularMigration_Jun09.pdf. 
23. See infra Part III.A. 
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the landmark 1990 Immigration Act that raised worldwide ceilings for immigration 
illustrates how American immigration policy is far from a one-way ratchet fueled 
by restrictionist sentiment, it is also quite plain that such a statute—devoid as it 
was of large-scale enforcement measures even as it embodied changes sought by 
immigrant, civil rights, and business advocates—would stand little chance of 
passage today.  
Beyond what these developments tell us about immigration law, they also 
reveal much about the interplay of policymaking and statutory entrenchment in 
American law. As Part IV explains, the federal immigration system illustrates how 
political feedback relationships can erode the legitimacy of public agencies. The 
recent history of American immigration law also sheds light on the prospects for 
powerful nation-states to control, in limited but nonetheless significant ways, the 
transnational flows affecting their well-being and security. Thus, while no 
thoughtful observer can deny that advanced industrialized countries like the 
United States have a measure of capacity to shape these flows, what power exists 
to control them is badly depleted under the current system. In an irony that 
reverberates through far-flung doctrinal corners, that capacity has itself been 
shaped by institutional realities producing far too much attention to controlling 
borders—and too little to controlling immigration. 
I. THE STRUCTURE AND PERSISTENCE OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW 
Ranchers in the Sonoran Desert of Arizona’s Cochise County, technology 
executives in forested suburbs of Seattle, meatpacking managers overseeing 
facilities in the Nebraska prairie, New England university presidents, and 
California farmworkers all have something in common. All are affected in large 
and small ways by the American immigration system, and all have a means of 
affecting the lawmaking process that produced that scheme. These Americans live 
in a nation of vast cities, complex labor markets, and social change. In each of 
these domains and many others, the story of immigration—and the responses to 
it—is the story of the nation. This makes for a complicated history, where 
significant episodes of restrictive, exclusionary policymaking have alternated with 
self-conscious efforts to establish a framework for large-scale lawful migration.24  
Recent efforts to establish such a framework have failed. In this Part, I set 
the stage for understanding the realities of modern immigration law by explaining 
its significance and the contradictions arising during a roughly quarter-century 
long process to build such a framework for lawful immigration. The focus then 
turns to the persistence of the nation’s core immigration compromises, even in the 
face of concerted efforts by two Presidents over the last five years to make major 
changes amid widespread public scorn. As with other characteristics of the 
existing INA compromise, this persistence is not fully explained by the public’s 
 
24. See ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN 432–33 (2006). 
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broad acceptance of immigration law’s goals or structure or by the widespread 
prevalence of political gridlock, nor does it arise from a reasoned strategy (either 
among the bulk of employers or among policymakers) to manage the labor 
market. 
A. Statutory Foundations of the Immigration System 
In 1965, the Johnson administration scored a sweeping legislative victory. 
The Texan in the Oval Office had already achieved far-reaching changes in civil 
rights statutes. Now, Johnson and his congressional allies had delivered on the late 
President Kennedy’s goal of starkly reforming American immigration law. With 
the enactment of the 1965 Immigration Act, the federal government began 
administering a new system providing a higher number of visas, removing national 
origin quotas, and establishing family unity (as well as continuing availability of 
some employment-based visas) as a core principle of immigration law. With its 
pragmatic accommodation for heightened legal immigration and its realization of 
the ideal of removing the national origin quotas that had so defined immigration 
law in the preceding half-century, the 1965 law was a landmark achievement.25 At 
the same time, the law embodied some tensions that arise from pressures for 
compromise in a pluralistic society and which are perhaps heightened in the 
contested field of immigration. We will shortly discuss how agencies’ 
implementation of these complex statutes plays a critical role in managing those 
contradictions and, ironically, in facilitating their persistence, but to understand 
that process our first task is to review some core statutory features of immigration 
law. 
The package of intricate statutory changes drastically reformed the INA. 
Gone were the national origin quotas that had long garnered heavy criticism as 
blatantly racist, particularly at a time when domestic policy concerns were 
increasingly focused on matters of civil rights. The longstanding four-category 
preference system was replaced with a more targeted set of seven preference 
categories, emphasizing the goals of family unity and (subject to a smaller number 
of total visas) meeting employer demand for individuals with particular skills. 
While these changes, and particularly the elimination of national-origin quotas, 
reflected more tolerant attitudes toward Catholics, Asians, and Jews amidst 
national concerns about inclusion and equality under the law, the new statute 
nonetheless imposed hemisphere-specific limits on immigration. In particular, it 
created a worldwide quota of 120,000 immigrants for the Western Hemisphere, 
and 170,000 immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere (along with a per-country 
limit of 20,000 for the Eastern Hemisphere). While lawmakers eventually 
 
25. See Edward M. Kennedy, The Immigration Act of 1965, 367 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 137 (1966) (providing a contemporaneous account of why the 1965 Act wrought such dramatic 
changes in the American immigration scheme). 
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abolished distinctions between the Western and Eastern hemispheres, important 
constraints remained with respect to overall limits on most immigrant visa 
categories, and applying to specific countries.26 
When Congress enacted the 1990 Immigration Act, it essentially finalized the 
macrolevel architecture of modern American immigration law. The new legislation 
raised the annual limit for worldwide immigration to 675,000 (after a three-year 
period of higher totals to clear backlogs). Of these, about sixty-eight percent of 
visas were allocated to family-sponsored immigrants,27 and about twenty percent 
for employer-petitioned immigrants. A small new diversity visa lottery system 
allocated 55,000 visas under the new law. In addition, the legislation (and a 
subsequent 1991 enactment making technical modifications) also created five new 
employment-based immigration categories to take the place of the two previously 
existing categories, and slightly altered the country-specific quotas that continue to 
create long backlogs in countries with higher demand for emigration to the United 
States.28 
If the reform of legal migration opportunities drove the 1965 reforms, 
concern over undocumented migration drove the other major statute shaping the 
modern system.29 Unquestionably a compromise to integrate somewhat 
competing visions for the future of immigration policy, the 1986 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) included two large legalization programs (one 
based on the amount of time individuals had unlawfully been present in the 
United States, and another a special program for agricultural workers).30 At the 
 
26. For a helpful discussion of the changes in the INA, see ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 317. 
27. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, such as parents and minor children, are still exempt 
from numerical limits on immigrant visas. Nonetheless, their numbers are deducted from the full 
allocation of visas for family-based immigrants (subject to a minimum guarantee of admission of at 
least 226,000 other relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent residents). 
28. The per-country ceiling is set at 25,000, not counting immediate family relatives. Beginning 
after the 1990 Immigration Act, seventy-five percent of second-preference immigrants (for example, 
immediate relatives of lawful permanent residents) are generally excepted from the country-specific 
cap. Moreover, if the limit on employment-based immigration exceeds the demand in that category in 
any calendar quarter, any remaining openings may be filled from among visas in other categories 
(even if the total otherwise exceeds the per-country cap). See generally DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA 
DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 28–35 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing the 
Immigration Act of 1990 and how it reformed the rules regarding legal entry to the United States, 
including the numerical limitation system). Although these measures introduced a small degree of 
flexibility into the scheme, the overall structure of the INA, as amended, remains relatively hardwired 
and bereft of the flexibility often delegated to administrative agencies in the modern system.  
29. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 
Ironically, what was considered a relatively large undocumented population in 1986 paled in 
comparison to the number of illicit migrants in the United States even five or six years later. See JEB 
BUSH & THOMAS F. MCCLARTY III, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY: INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 63, at 88 (2009), available at http://www.cfr.org/ 
immigration/us-immigration-policy/p20030 (discussing the context during which IRCA was passed). 
30. Applicants in the general program were required to meet most of the requirements of 
immigrant admissibility to the United States, to not have been convicted of any felony or of three or 
more misdemeanors in the United States, to not have assisted any form of persecution, and to register 
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same time, IRCA made a host of other changes to immigration law reflecting an 
emerging political move toward regulating and reducing the relatively routine 
employment of undocumented migrants through a comprehensive scheme. The 
statute’s premise of addressing immigration-related issues through a 
comprehensive strategy was borne out in provisions increasing border 
enforcement—though in retrospect, these increases were quite limited in 
comparison to what lawmakers would provide over the ensuing quarter century.31 
Most notably, it imposed landmark new affirmative responsibilities on the entire 
labor market by requiring employers to assess the immigration status of potential 
hires as part of a system to reduce the presence of unauthorized workers in the 
United States.  
Through the anodyne language of statutory provisions forging that system, 
IRCA readily conveyed one of its core goals. Perhaps it even conveyed the 
clandestine ambition of virtually all immigration regulation: shaping labor markets. 
Specifically, the employer sanctions provisions of IRCA punished a “person or 
other entity” that hires, recruits, or refers for a fee for employment in the United 
States a noncitizen, either (1) knowing that person is unauthorized, or (2) without 
complying with the Act’s employment verification system.32 The new 
requirements extended to all employers, including those subcontracting their 
work, and nearly all workers (including temporary workers). Moreover, the law 
required employers to retain I-9 forms indicating the specific documents 
examined.33 IRCA also permitted an employer to establish as an affirmative 
 
for selective service if required to do so. If noncitizens met these requirements and filed an initial 
application before May 4, 1988, they received temporary residence. Recipients of temporary residence 
then had a limited period of time during which they could adjust their status to lawful permanent 
residence, subject to conventional conditions involving minimal civics education and English-
language requirements. 
31. Because provisions included in IRCA also inaugurated the modern era of increasing 
concern about border security, and about (interior) enforcement, it may appear to some observers as 
quite similar to recent immigration laws. Nonetheless, it also created by far the largest legalization 
program in the history of the United States. IRCA’s legalization program was responsible for putting 
millions of people (ultimately 2.7 million) on a path to permanent residence. See DONALD M. 
KERWIN, MIGRATION POLICY INST., MORE THAN IRCA: U.S. LEGALIZATION PROGRAMS AND 
THE CURRENT POLICY DEBATE 7–8 (2010), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
pubs/legalization-historical.pdf. To understand IRCA, its historic employer sanctions provision and 
more modest border enforcement elements need to be put in the context of the legalization program. 
32. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 274A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006). Note 
that, in principle, this formulation established that knowledge of an individual’s undocumented status 
made an individual liable to sanctions even if the administrative requirements of the law (such as 
inspection of documents and maintenance of I-9 forms) were otherwise followed. Not surprisingly, 
the question of what constitutes knowledge soon triggered considerable legal disputes. See, e.g., Collins 
Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1991). 
33. See Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar 
Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1049 (1990). Although penalties have changed, the fundamental 
problem of low detection probability and the lack of sanctions for outcomes involving employer 
states of mind, other than “knowledge,” plainly limit the scope and impact of enforcement. 
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defense to an allegation of unlawful employment that it had complied in good 
faith with the requirements of the new employer verification arrangement 
requiring inspection of an individual’s documentation.34 These provisions raised 
concerns among some lawmakers that IRCA would trigger widespread national 
origin discrimination among employers inclined to use such characteristics as a 
proxy for the appropriate immigration-focused screening—concerns that were 
vindicated through the creation of a new Justice Department office to enforce 
laws against unlawful national origin and immigration-related discrimination 
practices. As part of its promise to stem the flow of undocumented workers, 
IRCA also inaugurated a period of increasing border enforcement resources. 
None of these measures proved capable of stemming undocumented immigration 
in the succeeding decades. As explored below, IRCA’s own internal contradictions 
soon exerted an undeniable impact on the entire immigration system, including 
passage of subsequent enforcement-oriented legislation, the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which greatly 
expanded the proportion of immigrants subject to removal.35  
It is this statutory framework that has produced one of the largest continuing 
flows of legal immigration in recent history. At a time when even other countries 
that shared long traditions of high immigration have curtailed new legal migration, 
the American statutory scheme has remained favorable to high per capita levels of 
legal immigration.36 In the process, U.S. laws have helped unify hundreds of 
thousands of families, incorporated millions of new workers to take part in the 
American system, and continued to provide a relatively unimpeded path for lawful 
permanent residents to become citizens. At the very same time, the system has 
generated a host of results often described as troubling.37 Visa preference 
categories, interacting with country visa caps, have produced staggering visa 
backlogs and restricted the availability of immigrant visas for talented individuals 
capable of making unusual contributions to the American economy. The system 
harbors little flexibility to adjust as social or economic circumstances change. 
Crucially, two other things have been achieved by the current system: the statutes 
imposed ambitious labor market rules that are (for reasons discussed below) 
 
34. INA § 274A(a)(3). 
35. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1986). 
36. Australia is one contrast. See, e.g., Gary P. Freeman & Bob Birrell, Divergent Paths of 
Immigration Politics in the United States and Australia, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 525, 525–26 (2001) 
(“Only in Australia did [populist concern over immigration] lead to tighter control over legal and 
illegal entries, declining annual numbers, and significant retrenchment with regard to policies 
supporting multiculturalism.”). 
37. For one review of such criticisms, see BUSH & MCCLARTY, supra note 29, at 50–51 
(conceding that the current statutory framework for visa allocation provides legal resident status for 
family reunification, but noting that the process is slow and ineffective, leading to delays of up to a 
decade or more), and id. at 87 (criticizing the current use of national quotas because it limits the 
amount of skilled immigrants U.S. companies seek). 
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difficult to enforce, and fed now-familiar public expectations of controlling 
immigration through domestic regulation and border enforcement. 
Perhaps even more so than with statutory schemes addressing a single sector 
or harboring narrower ambitions than structuring the very sovereignty of a nation, 
the significance of these immigration statutes depends on how they are 
administered. Indeed, the crucial if limited role that implementation and 
enforcement discretion play in the recent story of immigration law persists despite 
the unusually hardwired nature of statutory choices involving the allocation of 
immigrant visas.38 Although the INA framework is primarily a vehicle for 
Congress to control most important details of routine immigration policy, it 
nonetheless leaves to agencies in the executive branch certain key decisions. 
Between the INA, IRCA, and IIRIRA, a vastly larger number of people are 
subject to removal than law enforcement is in a position to remove. Agencies have 
a role (constrained in limited ways by the President) in targeting resources at 
particular enforcement goals. They can influence the interpretation of ambiguous 
terms involving asylum and refugee status, as well as administrative practices 
determining the availability of work authorization to certain immigrants.39 
Routines and administrative practices therefore play a critical role in shaping how 
immigration law is experienced and what consequences it creates. 
Some observers and stakeholders scrutinizing those practices undoubtedly 
approve of specific features in the existing immigration system. Indeed, some 
political players would prefer those features to some of the characteristics of a 
reformed immigration system. What is striking is nonetheless how the resulting 
statutory scheme bequeathed to the agencies a set of daunting practical challenges 
that have grown more pronounced over time. In fashioning the modern INA, 
Congress and the President did little to provide for flexibility in addressing 
changing economic and social conditions. They have left in place a system that has 
only to the most limited degree managed to quench the thirst of the American 
labor market for unauthorized workers, despite a staggering increase in an 
undocumented population, including both millions of individuals who have 
 
38. For just one example highlighting instances of executive branch discretion in certain 
aspects of the implementation of immigration law, see Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence to the 
Executive Branch’s Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas in Immigration Matters: The Case of the 
Haitian Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1993). Despite recent concerns from appellate courts 
regarding the provision of deference to immigration judges, immigration-related agency judgments 
have traditionally been afforded Chevron deference. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 
(1987). Formally, of course, much of immigration adjudication turns on the exercise of the Attorney 
General’s adjudicatory discretion. Yet the overall architecture of immigration—and particularly the 
number and allocation of visas—provides only meager opportunities for agencies to play a 
meaningful role in policymaking. See infra Part IV. 
39. See, e.g., Muzaffar Chishti & Claire Bergeron, Signs of Change in Immigration Enforcement Policies 
Emerging from DHS, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www. 
migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=722 (chronicling apparent changes in 
enforcement under the then still-new presidential administration). 
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entered without inspection (the vast majority by crossing the southern border) as 
well as millions more who initially entered with valid nonimmigrant status that 
later expired.40  
Indeed, it is hard to disentangle that increase in the undocumented 
population from the structure of the law in place after IRCA. At a time when the 
American public was beginning to view undocumented migration as a more 
serious concern, the statutory framework put the country on a path toward 
pronounced failure in addressing that concern. First, the law created a system for 
verifying employment eligibility that was full of gaps and, because of how obvious 
the enforcement difficulties were, virtually inviting employers not to comply.41 
Second, constructive knowledge of undocumented status was difficult to prove, 
drastically limiting the scope of severe penalties for noncompliance. Third, the law 
continued to provide a relatively inflexible scheme for managing changes in the 
demand for migration. Even acknowledging the interdependence between legal 
migration opportunities and future demand, it is difficult to imagine an all but 
entirely rigid system serving as an element of an effective strategy to reduce illicit 
migration.42 Finally, it contained the initial installment of increases in border 
enforcement, thereby taking the first step in the border enforcement ramp up that 
eventually went a long way toward disrupting circular migration and encouraging 
an increasing number of illicit migrants to stay exclusively in the United States 
longer-term. 
These features help connect the statutory framework, its subsequent 
implementation, and the major legal disputes defining modern immigration law. 
Following the enactment of IRCA, cases like Collins Foods International, Inc. v. INS 
further confirmed that the statute sets a difficult bar for authorities to show 
employer knowledge of their workers’ illegal status.43 Consider, further, the 
increasingly prominent issue of local and state intervention in immigration policy. 
For decades, such disputes have turned largely on the preemptive effect of 
provisions contained in the INA that limit the scope of state and local lawmaking 
and reflect a recognition of the difficulties implicit in unconstrained nonfederal 
lawmaking in this area. At the same time, the laws generating disputes about state 
and local intervention in immigration policy arise largely from regional perceptions 
 
40. See Ted Robbins, Nearly Half of Illegal Immigrants Overstay Visas, NPR NEWS (June 14, 2006), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5485917.  
41. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (testimony of Austin T. Fragomen), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/ 
UploadedFiles/Fragomen_Embargoed_Testimony.pdf. 
42. In the short term, legal migration opportunities almost certainly serve as a partial substitute 
for unlawful migration activity. See infra Part III.A. The value of illicit migration should be expected to 
depend at least in part on the gap between legal migration opportunities and demand; if demand 
fluctuates by increasing and legal migration opportunities remain rigid, the value of illicit migration 
(ceteris paribus) will tend to increase. 
43. Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 555 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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that the federal government has defaulted on its end of the bargain. The district 
court’s opinion in the litigation over Arizona’s S.B. 1070 legislation, for example, 
explicitly acknowledged that frustration.44 Meanwhile, even though the Supreme 
Court ultimately declined to extend the full coterie of labor regulatory protections 
to undocumented workers in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB., both the 
dissent and the lower court opinions in the case recognize—as explicitly as Judge 
Bolton acknowledged the public’s frustration in the Arizona case—that labor 
markets are affected by the presence of millions of undocumented workers.45 
The unwieldy statutory compromise that has played a major role in 
generating that undocumented population has thus given rise to a doctrinal picture 
replete with contradictions. In that picture, society commits not to hire 
undocumented workers but makes it difficult to enforce that commitment. Even 
as unauthorized migrants generate increasingly intense political debate and 
enforcement initiatives, those workers nonetheless merit legal protections and the 
overall structure of the IRCA enforcement regime remains unchanged. Moreover, 
the presence of undocumented workers at a time of significant social and 
economic change generates continued regional demand for state and local laws 
even as the federal government seeks to discharge its preeminent responsibility in 
this area. Whatever else one expects from judicial efforts to clarify and police 
these doctrinal domains, the underlying disputes will persist as long as the present 
statutory regime (or something like it) persists. 
The legacy of today’s INA has been growing controversy and concern. 
Certain features of the status quo play a significant role in our national 
architecture. These include continued high legal immigration, and a relatively open 
path from lawful permanent residence to citizenship. Yet many of its 
consequences are also costly, even if the subtleties are poorly understood. An 
example: today’s immigration law is characterized by vast and growing sums spent 
on compliance even as noncompliance is commonplace.46 Although it is difficult 
to measure the precise social welfare effects of immigration law, it would be a 
heavy lift to argue that the status quo is socially optimal from an economic 
perspective. There is at least a plausible case lending credence to the arguments of 
economic stakeholders who maintain that, in the short-term, the country’s 
capacity to excel in scientific and technical innovation, higher education, and 
 
44. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) 
45. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB., 535 U.S. 137, 155 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (concluding that “denial [to the NLRB of the power to award back pay to unauthorized 
immigrants in the event of labor law violations] lowers the cost to employer of an initial labor law 
violation (provided, of course, that the only victims are illegal aliens). It thereby increases the 
employer’s incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien employees.”). 
46. See generally Wayne A. Cornelius, Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of 
U.S. Immigration Control Policy, 27 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 661 (2001) (discussing unintended 
consequences of the enforcement buildup in border policing occurring since the early 1990s, and 
questioning the impact of border enforcement on illicit entries into the United States). 
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certain forms of business activity depends on continued capacity to attract 
economic immigrants with advanced skills and creative prospects—and that 
existing policies create costly barriers to this process.47 At the other end of the 
economic spectrum, the large undocumented population experiences a gap in 
wages relative to what they would earn if they were legal workers. The size of that 
population, too, has the potential to adversely impact wages and working 
conditions for legal workers.48  
Just as bleak is the security-related legacy of the status quo. The status quo 
brings with it a large cost of significant outlays of funding focused on routine 
immigration enforcement, which could focus on more effectively targeting 
terrorist mobility and related problems.49 A related concern voiced even by police 
is the potential for growing distrust of law enforcement in immigrant 
communities, making it more difficult for police to build relationships helpful for 
gathering routine intelligence about individuals and organizations capable of 
posing more serious threats.50 The complex impact of additional border 
enforcement, while providing a heightened sense of safety in some communities, 
also raises questions about the longer-term security implications of the status quo. 
Like other forms of regulation, efforts to engage in shadow governance are replete 
with trade-offs. As one potential source of further example, take the movement of 
people across the U.S.-Mexico border. Historically this has been a relatively 
disorganized activity, and the prices charged by smugglers have been low. But 
aggressive border enforcement could theoretically drive up prices, induce larger 
shares of aliens to cross at ports of entry (where greater organization is required), 
and entice cartels to become involved in controlling an increasingly lucrative trade. 
In fact, the evidence from the price of illicit migration from Mexico to the 
United States is quite striking. The number of migrants pursuing high-risk routes 
through the desert has skyrocketed, and as a consequence, so has the number of 
illicit migrants who die while seeking to cross the U.S.-Mexico border. The 
 
47. See BUSH & MCCLARTY, supra note 29, at 47 (discussing the context during which IRCA 
was passed); see also SPENCER ABRAHAM ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION AND 
AMERICA’S FUTURE: A NEW CHAPTER 40 (2006), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
ITFIAF/ [hereinafter MPI TASK FORCE]. 
48. See, e.g., William Shaw, U.S. Immigration Policy Must Change, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR 
INT’L PEACE (June 17, 2010), http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id= 
41001 (stating that “[u]ndocumented workers are limited in their ability to organize to protect their 
rights, which may erode working conditions for American workers in general through competition 
(though some employers benefit from this)”). 
49. See infra Part III for a discussion of the rising costs of immigration enforcement. If we 
leave aside border enforcement policy, moreover, even the large increases in immigration funding 
nonetheless probably prove poorly matched for the tasks that agencies are supposed to carry out. 
50. See generally SUSAN GINSBURG, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., SECURING HUMAN MOBILITY 
IN THE AGE OF RISK (2010) (discussing the resource-intensive challenges in monitoring and 
disrupting terrorist mobility, and opportunity costs of immigration enforcement strategies that fail to 
prioritize high value targets). 
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alternative for migrants is to seek assistance from alien smugglers, whose response 
to an increasingly fortified U.S.-Mexico border has been to increase prices starkly. 
Studies of illegal border crossing behavior indicate an increasing concentration of 
aliens crossing through border checkpoints (requiring more sophisticated 
planning, forged documents, and other techniques), the proportion of aliens using 
coyotes rising, and border crossing fees rising. These changes are likely to further 
the pattern of more organized trafficking networks becoming involved in alien 
smuggling.51 News reports on these issues are not always accurate, but it is telling 
that they show a major spike in reporting on drug trafficking organizations’ 
interest and involvement in alien smuggling.52 
At some level this is no surprise. As the border buildup proceeded it altered 
the risk of nonassisted border crossings, driving many crossers towards dangerous 
and sometimes fatal crossings in the desert. But others paid more to smugglers—
making the average price for being smuggled across the border quintuple in 
inflation-adjusted dollars between 1990 and 2009. Crucially, the price change is 
likely to attract, as well as encourage, organized illicit activity, as the returns of 
controlling the smuggling market rise dramatically and the methods of successful 
illicit crossing increasingly involve use of ports of entry. These developments 
illustrate how domestic laws can affect the organization of transnational criminal 
activity. The impact of domestic immigration and border security policy on other 
states, including fragile jurisdictions, underscore the importance of disentangling 
distinct security goals affected by immigration and border policy. While the 
multidecade buildup of border enforcement unquestionably raised the cost of 
illicit activity, such a development could simultaneously contribute to the rising 
concentration of the remaining illegal cross-border migration in large criminal 
organizations with greater capacity to threaten state authority structures. 
Some of these limitations are not entirely lost on policymakers or the public. 
Many recent surveys document widespread public scorn regarding the status quo 
associated with immigration law. Stakeholders and organized interests representing 
law enforcement, business, civil rights, and religious concerns (among others) have 
decried the present system. Since 2006, hundreds of lawmakers and two 
Presidents (a Republican and a Democrat) have heavily criticized the present 
 
51. See Wayne Cornelius, Presentation at the Center for Comparative Studies in Race and 
Ethnicity, Stanford University: Does Border Enforcement Matter? What Mexican Migrants Can 
Teach Us (Sept. 30, 2010) (discussing rising prices for alien smuggling in the last ten to fifteen years, 
and the increasing concentration of border crossing activity occurring at ports of entry in California 
and Texas, but not Arizona). 
52. As just one example of the analyses emphasizing the connection between alien smuggling 
and drug trafficking organizations, see Alien Smuggling: DHS Could Better Address Alien Smuggling Along 
the Southwest Border by Leveraging Investigative Resources and Measuring Program Performance, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (statement of Richard M. Stana). Separately, I am working on a project that chronicles changes 
in alien smuggling and its relationship to organized criminal entities along the U.S.-Mexico border in 
recent years. 
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immigration law regime and made efforts to change it. These moves have failed to 
dislodge or fundamentally modify the preceding arrangement, raising questions 
about the staying power of broadly disfavored legal regimes and the consequences 
of their entrenchment. 
B. Statutory Entrenchment and Its Persistence 
When a statutory scheme is entrenched, the challenges entailed in changing 
the law stretch beyond the mere requirements of lawmaking and instead implicate 
the broader logic of the entire political system.53 In the American pluralist political 
system, organized interests and their closely allied public supporters routinely end 
up at the center of the policymaking process. In one version of the now-classic 
account of American pluralism influenced by political scientist Robert Dahl, 
organized interests offset broader public concerns in lawmaking and regulatory 
implementation,54 resulting in many arrangements with concentrated benefits to 
specific groups even if the aggregate benefits are far outweighed by diffuse costs 
borne more broadly. A generally functionalist account of immigration law could 
pivot on the idea that perhaps the most relevant concentrated interests—
employers—are perfectly happy to keep in place a system that lets them squeeze 
value from undocumented labor or workers with temporary H-1b visas, while 
maintaining (given the problems with employer sanctions) a relatively low risk of 
sanctions by federal authorities.  
There is no question that some players in the system benefit more than 
others from existing immigration law. But the very behavior of some of the 
industries that allegedly benefit most from current law—including, for example 
agribusiness and the service sector—tells a more complex story. Indeed, neither 
the simple functional labor market account nor conventional variations of it 
adequately explain the persistence of the present statutory scheme, a persistence 
that defied three recent efforts by a Republican President and a Democratic 
President, and majority votes in both houses of Congress over the course of four 
years. Nor can this pattern be explained convincingly by political economy 
accounts focused purely on public opinion or general gridlock. Each of these 
factors may be important to some degree, by illustrating a means through which 
social or political developments can make an imprint in the nation’s approach to 
migration. None, however, explains the persistence of recent compromises built 
into American immigration law. To understand the logic of how America regulates 
migration, we must account for why the existing scheme persists.  
Rational Labor-Market Management. Consider first the fit between 
existing immigration law and domestic economic concerns. Certain stakeholders 
 
53. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 12, at 127–32 (discussing the definition of 
entrenchment). 
54. See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY (1971). 
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benefit from the status quo because they gain from a labor market with a large 
number of undocumented workers.55 To be more precise, some businesses and 
individuals reap rewards from the nation’s existing immigration scheme relative to 
a system with some mix of characteristics associated with potential alternative 
paths for immigration law: (1) far more limited undocumented immigration; (2) 
aggressive and reliable employer verification; and/or (3) less employer control of 
the heavily rationed opportunities for employment-based legal migration (such as 
opportunities available through H-1b visas). Moreover, because some econometric 
studies suggest that most Americans have benefited from immigration,56 it may 
also be tempting for some observers to conclude that Americans gain something 
from the status quo because it provides cheaper labor and lower prices that 
redound to the advantage of both employers and businesses.  
But the benefits from the status quo are not uniformly distributed, and have 
helped create strong dissatisfaction with immigration policy among economic 
actors ranging from technology companies to unions. Even agribusiness, a sector 
that arguably derives some benefit from the cheaper labor costs that 
undocumented immigration makes possible, has strongly pressed for reform 
(through, for example, enactment of the so-called AgJobs legislation addressing 
the unlawful status of certain agricultural workers). The key issue here is not 
whether some Americans benefit from lower labor costs relative to a 
(counterfactual) world with little or no undocumented immigration; it is whether 
the status quo carries economic costs relative to a regime where the 
undocumented population is regularized (and some reform of future flows of 
immigrants occurs). 
This question, in turn, implicates the recurring logic of pluralist division and 
is vigorously present in the sense that parties interested in the economics of the 
labor market have a variety of reactions—and increasingly, those reactions 
disfavor the immigration status quo. Many leading labor groups and business 
interests increasingly express dissatisfaction or outright hostility regarding the 
existing immigration system. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU) rarely agree, but they both staunchly 
criticize the status quo and insist their stakeholder constituents bear high costs as a 
 
55. Cf. Sabrina Isé & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Legal Status and Earnings of Agricultural Workers, 77 AM. 
J. AGRIC. ECON. 375, 386 (1995) (noting that “[a]gricultural workers who work in the United States 
legally earn substantially more per hour and per week than those who are unauthorized to work 
here”). Note also that the research indicating wage increases after legalization suggests fairly clear 
linkages between legal status and wages, even if we consider that many of the workers affected by 
legalization increased their wages by changing their occupations. Such changes can still impact the 
labor market most directly relevant to their previous employers by forcing them to bid up wages. 
56. See BUSH & MCCLARTY, supra note 29, at 3–5; GIOVANNI PERI, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS IN RECESSION AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION (2010), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Peri-June2010.pdf. 
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consequence.57 Businesses seeking greater levels of employment-based migration, 
often though not exclusively clustered in the technology sector, argue that the 
nation’s immigration status quo is a major cost. Employers depending on 
semiskilled labor formed the Coalition for Essential Workers to advocate for a 
regime that entails lower risks (by reducing the amount of unlawful activity) while 
still providing access to foreign workers through legal channels. From a broader 
perspective, some participants in the economy undoubtedly view the existing 
system as imposing some high costs and it is difficult to argue that it represents 
the optimal approach to increasing domestic social welfare.  
It is easy to see, on reflection, how many participants in the economy relying 
on semi-skilled labor could simultaneously face manageable-to-low risks of 
sanctions while still desiring a more regularized, less risky scheme to obtain 
workers at what they consider an acceptable wage. None of these arguments, 
however, settle the more complex empirical question of how much Americans 
gain and lose economically from the existing immigration system. Scholars 
continue to debate this issue, even though it is becoming increasingly clear that 
most native-born workers benefit from our immigration status quo while a smaller 
number of such workers (particularly those lacking a high school education) do 
not benefit. Instead, the preceding discussion of the economic context for 
American immigration laws shows the limitations of the idea that the current 
system, by and large, implements a rational scheme to manage the labor market. 
At a minimum, that assertion raises the question of whose perspective (e.g., large 
or small employers, particular unions, Americans hiring domestic labor, or families 
of the undocumented) counts when defining the nature of rational labor market 
management. 
Democratic Choice and Immigration. The structure and staying power of 
the current scheme are not sufficiently explained by the idea that Americans have, 
at core, chosen their system.58 This idea turns out to be persuasive only if we 
accept the circular notion that the status quo is chosen because it is the product of 
the American system of representative democracy, executive power, and 
administrative governance. Instead, public reactions paint a complicated picture. 
Strong evidence suggests that substantial majorities of the public dislike the 
current scheme—although they often differ on the details. Many surveys depict an 
increasingly hostile trend toward the immigration status quo, and corresponding 
erosion in the public’s trust that the government can address the problem 
effectively (a point to which we return below).59 In some surveys, the public 
 
57. Id. (discussing support among business and labor constituencies for comprehensive 
immigration reform, including legalization of the undocumented). 
58. Cf. Thomas J. Espenshade, Unauthorized Immigrants to the United States, 21 ANN. REV. SOC. 
195, 195 (1995) (noting that the “current level of clandestine US immigration may not be far from 
what society might view as socially optimal.”).  
59. See infra Part III. 
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appears to hold contradictory views about immigration policy, raising the question 
of what explicit choices are reflected in such attitudes.60  
Where survey data do highlight substantial public majorities supporting a 
particular policy change (for example, favoring some form of legalization; or 
seeking lower levels of overall immigration, as well as fewer backlogs), such views 
are often at odds with existing immigration law. Even allowing for question-
framing effects and other complexities in the nature of public opinion about a 
complicated issue, there is little support for the idea that the public is satisfied with 
immigration law and policy. Trends in public responses to immigration policy also 
showcase increasing concern about immigration, rather than a pattern where the 
issue increasingly fades from view as the public comes to accept the present 
arrangement.61 
Some observers have remarked on the possible connection between the large 
number of undocumented immigrants and public perceptions about erosion of the 
rule of law. Indeed, both the increase in media coverage and changing patterns of 
geographic dispersion make it difficult for members of the public to ignore the 
presence of such a large undocumented population. Nonetheless, it is also the case 
that the current immigration status quo turns a vast number of Americans into 
lawbreakers. By creating a requirement to hire legal workers without a workable 
enforcement regime and institutionalizing relatively high costs of compliance for 
all hiring transactions (including household assistance, for example), IRCA 
contributes to a situation where millions of Americans violate federal law by hiring 
undocumented workers. In short, for every undocumented worker, there is an 
employer on the other side of the transaction. With the proportion of household 
help provided by unlawful workers as high as it is and the relative domestic 
burden of compliance, a vast number of Americans are almost certainly failing to 
comply with relevant laws.62 This state of affairs all but certainly impedes what 
John Skrentny has described as the “moral” entrenchment of existing immigration 
 
60. See id. 
61. Such gradual acceptance is often understood to play an important role in entrenching the 
legitimacy of a particular statutory scheme. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 12. The fate 
of the INA, in contrast, has been quite different. See infra Part III. These reactions raise the question 
of whether, over time, the public’s concerns about certain aspects of existing immigration law could 
spread to other domains, such as the existing, relatively unimpeded path from permanent residence to 
citizenship. 
62. See generally MPI TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 3–14 (discussing the proportion of U.S. 
employees who are undocumented); id. at 35 (“[A]n estimated 300,000–350,000 [unauthorized 
immigrants] enter the US labor force [each year]. The overwhelming majority work . . . in the low-
skill, low-wage, low-value-added sectors of the economy. Similarly, although the H-2A program for 
temporary agricultural workers has no caps, the program is deeply underutilized. It is seen as overly 
bureaucratic and unresponsive to employers and it contains few commensurate gains for workers. 
With little enforcement against illegal hiring, there are few incentives to use the program.”); id. at 46 
(discussing the low priority and ineffectiveness of meaningful employer enforcement under the IRCA, 
and stating that “[f]or non-compliant employers, the cost savings from employing illegal labor can 
outweigh the possible cost of sanctions.”). 
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laws.63 
Nor is the current situation fully explained by anxieties about immigration—
whether recently engendered or reflected in episodic historical turns toward 
greater restriction. American immigration policy embodies a limited but significant 
tradition of aperture to immigrants (motivated by foreign policy and other factors) 
incorporated into existing immigration law alongside a heritage of concern about 
new immigrants. Moreover, American immigration law and policy reflects major 
variations in priorities over the last few decades. The 1965 INA amendments 
contrast with the previously enacted status quo by raising visa totals dramatically, 
instituting hemispheric caps, and eliminating racial quotas.64 Further, IRCA’s 
legalization provisions contrast with the 1996 reforms focusing on unauthorized 
migration. Evidence of public attitudes about immigration from 1986 to the 
present show growing public willingness to support harsh immigration measures 
expanding the scope of removable individuals. 
Changing Public Mood. Similarly, the argument that the country has 
simply grown more ideologically conservative since IRCA provides little insight. 
Whether the country has in fact become more conservative, as the term is 
generally understood in discussions of American politics and policymaking, is a 
question that implicates conceptual debate over both the nature of ideological 
labels and methodological issues. Regardless of how one measures the nation’s 
aggregate ideological changes, the direction of immigration policy has long had a 
contested relationship to conventional political ideology. Specifically, many 
interests that are sometimes labeled conservative (in a conventional political sense) 
support larger immigration flows or legalization, while some progressives question 
the impact of immigration on wages or oppose significant policy changes 
including legalization.65 
Any reasonable analyst must acknowledge that politicians have been 
rewarded for keeping in place our overall immigration architecture and ratcheting 
up enforcement. In that sense, Americans have chosen the current system. But 
subtleties soon emerge whenever one juxtaposes the concept of democracy against 
a complex regulatory regime like immigration. The question of what the public 
 
63. See, e.g., John D. Skrentny & Micah Gell-Redman, Comprehensive Immigration Reform and the 
Dynamics of Statutory Entrenchment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 325, 328–29 (Mar. 18, 2011), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/3/18/skrentny-gellredman.html. 
64. See, e.g., Roger Daniels, The Immigration Act of 1965: Intended and Unintended Consequences, in 
HISTORIANS ON AMERICA: DECISIONS THAT MADE A DIFFERENCE 77, 82 (U.S. Dep’t of State 
2008), available at http://www.america.gov/publications/books/historiansonamerica.html (describing 
how the political logic of the 1965 amendments to the INA heavily reflects the idea “that immigration 
policy is a subset of foreign policy and that the monocultural goals of policies laid down in the 1920s 
were inappropriate for a nation seeking global leadership”). 
65. See generally Wendy M. Rahn et al., A Framework for the Study of Public Mood, 17 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 29 (1996) (discussing some of the complexities inherent in assessing the ideology of the 
public’s mood). 
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chooses in a democracy is far more complex than what is implied by axiomatic 
acceptance of the notion that the status quo neatly reveals the public’s 
preferences. In a pluralistic system, stakeholders advocate competing positions 
and the public’s attention is fragmented. Lawmakers, governors, and Presidents 
can garner attention for a variety of reasons, leading some members of the public 
to support candidates with whom they disagree on particular issues. Attitudes can 
be complex or even contradictory, raising the possibility that individuals may 
simultaneously appreciate some details of the current scheme while being 
concerned about the overall system. Leaving aside the issue of how we evaluate 
the public’s views and the relevance of multiple issues in elections, the existence of 
“veto gates” establishing supermajority requirements for policy change all but 
ensure that some statutory schemes will persist long after public views evolve.66  
In the end, immigration is a compelling example of the subtle and sometimes 
strained relationship between public attitudes and policy outcomes. The vast 
majority of the public lacks views about the intricate details of immigration policy, 
even if they have generalized attitudes about the overall system. The salience of 
immigration issues, far from being stable, has been growing over time. Moreover, 
while some individuals and interests benefit from the immigration status quo, a 
large majority of Americans seem to strongly disfavor the present system. These 
features suggest that public reactions about immigration are likely to be one 
important ingredient in explaining the political context in which immigration law 
exists and evolves, but certainly not the only factor that turns far-reaching policy 
goals into an administrative scheme. 
Gridlock. The fact that statutory change is slow and difficult in the United 
States does not sufficiently explain the existing equilibrium either.67 The status quo 
does not reflect a longstanding constitutional requirement.68 History matters in 
explaining how the current system developed, but the word “developed” 
appropriately conveys the presence of important changes creating current 
conditions. The current status quo resulted as much from dramatic statutory 
changes (including, in particular, the 1965 amendments to the INA and the 1986 
IRCA) as from long-term continuity. If we define the modern era as stretching 
from the moment that the core legal architecture of visa caps and worldwide 
immigration was put in place in 1965, it is clear that significant policy change has 
 
66. On the nature and significance of veto gates, see McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of 
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 720 (1992). 
67. For a discussion of some of the institutional factors creating “gridlock” and exacerbating 
the difficulty of broad legislative changes, see generally, DAVID W. BRADY & CRAIG VOLDEN, 
REVOLVING GRIDLOCK (2006). 
68. Neither, it is helpful to remember, did many supermajoritarian requirements that now 
unquestionably have a role in shaping the prospects for legal change. See generally Daniel Carpenter, 
Institutional Strangulation: Bureaucratic Politics and Financial Reform in the Obama Administration, 8 PERSP. ON 
POL. 825 (2010) (using legislative debates over financial regulatory reform to illustrate a broader 
process routinizing the use of once-exceptional procedural devices to slow legislative action). 
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occurred over the last half century. Some of those changes, including the 1980 
Refugee Act, the 1986 IRCA, the 1990 Immigration Act, and the original 1965 
amendments to the INA, reflect policy change in a direction that could be 
described as broadly generous toward immigrants.69 
Even if we examine more recent trends since 1990, the presence of veto—
though not unimportant in the political economy of lawmaking—also neglects to 
explain the continued production of immigration-related statutes and resource 
changes since then.70 These changes do not fundamentally alter the structure of 
the system because they leave in place most of the undocumented population, do 
not change interior enforcement much, and leave future flows unchanged. But 
they showcase the continued capacity of American policymakers to modify 
immigration law and policy in a particular direction even as key features of the 
overall system prove resistant to change.  
In short, while it is almost certainly true that changes in supermajority 
requirements, other things being equal, would have affected recent legislative 
debates about immigration, these constraints have not thwarted far-reaching 
immigration reforms over the last half century.71 The bare invocation of gridlock 
(or even the notion of growing gridlock) also proves unsatisfying as an explanation 
in light of massive statutory changes in domains outside immigration, including 
financial regulatory reform and health insurance reform.72 Finally, explanations 
focused on the existence of gridlock do not offer much detail (beyond simply 
underscoring that statutory gridlock leaves room for presidential action) about 
executive branch incentives with respect to the crucial implementation and gap-
filling functions defining the actual significance of immigration law. If we want to 
explain variations in the production of statutes, we must look beyond the simple 
existence of gridlock and supermajoritarian institutions. 
* * * 
Unquestionably, the lawmaking process in America, and in all pluralist 
democracies, is affected to some extent by cultural or ideological attitudes, 
overarching national or sector-specific economic interests, and institutional 
constraints slowing down statutory change. Each of these factors shapes the 
 
69. See generally ZOLBERG, supra note 24 (discussing major legislative enactments). 
70. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1986). For a 
brief summary of the recently enacted border security bill signed by President Obama, see Julia 
Preston, Obama Signs Border Bill to Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at A10. 
71. Immigration reform would have all but certainly been enacted absent the filibuster in 2007, 
and then again—at least as far as the DREAM Act is concerned—in 2010. See generally Michael 
Barone, Immigration Reform: The New Third Rail, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2010, at A19 (discussing the 
political risks of pursuing substantial statutory reforms of immigration policy for Republican and 
Democratic lawmakers). 
72. Note that in some of these domains, public attitudes and opinions appear to have shifted 
significantly in the course of a particular legislative or policy debate, emphasizing some of the limits of 
static applications of gridlock-oriented models. 
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political economy of lawmaking in general, and immigration in particular. But 
there is more to the story of American immigration law. Statutes are rarely, if ever, 
pure reflections of public attitudes—even attitudes far more monolithic and less 
replete with the subtleties that characterize public reactions to immigration.73 
Statutes are instead produced through institutional mechanisms designed in our 
system to accommodate multiple (and often competing) interests. Such 
fragmentation of interests also raises serious questions about assertions that 
statutes reflect overarching national interests in rational labor market-management 
or rational anything. More relevant is the question of whose interests a particular 
arrangement serves, and (potentially) which constituencies might pay a 
corresponding price. And to say that American policymaking is replete with veto 
gates creating vast “gridlock” regions where the status quo prevents change is 
largely to restate the question of how and when—given those constraints—
statutory schemes change or remain relatively stable. This assertion also says little, 
if anything, about the related question of how the executive branch turns statutes 
into administrative schemes affecting millions or even hundreds of millions. 
If it is difficult to account for the architecture and staying power of 
American immigration law by arguing that Americans have simply chosen it or 
face too many veto points to change it, how else might we explain it? A reasonable 
place to start in our exploration of this situation is with the mechanisms that turn 
immigration laws from dry statutory commands into a more elaborate, organic 
system of administrative regulation and enforcement. The immigration statutes are 
not unique in the extent to which they call for administrative elaboration. Perhaps 
more than many statutory schemes, the immigration system embodies 
contradictions and internal tensions that raise the importance of agency 
implementation. Those choices, along with developments in public attitudes about 
immigration policy that almost certainly included responses to the system itself, go 
a long way toward explaining the nature and persistence of the current American 
system. 
II. IMMIGRATION AS A REGULATORY SYSTEM 
In the late 1990s, enforcement officials were determined to crack down on 
illegal hiring practices despite the statutory limitations of modern immigration 
laws. The sprawling meat processing plants in the nation’s vast Great Plains 
almost inevitably drew their attention. These firms had dramatically changed their 
workforces in less than a decade and were increasingly staffed by relatively low-
 
73. See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 6–9 (1990) 
(Despite the fact that most voters know little about candidates’ policy positions, and few elections 
hinge on those positions, legislators nevertheless obsess over what they anticipate the electoral 
consequences of their decisions to be. Additionally, “[t]hose who have studied the link between 
constituency opinion and legislative decisions have found little evidence to support such a strong 
claim about legislators responding to opinion in their home districts.”). 
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wage Latino workers.74 As agents of the then-INS responded to concerns about 
the hiring of undocumented workers in the meat packing industry, they sought 
production of I-9 documents for tens of thousands of workers in Nebraska meat 
processing facilities before embarking on a similar effort in other states.75 The 
paperwork associated with thousands of workers exhibited irregularities, and as 
federal agents further scrutinized the situation, vast numbers of the relevant 
workers left the meat packing plants. The employers then reported widespread 
labor disruptions,76 and both state and federal politicians condemned the program 
energetically enough to stop it.77 
Any useful account of the modern American immigration system needs to 
explain why Operation Vanguard collapsed under its own weight even as many 
lawmakers and members of the public claimed to seek more aggressive 
enforcement. Such outcomes underscore the reality that immigration is a 
regulatory system, defined as much by its pervasive similarity to other areas as it is 
by the issue’s distinctive multidimensionality and cultural stakes. The discretion 
lodged in DHS to initiate removal proceedings holds considerable importance.78 
Yet the anodyne language of judicial opinions rarely, if ever, acknowledges the 
complexities agencies face in applying such discretion. As a regulatory domain 
simultaneously shaping labor markets, perceptions of security, and the scope of 
the national community, immigration policy affects a vast array of economic, 
political, and social interests. Those interests, in turn, work through several layers 
of institutions and a larger public context to shape policy outcomes. A country’s 
approach to immigration is a major feature of its national architecture, defining 
the scope of a national community as well as functional issues of economic 
consequences and security-related concerns.  
Just as multiple constituencies ranging from high-technology executives to 
farmworkers are affected by immigration policy outside the government, different 
players share power over immigration within the public sector. A swelling number 
of border patrol agents and their supervisors play a part in a system also affected 
by interior enforcement officials, lawmakers authorizing new immigration laws, 
appropriators controlling the financial spigot to immigration bureaucracies, and 
executive officials working against the backdrop of an increasingly engaged public. 
 
74. See Dell Champlin & Eric Hake, Immigration as Industrial Strategy in American Meatpacking, 18 
REV. POL. ECON. 49 (2006). 
75. See Matt Kelley, INS Is Staunch on Crackdown: Operation Vanguard Is Successful and Will Be 
Expanded, an Agency Official Tells Congress, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, July 2, 1999, at 1. 
76. See Nelson Says INS Operation Draining State’s Labor Pool, LINCOLN J. STAR, June 4, 1999, at B2. 
77. See id. (discussing politicians’ opposition to the INS operation); After Vanguard, Plan Next 
Trial Somewhere Else, LINCOLN J. STAR, Aug. 28, 1999, at B6 (discussing the widespread criticism of 
Operation Vanguard); Art Hovey, Panel Calls for Changes Immigration Issues: Task Force Tackles INS 
Crackdown, LINCOLN J. STAR, Oct. 17, 2000, at A1 (discussing how Operation Vanguard was 
suspended and placed under review by INS Commissioner Doris Meissner). 
78. See Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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Because immigration law’s complex statutory and regulatory structure is not the 
product of a single economic or political ingredient, understanding immigration 
law requires us to investigate the factors structuring the relationships among these 
actors.79 
We will see that immigration law’s role as yet another body of regulatory law 
proves at least as important as the uniqueness of the immigration issue. To a 
considerable extent, immigration law is forged in the same cauldron of lawmakers, 
institutions, agency officials, political reactions, and stakeholder interests that 
produces policies involving public health, national security, taxes, or criminal 
justice. Because immigration is capable of affecting the economic and political 
fortunes of multiple stakeholders in a pluralist democracy, it can trigger political 
reactions reminiscent of those arising in other domains. To understand 
immigration, we must contend with its distinctiveness as well as its similarities to 
problems arising in alternative domains. 
A. Shaping the System: Lawmakers, Implementers, Interests, and the Public  
Because immigration policy is first and foremost regulatory policy, it 
implicates conflict and competition. Agency officials, businesses, lawmakers, and 
other political actors engage in fights over agency autonomy, legal interpretation, 
and political economy common to other forms of regulation. Rules governing 
visas, border enforcement, and interior investigations represent more than merely 
a static bargain negotiated among competing interests. Migrants carry with them 
the potential to define both the very essence of a society as well as its outer limits. 
As such, the stakes in immigration policy implicate a variety of complex 
motivations. And the system has evolved in intricate ways in response to 
distinctive feedback relationships reflecting the responses of elites and the public 
to each other. But no account can make sense of an important regulatory system 
such as immigration without taking account of the relevant interests. 
As with public health or environmental regulation, stakeholders have 
considerable economic and political interests at stake when it comes to controlling 
migration. As with criminal justice, the public rarely understands a variety of 
complexities, but has strong opinions on the subject. As with other intricate 
domains of legal regulation, then, immigration implicates compromises rooted in a 
pluralist political system. Agencies can fragment and reflect different priorities 
given pressure from labor unions, domestic law enforcement agencies, large 
employers, and civil rights organizations representing recent immigrants. 
 
79. Although the United States offers a unique legal, geographic, and political context, 
immigration has the potential to trigger similarly contentious debates in other advanced industrialized 
democracies. See ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 449–50 (“As I have emphasized throughout, the debates 
that immigration provokes are especially contentious because they implicate disparate spheres of 
concerns and interests, and also involve both domestic and external policy considerations.”); Freeman 
& Birrell, supra note 36, 532–36 (discussing the experience of Australia). 
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Businesses are likely to contest vigorous enforcement. Minimizing the far-reaching 
influence of such pressure is akin to arguing that immigration, despite its 
enormous economic, political, and social stakes, is sharply different from the vast 
array of regulatory contexts where politics and organizations play a critical role in 
legal implementation.  
Organized interests shape not only the implementation of regulatory laws, 
but also their content. Even as lawmakers scramble to respond to district-specific 
concerns, their political fortunes and constraints are heavily affected by regional 
and national advocacy organizations, businesses, labor groups, and related 
constituencies.80 Indeed, the pluralist character of American legislative politics may 
tend to engender not only competition between constituencies who want to 
protect immigrants and organizations determined to limit immigration flows, but 
also the consequences of shifting alliances resulting between either of those 
constituencies and interests seeking primarily to reap economic rewards from 
immigrant labor.  
The otherwise noteworthy distinctions in the roots of those interests—only 
some of which involve explicit economic or material goals—are not as critical at 
this juncture as is recognizing that, for all its differences, immigration bears some 
similarity to tax policy or economic regulation. Competition among interests 
hardly implies that agencies are “captured,” a far more specific claim that refers to 
the eliding of contingent factors which drives the capacity of agencies to achieve a 
measure of independence.81 Deeper ideological reactions or psychological 
processes may also play a major role in issues seen by the public as a bellwether of 
the nation’s culture and future direction.82 
 
80. Lawmakers’ interactions with interest groups take place, moreover, in a setting where 
institutional rules play a critical role in shaping policy outcomes for regulatory systems such as those 
implicated in immigration policy. In a system where policymaking is multidimensional (and, indeed, 
even if the legislature focused exclusively on writing immigration laws, the following section unpacks 
the multidimensionality of this issue), and lawmakers are elected locally from heterogeneous districts, 
there is essentially no single, predictable relationship between voter preferences and policy outcomes 
that does not depend on institutional rules. See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Political Institutions 
and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7 (2003). 
81. For a discussion of those factors, at least in the context of public health, see Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar, Coalitions, Autonomy, and Regulatory Bargains in Public Health Law, in PREVENTING 
CAPTURE (Daniel Carpenter et al. eds., forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Cuéllar, Coalitions]. 
82. Cultural conflict matters, and issues vary in terms of the intensity of cultural conflict they 
provoke. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere et al.., Purple America, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 97 (2006) 
(acknowledging divergent public reactions to social issues compared to economic issues and 
recognizing the significance of social issues even in a larger political environment where reactions to 
economic issues have a stronger effect). At least some studies, for example, suggest that reactions to 
undocumented immigrants are driven in part by respondents’ perceived cultural affinity with the 
unauthorized migrants. See, e.g., Thomas J. Espenshade & Charles A. Calhoun, An Analysis of Public 
Opinion Toward Undocumented Immigration, 12 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 189 (1993). For an 
interesting discussion of the relationship between elite polarization on cultural issues and reactions 
among the larger public, see Ryan L. Claassen & Benjamin Highton, Policy Polarization Among Party 
Elites and the Significance of Political Awareness in the Mass Public, 62 POL. RES. Q. 538 (2009) (increasing 
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Public reactions to issues with an intense cultural or social dimension, 
moreover, can interact with the strategies of interested parties whose strategic 
repertoire can include mobilization of the public. At core, however, if businesses 
have something to gain from (say) a new regulatory approach to one of America’s 
few existing temporary work programs, they will fight for their preferred 
outcome.83 Where the recent history of immigration law is concerned, organized 
interests have had a lot to say, even with the longstanding potential (increasingly 
realized) for greater concern about immigration among the larger public.84 Given 
the significant consequences of regulation, the enforcement of regulatory rules is 
also an all but inevitably contested arena. Contrary to strong versions of the 
“regulatory capture” thesis popular among some political economy scholars and 
observers of the policy process, economic interests often vigorously contest 
regulatory enforcement. Sometimes, they succeed.85 In the immigration context, 
witness some of the forces driving the demise of Operation Vanguard,86 or the 
relatively weak requirements for obtaining approval of H-1b temporary visa 
petitions often made by large corporations.87 
The success of organized interests in any policymaking domain must 
contend, however, with the possibility of intense public reactions capable of 
reshaping the policymaking environment. The influential literature on “policy 
feedback” in political science addresses one aspect of the political economy of 
statutory and policy entrenchment, whereby policy changes create their own 
 
elite polarization on cultural issues involving race, social welfare policy, and abortion is associated 
with growing polarization among survey respondents with high levels of political information). 
83. Such conflict plays out against a status quo offering a limited number of employment-
based and temporary worker visas, and imposing administrative costs on employers seeking to make 
use of such visas. See ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32044, IMMIGRATION: 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS (2010). 
84. Interests and coalitions, and not just longstanding cultural or social reactions, play a major 
role in shaping immigration law. For a discussion of the role of political interests and coalitions in the 
development of the 1965 Immigration Act, see generally ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 337–82. An 
insightful summary of the role of economic interests in shaping IRCA and the potential for temporary 
worker arrangements is found in Daniel J. Tichenor, The Politics of Immigration Reform in the United States, 
1981–1990, 26 POLITY 333 (1994). See also John A. Clark & Jerome S. Legge, Jr., Economics, Racism, and 
Attitudes Toward Immigration in the New Germany, 50 POL. RES. Q. 901 (1997) (arguing, on the basis of 
survey results comparing Germans from different regions, that economic concerns explain policy 
attitudes in the former German Democratic Republic). 
85. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 68 (discussing organized interests’ approach to diluting 
financial regulatory reform, including efforts to weaken the statutory bases for subsequent regulatory 
enforcement); John T. Scholz & Feng Heng Wei, Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System, 80 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 1249 (1986) (discussing how state occupational safety activities respond to contact 
with interest groups). 
86. See supra notes 74–77 (describing the context, nature, and fate of Operation Vanguard). 
87. See generally Sabrina Underwood, Note, Achieving the American Daydream: The Social, Economic, 
and Political Inequalities Experienced by Temporary Workers Under the H-1B Visa Program, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 727 (2001) (describing the H-1B visa program and the American Competitiveness in the 21st 
Century Act of 2000 that increased the number of H-1B visas for 2001–2003). 
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political responses and support.88 In underappreciated respects, this literature may 
shed important light on the fate of immigration. In particular, some of this 
literature underscores the extent to which public perceptions play an important 
role in the trajectory of public policy in a democracy.89 For example, members of 
the public whose lives are positively affected by new health or environmental 
regulations that are effectively administered can mobilize constituencies that 
would not have supported the original legislative package.  
At the same time, the public’s role in influencing policymaking can create 
strategic dilemmas for politicians, as they consider what appeals they will make to 
the public or how (for example) patterns of enforcement facilitate (or hinder) 
politicians’ decisions to focus on particular aspects of an issue. In other cases, 
exogenous developments might initially change the distribution of public attention 
focused on an issue, thereby affecting the political context even if the public’s 
underlying substantive views on the issue remain largely unchanged. By 
investigating the role of the public (and its potential reactions to enforcement 
patterns), we could also shed light on whether forms of “policy feedback” not 
commonly described in the literature could arise. In particular, it is possible that 
greater public attention—far from either entrenching and legitimizing a statutory 
compromise or failing to bring attention to it—could also bring attention to an 
issue without legitimizing the statute in question.90 
If interests and reactions outside government are all but certain to go a long 
 
88. Policy feedback might be understood as one potentially significant element in explaining 
the evolution of policy, particularly in a democracy. E.g., E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, 
PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF 288 (Schuyler C. Wallace ed., 1935) (coining the phrase that “new 
policies create a new politics”). More recent works provide a more systematic treatment of policy 
feedback. For two seminal works, see DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 1990), and THEDA 
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS (1992). For an interesting explanation of policy 
feedback in the context of the GI Bill, see Suzanne Mettler, Bringing the State Back In to Civic 
Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 351 
(2002). See also Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Pierson, Increasing Returns] (demonstrating that “increasing returns” 
(positive feedback) processes are likely to be prevalent, and can provide a more rigorous framework 
for developing some of the key claims described in historical institutionalism scholarship). 
89. A useful overview of the theoretical terrain (and some of the gaps that remain) can be 
found in Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change, 45 WORLD POL. 
595, 610 (1993) [hereinafter Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause] (“Policies do create powerful packages 
of resources and incentives that influence the positions of interest groups, government elites, and 
individual social actors in politically consequential ways.”). 
90. Plainly, changing attitudes can affect policy developments, a phenomenon sometimes 
obscured by the fact that policymakers also shape attitudes. For an insightful effort to disentangle 
both dynamics (while also acknowledging the strategic consequences of the potential feedback 
relationship between them), see BRANDICE CANES-WRONE, WHO LEADS WHOM? PRESIDENTS, 
POLICY, AND THE PUBLIC (Susan Herbst & Benjamin I. Page eds., 2006). What has received less 
attention is the potential for the implementation of statutory compromises to affect the environment 
in which attitudes develop and (through some version of “policy feedback”) the further evolution of 
those compromises. 
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way toward explaining how regulation evolves, the organization of public 
authority within government is also critical. The organizational context can help 
policy remain in place, as with the long resistance of the U.S. Department of 
Defense and its services to legislative reform of the combatant commander 
structure.91 Organizations and their leaders can also affect the costs and benefits 
of executive action, by building coalitions with lawmakers and seeking to 
undermine executive decisions that they reject.92 Organizations can also mobilize 
to change existing policies, as epitomized by the role of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in reshaping its jurisdiction in response to changing economic 
conditions and the rising power of the trucking industry.93 In addition, poor 
organizational reputation could damage the prospect for substantive legal changes 
that depend on (or at least on the perception of) competence and effectiveness on 
the part of the relevant public agencies.94 
Since organizations matter, so can the fragmentation of authority across 
them. Hierarchical organizations with few constraints and preeminent authority 
over a particular function, such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) in relation to measures involving restrictions on travel, are bound to 
operate quite differently from those that must share power over a domain of 
public activity with other players. Simple trade-offs rarely exist in this context, of 
course, as unifying one mission (e.g., infrastructure security, by placing the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)) fragments another (transportation policy).95 Whatever 
the original prescriptive or political rationale for splitting up power among 
multiple bureaus, the resulting organizational fragmentation can carry costs such 
as making policymaking (and policy implementation) more difficult.96 
Organizations are thus central players in the political economy of legal 
implementation. Between efforts to accommodate the competing goals of multiple 
bureaucracies and the differing views held by organizations with distinct expertise 
 
91. See generally AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN 131–35 (1999) (describing how 
presidential reform was thwarted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff design). 
92. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 217 (1989); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing” 
the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
587, 654 (2009) [hereinafter Cuéllar, Securing] (“Across the constellation of interests within and around 
an agency, it remains possible that some players will be all too aware of an agency’s potential capacity 
to acquire a greater measure of autonomy over time, as it builds an external constituency of support 
or acquires an ever stronger reputation for technical competence.”). 
93. See generally LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, REGULATION, ORGANIZATIONS, AND 
POLITICS (1994) (describing the evolution of Interstate Commerce Commission motor freight policy 
in response to changes within the trucking industry). 
94. This is a major implication of Daniel Carpenter’s magisterial account of the evolution of 
the FDA. See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER (Ira Katznelson et al. eds., 2010). 
95. See generally Cuéllar, Securing, supra note 92, at 653 (discussing the inevitable prescriptive 
trade-offs in organizing the bureaucracy). 
96. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 92, at 257–58, 267–71 (agency fragmentation raises the 
difficulty and costs of coordination). 
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and value commitments, then, fragmentation may create at least two 
consequences: (1) a “transaction cost” on policymaking that, in an ideal world, 
would implicate coordination across agencies (e.g., enforcement plus adjudication 
plus prosecution coordination); and (2) questions about the capacity of the 
President to tightly control immigration policy.97 
B. Shaping the Context: Immigration Law’s Multidimensionality 
The more specific immigration-related context is just as important, 
particularly in one crucial respect. No single prescriptive ideal or goal defines the 
immigration issue. Instead, the social context in which immigration law is written 
and implemented is likely to reflect at least three different dimensions, where elite 
and public concerns straddle the divide between cultural and more conventional 
policy concerns. This multidimensionality thus yields a more complex debate 
relative to a variety of more conventional regulatory domains. 
First, immigration has powerful effects on the labor market. Although most 
Americans appear to benefit from these effects, not everyone does. Immigration 
probably also bears some relationship to society’s capacity for innovation—a 
dynamic that may be partly rooted in immigration’s relationship to diverse skill-
sets and approaches to economic activity (as recognized in some econometric 
analyses of immigration’s impact on the labor market). Although we are not close 
to understanding all substantial questions regarding immigration’s (conventional) 
economic impact, it is relatively easy to appreciate immigration’s far-reaching 
consequences as an economic issue, and thereby its potential to shape broader 
public reactions to economic and social policy.98  
Second, immigration and its closely related domain of border security clearly 
have an impact on Americans’ perceptions of security, and, at the margin, on the 
country’s broader instrumental security agenda.99 The dilemmas associated with 
regulating terrorist mobility are an example. Absolute control over the mobility of 
individuals engaged in terrorist activity (or very likely to be, on the basis of strong, 
justifiable suspicion) is all but impossible. But what is possible depends 
substantially on immigration policy, particularly in a relatively open society that 
 
97. Contrast this view with that advanced (admittedly with at least a few caveats) in Cox & 
Rodríguez, supra note 14. There, they argue that perhaps the single most significant underappreciated 
feature of American immigration law is the critical role of the President in controlling immigration 
(largely through ex post facto discretionary enforcement). Id. at 528. But organizational 
fragmentation—plus pressures involving public and lawmaker reactions—could squelch that control 
or at least severely limit it. Id. at 537–38. 
98. See, e.g., Ann-Helén Bay & Axel West Pedersen, The Limits of Social Solidarity: Basic Income, 
Immigration and the Legitimacy of the Universal Welfare State, 49 ACTA SOC. 419 (2006). 
99. For a helpful overview of some of the terrain, see generally Christopher Rudolph, Security 
and the Political Economy of International Migration, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 603 (2003) (describing how 
migration affects the security of advanced industrial states and how the security environment shapes 
the way states deal with international migration). 
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values limits on the scope of internal surveillance and policing. Not surprisingly, 
the larger public often (though certainly not always) views immigration through a 
security lens—and this pattern varies over time. 
Finally, immigration, at its core, is a means through which we delimit 
national communities in a world where laws and societies are defined—at least in 
principle—by the scope of the nation-state.100 This dimension implicates not only 
concerns about the stability and reach of legal arrangements (and, consequently, 
potential concern about the efficacy of those arrangements in the face of larger 
global forces) but also reactions (sometimes subtle and less than fully conscious) 
to demographic and cultural change. As a descriptive matter, capacity to accept 
demographic and cultural change is neither infinite nor is it uniformly distributed 
across a large and diverse country such as the United States.101 
These factors reflect differing dynamics and interests relevant to immigration 
law. Because recessions, security concerns, and demographic change have 
activated concerns in all three domains over the last few years, Americans have 
become increasingly concerned about the nature of their immigration policy in 
recent years (though not necessarily about immigration as such). As Figures 1 and 
2 reflect, news coverage of immigration has increased dramatically over the last 
three decades. Particularly striking is the proportion of news coverage focused on 
border issues. Such news coverage, in turn, coincides with public reactions 
reflecting swelling national concerns about immigration.102 Demographic change 
means larger undocumented populations are moving into parts of the country 
with less of a history of large-scale recent (Latino) immigration, turning policy 
disputes about migration into increasingly national concerns. With these 
considerations in mind, we can turn to assessing the details of immigration law’s 
evolution and implementation in recent decades. 
  
 
100. See ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 11 (describing “the [formal] organization of the world into a 
congeries of mutually exclusive sovereign states, commonly referred to as the ‘Westphalian system’”). 
101. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 4 (1983). The Report notes: 
We see evidence that if the newcomers to a community do not excessively disrupt or 
change the attributes of the community which make it familiar to its residents and uniquely 
their “home” . . . then the newcomers may well be welcome, especially if they make 
positive contributions to the community’s economic and general well-being. On the other 
hand, it is seen that if the newcomers remain “foreign,” they may not be welcome, 
especially if they seek to carve out separate enclaves to embrace only their own language 
and culture and if their numbers and the areas of the community which they directly affect 
are great. This should not be so in the “ideal” world, but it is real.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
102. Francine Segovia & Renatta Defever, American Public Opinion on Immigrants and Immigration 
Policy, 74 PUB. OPINION Q. 375, 393 (2010) (“Spanning what will now be over a decade, public 
opinion on immigration indicates an increasing lack of confidence in U.S. leaders’ abilities to address 
immigration issues.”). 
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Figure 1: Yearly Count of Major Newspaper Articles Mentioning Immigration 
Issues in the Title103 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of Total Congressional Hearings and Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac Articles Focused on Immigration, 1960–2009104 
 
103. Headlines were compiled from the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and 
USA Today (accessed through Westlaw database). 
104. POLICY AGENDAS PROJECT, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN (search of 
Congressional Hearing and Congressional Quarterly Almanac databases, 1960–2009), available at 
http://policyagendas.org/page/trend-analysis. 
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III. THE INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF THE IMMIGRATION STATUS QUO 
From legislative action to agency enforcement choices, the broad evolution 
of immigration law and policy since the mid-1980s bears out the institutional story 
described above, and goes quite a distance toward explaining some of the 
limitations and contradictions bedeviling the American immigration system. As we 
will see, that system avoided crucial trade-offs, hastening what can only be 
described as a considerable degree of statutory dysfunction. The constraints built 
into the system, in turn, were exacerbated by organizational problems and limited 
presidential control and have become, ironically, more difficult to change as public 
concern about immigration has grown in response to demographic changes and to 
some of the structural problems with the system itself. 
By leveraging the multiple political economies just discussed as well as some 
of the uniquely multidimensional features of immigration, the following account 
goes a long way toward explaining why changes in immigration policy have run 
into increasing difficulty as the years since IRCA stretch into decades. Put simply, 
the problem is not merely the role of veto gates creating institutional gridlock, but 
rather a combination of continued opposition from politically significant 
stakeholders, pervasive employer-based enforcement, and diminishing public 
legitimacy which together make large-scale change easier to undermine. The next 
part takes a closer look at the factors that can help us better understand the 
relationship between a complex statutory scheme and the administrative process 
that gives it relevance.  
A. Statutory Dysfunction: Statutory Bargains Built on Contradictions 
If ever a competition discriminated among statutes on the basis of how 
loudly they send mixed messages, surely IRCA would merit a gold medal. At the 
same time that IRCA enshrined in American law an explicit new employer 
responsibility to avoid hiring undocumented workers, the statute embodied a 
regime of enforcement and verification that seemed only a few small steps 
removed from what someone might have designed to make the law fail. If IRCA 
visibly failed to deliver what it promised, the INA’s visa allocation scheme—
constituting the backdrop for IRCA and subsequent rounds of immigration 
lawmaking—also came up short, although perhaps in subtler and more complex 
ways. 
But the challenges associated with immigration statutes go well beyond the 
employer sanctions system inaugurated by IRCA, and it is helpful to understand 
some of the limitations built into the broader immigration system before revisiting 
employer sanctions. Immigration flows reflect a variety of changing domestic and 
international conditions, some of which are in principle relevant to the 
institutional design of immigration laws. Yet very little flexibility is built into the 
American system for allocating visas. Country quotas often result in both waits 
exceeding a decade for many categories (particularly family-based visas), as well as 
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a small number of employment-based visas, which are allocated through a 
cumbersome process primarily involving employers.105 The INA includes strict 
constraints on most aspects of agency substantive regulatory policymaking, 
forcing agencies to explore far more limited and imperfect options involving 
enforcement-related changes (many of which are not implemented through rules 
or even explicit enforcement guidelines).  
A good example is found in the structure of the INA provisions governing 
family-based immigrant admissions following the Immigration Act of 1990. Rather 
than addressing concerns about backlogs and flexibility by repealing the ceiling for 
family-based visas (or allowing an agency to change the ceiling pursuant to certain 
conditions), Congress instead established an elaborate formula found in INA 
section 201(c). Under that arrangement, the statute establishes a floor for family-
based preference categories (a minimum of just under 230,000 spaces each 
year).106 Whenever total family admissions (including those that are not capped) 
exceed 480,000 in a single year, the guaranteed floor overrides the ceiling that 
would otherwise be applicable for the succeeding fiscal year (thus ensuring that 
uncapped family categories do not entirely preclude admission of a minimum 
number of individuals in capped family visa categories). In a similar vein, recent 
policy regarding temporary visas, epitomized by the H-1b program, involve 
compromises that please virtually no one—the program meets short-term 
employer needs yet denies employers the benefit of recipients’ accumulated 
experience because they are forced to leave. In this manner, labor and similar 
constituencies are placated with pro forma administrative procedures putatively 
designed to protect American jobs that raise costs and increase delays with little 
consequence.107 
This very pattern contrasts with the degree of substantive flexibility agencies 
routinely receive in other regulatory contexts. In the context of illegal drug policy, 
relevant federal statutes provide the Attorney General with authority to 
temporarily “schedule” (e.g., establish criminal penalties associated with the 
distribution of) a drug if “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public 
safety.”108 Other examples abound, in domains ranging from air pollution 
regulation to occupational safety.109 Even among domains that involve more 
circumscribed delegations of authority to agencies than those spawning colorable 
nondelegation claims, agencies are rarely subjected to the type of constraints so 
 
105. For a discussion of the relative rigidity in the system and the potential policy 
consequences of modifying such a scheme, see MPI TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 22. 
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2009). 
107. See Underwood, supra note 87. 
108. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2004). 
109. Two of many other examples include the legislative authority to establish National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act, discussed in Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), and provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act at issue in 
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
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common in immigration.110 With lawmakers exhibiting continued reluctance to 
write statutes conferring widespread formal discretion to agencies and executive 
branch officials on decisions regarding such a politically sensitive subject, the 
executive branch ends up with relatively limited capacity to adapt legal provisions 
to changing objective conditions and public demands.111 
Plainly, greater flexibility in allocating visas is not guaranteed to end unlawful 
migration. The precise elasticity of demand for undocumented immigration 
relative to changes in legal migration opportunities is difficult to anticipate 
precisely. That said, we can learn something from the history of the Bracero 
program in the 1960s. When the program was abruptly terminated and quotas 
were imposed on Western hemisphere migration, businesses turned in vast 
numbers to hiring undocumented workers, which in turn helped establish the 
pattern of illicit migration.112 Historical examples of this type suggest the extent to 
which lawful and illegal migration are (imperfect) substitutes for each other, and 
highlight the trade-offs and incentives potential migrants face as they contemplate 
their choices.113 Other things being equal, it probably makes sense to presume that 
potential migrants would probably prefer safer legal migration opportunities to 
illicit ones. Employers who are weighing the value of making a concerted effort to 
hire legal workers might confront a similar calculus. Sensitivity to the potential 
risks of illicit crossing (particularly as the danger involved changes) is certainly 
consistent with undocumented migrants’ increasing unwillingness to risk crossing 
 
110. For an overview of a variety of statutory domains that evolved over time largely in 
response to relatively flexible grants of statutory authority to agencies, see ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, 
supra note 12. 
111. At least in the short term, this trend bodes poorly for efforts seeking to address structural 
problems in immigration law through creation of an executive branch agency or independent 
commission with the power to make substantial adjustments in the availability of visas. The historical 
pattern suggests extreme congressional reluctance to create such an entity, and even if such an effort 
succeeded, it would almost certainly face substantial congressional pressure unless lawmakers were 
persuaded that the public would not hold them accountable for the new entity’s decisions. See MPI 
TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 42 (developing a proposal for an independent commission); Cristina 
M. Rodríguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE 
L.J. 1787 (2010). For further discussion on delegation, see infra Part V.A. 
112. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS (2002). 
113. The experiences of migrants in South Korea in past decades provide another example of 
how migrants choose between lawful and unlawful status given a variety of constraints and incentives. 
Temporary workers were given “trainee” visas to enter the country, but soon discovered they could 
make more money as undocumented workers and began working illegally. See Wang-Bae Kim, 
Migration of Foreign Workers into South Korea: From Periphery to Semi-Periphery in the Global Labor Market, 44 
ASIAN SURV. 316, 324 (2004) (“The primary reason for deviance from the original contract [to work 
only in jobs authorized for “trainee” visas] lies in the simple reality that these workers are able to 
make more money through illegal work.”). For an informative discussion of the trade-offs involved in 
designing policies, including temporary migration opportunities, to manage the demand for migration, 
see GORDON H. HANSON, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3–8 (2009). These experiences and challenges illustrate the 
importance of program design details in any framework seeking to deploy changes in legal migration 
as a means of discouraging unauthorized workers. 
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the U.S.-Mexico border in the context of circular migration.114 Moreover, the 
marginal benefit that residents of other countries expect to realize from emigrating 
varies, so there’s no reason to expect that allocating (for example) two or three 
times as many U.S. visas to Mexicans would immediately generate a two or 
threefold increase in the overall willingness of Mexicans to emigrate to the United 
States (thereby maintaining the pre-existing ratio of legal visas to overall demand).  
It is admittedly difficult to evaluate the precise injury to immigration law’s 
legitimacy arising from the visa allocation scheme. The consequences of those 
compromises, however, are unlikely to bolster Americans’ opinions of the efficacy 
and legitimacy of their immigration policy. The public’s opinions are affected by 
the baseline expectations set by policymakers, elites, legal proceedings, and the 
media. In multiple ways, these sources emphasized the expectation that the 
country’s southern border could be relatively easily “secured” in the sense that—
despite the existence of Western Hemisphere quotas after 1965 and a labor market 
thirsty for semiskilled labor from Latin America—little or no illicit immigration 
would occur. The combination of physical proximity to an attractive labor market, 
visa overstays (which even today make up well over a third of all undocumented 
immigrants), and limits on legal migration opportunities for semiskilled workers 
from Latin America made it difficult to deliver on converging expectations about 
border control. Missing these nuances, some modern observers describe the 
problem in terms of “regaining” control of the borders without recognizing the 
extent to which the new dynamics create a novel and important challenge for the 
country.115 
Meanwhile, the undocumented population has crept steadily upward.116 At 
the same time, employers with strong interests in hiring immigrants (particularly 
ones with specific skills) have been constantly at loggerheads with civil servants 
and labor organizations in a process that increases the administrative costs of such 
hires while rarely changing the number of available visas. This process has also 
 
114. See Douglas S. Massey, Borderline Madness: America’s Counterproductive Immigration Policy, in 
DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129, 135–36 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007) (discussing the sensitivity of 
migrants to the costs and benefits of illicit border crossing). The threats associated with illicit 
migration may arise from migrants’ desire to avoid heavily policed, formerly attractive locations for 
border crossing by attempting to cross in the desert. Migrants may also encounter risks as organized 
criminal groups become increasingly involved in alien smuggling. See supra Part I.A (discussing the 
potential for increased interest in alien smuggling from organized criminal networks as the real price 
of border crossing increases). 
115. Compare Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., The Borders We Deserve, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at A25 
(noting that progress on immigration is only possible “if America first regains control of its southern 
border”), with Edward Alden & Peter Andreas, Letter to the Editor, The Big Picture Beyond Arizona’s 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at WK7 (“[C]alls to ‘regain’ control of the border suffer from 
historical amnesia, perpetrating a common myth that it was ever actually under control.”). 
116. See generally JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CENTER REPORT, 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1–31 (2011). 
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given rise to a process that poorly serves its stated purpose and almost certainly 
engenders cynicism about immigration policy. 
IRCA was not built to solve these problems. By the mid-1980s, the relatively 
high undocumented population and the politics of congressional compromise all 
but guaranteed that any new legislation would include a considerable emphasis on 
enforcement. Few thoughtful observers expected success in controlling illicit 
migration through an exclusive focus on border enforcement. Lawmakers and the 
Reagan Administration thus incorporated a new employer sanctions regime in 
even the earliest version of the principal immigration reform bill then being 
discussed. In retrospect, the move toward greater employer responsibility in 
immigration policy was at least as historically significant as the IRCA legalization 
program. Throughout the nation’s past trajectory, employers had avoided such 
responsibilities. When lawmakers had previously enacted laws criminalizing the 
harboring of unlawful immigrants, a “Texas proviso” clarified that any such 
harboring offense did not encompass the mere existence of an employment 
relationship.117 Even as the Texas proviso was eliminated in IRCA, the new 
reforms soon came to reflect the contested nature of regulatory policy. The 
resulting scheme was one that accommodated employers’ considerable influence, 
while nonetheless creating a set of requirements that allowed policymakers to 
herald a new era in immigration law. 
In effect, IRCA established a framework that rendered vast tracts of labor 
market activity unlawful, including employer activity that was not previously 
unlawful. At the same time, lawmakers coupled this ambitious change in the scope 
of labor market regulation with a rickety, easy to evade system that drastically 
limited enforcement. Far from being strictly liable for hiring unauthorized 
workers, or even being subject to a simple negligence standard, meaningful 
sanctions only kicked in if employers had knowledge of their worker’s unlawful 
status. Given the relevant procedural and substantive limitations, neither the 
conventional penalties, nor the harsher “pattern or practice” provisions, provided 
a simple means of enforcing IRCA’s requirements. Nor did courts interpret the 
relevant provisions in ways that would have systematically eased the authorities’ 
burdens when enforcing the law.118 Employers could avail themselves of a “good 
faith” exception if they had otherwise followed the requirements of IRCA, which 
included simply examining required identity documents to determine if they 
appeared valid.  
Hence, instead of providing incentives for the reporting of information to 
authorities and routine monitoring, IRCA’s most severe penalties (and even these 
were relatively meager) were reserved for willful violations that were difficult to 
 
117. See ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR 121 (2004). 
118. See Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 553–56 (9th Cir. 1991) (A valid finding 
of “constructive knowledge” requires, for example, lower-level managers to have actual information 
of an employee’s ineligibility to work.). 
Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete) 4/17/2012  1:22 PM 
40 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:1 
 
prove. At the same time that it gave immigration authorities the staggering task of 
policing tens of millions of businesses, IRCA left the agency little flexibility to 
dramatically heighten penalty levels to a degree that could have changed 
businesses’ expected utility calculations in an environment where the probability 
of detection was low.119 Kitty Calavita reviews how IRCA constituted a “reversal 
of the long-standing laissez-faire policy” that previously governed low- and 
semiskilled immigration to the United States. Moreover, she notes, “[E]mployer 
violations are widespread and . . . the continued hiring of undocumented workers 
is a direct consequence of the high benefits that employers derive from this source 
of cheap labor, coupled with the low risks associated with this ‘white-collar 
crime.’”120 At a minimum, certain tensions were built into the statutory scheme in 
light of the mismatch between the public expectations IRCA helped cement 
(regarding the extent of legal regulation of labor markets) and the limited tools the 
public sector received to achieve these goals.121 Those tensions could become 
even worse if resources for interior enforcement eroded—a subject addressed in 
detail below.  
Admitting defeat is politically risky for agency leaders. If the Federal Drug 
Administration (FDA) is not likely to convey its inability to inspect the vast array 
of food processing establishments under its jurisdiction and the FBI is scarcely 
about to simply accept the difficult odds it faces in disrupting some terrorist plots, 
neither are immigration officials eager to convey the full range of difficulties they 
face in implementing their responsibilities. If anything, those risks are greatest just 
as the agency prepares to implement a major new statutory responsibility. So it is 
not surprising that immigration authorities’ first response to their daunting task 
was to assert the existence of widespread compliance. Early in the history of 
IRCA, law enforcers claimed widespread compliance on the presumption that 
employers would generally (and voluntarily) comply with the law. The INS District 
Counsel in San Diego, for example, trumpeted “the success we’ve had across the 
board in securing voluntary compliance from employers nationwide.”122 No doubt 
some employers, whether vast corporations or small businesses, make an effort to 
comply. But in an environment where compliance is administratively burdensome 
and may carry a considerable opportunity cost in terms of labor expenditures, it is 
far more likely that the extent of compliance would depend in good measure on 
some combination of social norms about the value of conforming to legal 
requirements and reliable enforcement.123  
 
119. For an insightful analysis, see Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a 
Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1042 (1990). 
120. Id. 
121. See id. 
122. See id. at 1050. 
123. Cf. Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior, 27 LAW 
& POL’Y 262 (2005). Thornton and her coauthors conclude that most firms are already in compliance 
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To wit, Calavita conducted a survey of sectors that had long relied on 
immigrant labor in Southern California. She assessed behavior in the garment 
industry, construction, restaurants, hotels, and building and landscape 
maintenance. Results revealed a widespread lack of compliance with employer 
responsibilities under IRCA. Forty-eight percent of the employers who were 
interviewed indicated they “thought” they had undocumented workers in their 
work force. Of these, nearly half estimated that a quarter or more of their 
workforce was undocumented. Further, the workers themselves reported 
information validating these findings (thirty percent were undocumented, and 
another thirty percent were in the process of applying for legal status under 
IRCA’s legalization provisions).124 
The trajectory of the IRCA-imposed employer sanctions, and their 
subsequent implementation, reflects the extent to which regulatory enforcement 
implicates competition and contestation. In the immigration context, the conflict 
over targeting employers with potentially far more aggressive regulatory 
enforcement targeting employers is exacerbated by the potential costs to business 
and some agency resistance and risk aversion.125 As Martin puts it, in principle, 
interior enforcement imposes quite tangible burdens on business:  
As a result, significant interest group pressure quietly helps push 
Congress toward underfunding these enforcement endeavors, and there 
has been no equivalently organized constituency pushing back. Moreover, 
though employers may not like the current I-9 verification process, 
involving the examination of work authorization documents of all new 
hires (albeit according to a very lax standard of scrutiny), they have 
become accustomed to it. Proposed revisions in the employers’ 
obligations generate determined resistance among a highly influential 
interest group.126 
The features thus built into the IRCA system from the outset contrast with 
more functional schemes, such as those governing aviation safety and health 
surveillance. True, all regulatory schemes require some implementation and 
enforcement. If they did not, then the regulation itself would not be necessary. 
While the challenge of implementation makes virtually every regulatory scheme 
susceptible to problems of execution, several factors probably combine to 
exacerbate the problems with regard to immigration. In immigration, the relevant 
agencies did not begin with a reservoir of public reputational capital, unlike (for 
 
with environmental regulations because of social norms and that “explicit general deterrence” 
knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance 
that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance 
routines. 
124. See Calavita, supra note 119, at 1051. 
125. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 525, 544–48 (2007). 
126. Id. at 546. 
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example) the FDA. Agencies lacked statutory authority or resources to better align 
activities with public expectations (because of congressional reluctance to delegate 
formal authority to agencies on most immigration policy issues). Contrast this with 
agencies possessing broader authority to reshape regulatory requirements in order 
to address substitution problems (e.g., financial regulatory agencies charged with 
antilaundering responsibilities; food safety agencies). The social and cultural 
dimensions of immigration make it easier for social, economic, and political 
developments to engender divisive reactions and changes in public concern, and 
complicate the argument that the use of enforcement discretion is a legitimate 
means of achieving de facto regulation of immigration policy in the absence of 
broad rulemaking authority.  
For all these reasons, many regulatory agencies encounter a less 
dysfunctional picture when working with complex regulatory schemes not 
involving immigration. The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) regulation of 
aviation safety is more tightly coupled to asserted regulatory goals than anything 
involving immigration. Even in acknowledging some limitations of historically 
existing regulatory practices, reports on FAA surveillance of safety problems 
indicate a variety of detection mechanisms for assessing the risk of regulatory 
violations not available to immigration authorities, including a greater flexibility to 
determine fines, prophylactic requirements, and general regulatory 
requirements.127 As another point of contrast, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s (CDC) monitoring of health conditions leverages state authorities 
and health reporting throughout the country to create a relatively reliable system 
for tracking recent changes in infections or incidence of foodborne illness. 
Congress requires the CDC to collect data on a variety of diseases through the 
National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System.128 To facilitate reporting, the 
CDC established a National Electronic Telecommunications System for 
Surveillance, which includes participation of all fifty state health departments, 
New York City, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. territories. While Congress 
does not require all states to participate, the fact that every single state health 
agency in the country participates underscores the extent to which jurisdictions 
face incentives to take part in the system. A similarly comprehensive arrangement 
 
127. For a brief overview of some of the scope of regulation and detection mechanisms 
involved in FAA aviation safety regulation, see generally Kendal Van Wagner, Comment, Cutting Costs 
and Cutting Corners—The Safety Risks Associated with Outsourcing Aircraft Maintenance and the Need for 
Effective Safety Oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 631 (2007). For an 
overview of the mechanisms through which the FAA monitors the nature and magnitude of 
commercial aviation safety developments, see AL GORE, FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON: 
WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY (1997). 
128. See National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/osels/ph_surveillance/nndss/nndsshis.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 
2011). 
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is in place to provide information on foodborne illness through the FoodNet and 
PulseNet initiatives.129  
These regulatory efforts exist in a larger context. Budget constraints and 
institutional features combine with public reactions to limit the scope of federal 
authority. As a result, federal capacity for national-scale, routine regulatory 
monitoring is far from unlimited. While the federal government is by no means a 
classic weak state, its development has followed a historically contingent path that 
has made some regulatory and administrative functions easier than others.130 The 
federal government’s historical trajectory led it to build public organizations 
capable of administering benefits and federal resources on a national scale. By 
contrast, exclusive federal administration of a pervasive, national-level regulatory 
monitoring system (designed to detect and facilitate responses to real-time 
developments that call for regulatory action or enforcement) is less common.  
In fact, virtually all such systems at the federal level fall into four categories, 
each possessed of a certain institutional logic making it at least plausible to expect 
some results. The first involves building elaborate mechanisms for third party 
reporting coupled with a large bureaucracy for civil enforcement and criminal 
referrals. A classic example is the IRS.131 Second, federal regulatory monitoring 
systems can also leverage the presence of individual, organizational, and state-level 
incentives for accurate reporting, with the aforementioned CDC schemes relying 
on the incentives of the reporting jurisdictions to share accurate information.132 
The third category involves relatively close monitoring of a small, tightly 
circumscribed industry with strong barriers to entry, as with the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s oversight of safety in nuclear power plants or the FAA’s 
 
129. See generally Sandra Hoffmann & William Harder, Food Safety and Risk Governance in 
Globalized Markets, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 48 (2010) (“The United States has also invested in 
improvements in disease monitoring to provide the information basis for risk-based targeting of 
policy by federal and state government—most importantly through development of FoodNet, a 
nationwide active surveillance system, and PulseNet, which uses genetic fingerprinting in tracing the 
source of outbreaks.”). The CDC is in many respects not a conventional regulatory agency: it engages 
in few regulatory rulemakings or enforcement actions. Yet its monitoring of public health 
developments, and its analysis of and reporting on such information can trigger powerful 
enforcement, rulemaking, or adjudicatory actions from other public agencies. Cf. JERRY L. MASHAW 
ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 17 (6th ed. 2009) (describing the stereotypical frameworks of 
regulatory agencies with respect to promulgating regulations and enforcement). 
130. For two insightful discussions of changes in federal capacity to implement administrative 
and regulatory programs, see DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY (2001), and Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006). While both accounts underscore the longstanding capacity of 
the federal government to undertake regulatory and administrative activity, they also acknowledge that 
such capacity has developed in accordance with a variety of constraints and limitations. 
131. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON M. BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 181 (4th ed. 2008) (“[E]mployers are required to send information 
reports on wages and salaries for all their employees to the IRS. The IRS computers then match up 
most of these information reports against tax returns.”). 
132. See Cuéllar, Coalitions, supra note 81. 
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regulation of safety in commercial aviation. Finally, federal regulatory monitoring 
schemes sometimes involve wholesale deployment of state-level bureaucracies, as 
with environmental protection, leveraging local monitoring systems and 
institutional knowledge.133  
By contrast, employer sanctions do not fall into any of these categories, 
though the early history of the federal effort shows an aborted attempt to borrow 
some elements from these models and that the relevant officials initially sought to 
argue that (as with the CDC) incentives for compliance were high. Without the 
institutional logic available for any of the aforementioned categories and no clear 
precedent for the success of a vast new federal regulatory monitoring scheme, 
IRCA faced staggering challenges from the very beginning. If there was any 
plausible way to see how federal officials could manage those challenges, it would 
all but certainly involve a combination of regulatory flexibility coupled with 
substantial resources for interior enforcement. As discussed below, neither of 
these elements materialized.  
The present discussion of statutory dysfunction began by acknowledging that 
employer sanctions are not the only cumbersome compromise built into 
immigration law. Some observers might therefore emphasize that the immigration 
system would be severely compromised even without the problems of enforcing 
IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions. It is true enough that a good deal probably 
depends on how statutes are implemented—a topic taken up below. Although a 
variety of factors may affect the legitimacy of the immigration system, however, it 
is revealing to examine the specific criticisms that lawmakers and other politicians 
levy at the status quo. The fiercest critics frequently focus on enforcement 
problems.134 Moreover, the decisions of prospective unauthorized immigrants are 
affected by labor market opportunities,135 which are in turn affected by 
enforcement of labor market regulations. In effect, the mechanisms enshrined in 
law have almost certainly contributed to public skepticism of the system, eroding 
support for the more ambitious goals and heightening the focus on a growing 
undocumented population. 
Even if one acknowledges the trade-offs and limitations built right into 
existing statutes, might the general public have been persuaded to take seriously 
 
133. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1141, 1178 (1995) (“[T]he federal government simply does not have the capacity to 
regulate [pollution] effectively without the cooperation of state and local governments.”). 
134. For just a couple recent examples, see Press Release, Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subpoena Issued to DHS for Secure Communities Data (Nov. 4, 2011), http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
news/DHS%20Subpoena.html (criticizing DHS for failure to provide necessary data), and Mickey 
McCarter, DHS: Republican Lawmakers Demand DHS Drop “Irresponsible” Deferments of Immigration 
Enforcement, HOMELAND SECURITY TODAY (July 6, 2011), available at http://www.hstoday.us/ 
briefings/daily-news-briefings/single-article/republican-lawmakers-demand-dhs-drop-irresponsible-
deferments-of-immigration-enforcement/65aeec030d8e786ec0a89851fcb54bd3.html. 
135. For a description on migration decisions of prospective immigrants, see Cornelius, supra 
note 46. 
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the idea that they were often themselves the very employers from whom compliance 
was expected? It is among law’s most meaningful characteristics that compliance 
arises in settings where enforcement is difficult or even nonexistent. Public health 
regulatory rules, for example, matter for multiple reasons, and not only because 
failure to comply could result in adverse material consequences for state or private 
sector officials. Legal regimes can generate a considerable degree of support 
because of the law’s perceived legitimacy or social significance, or because a failure 
to comply could expose an individual to informal sanction from among her 
peers.136 It is just as true that some laws fail to garner such support because the 
public perceives them as widely ignored, ineffective, burdensome, and ultimately 
illegitimate. Scholars investigating the regulatory process have long analyzed the 
consequences of different enforcement regimes on compliance. In particular, a 
major effort to understand private sector compliance (or the lack of it) in the 
environmental context emphasized the role of industry’s perceptions regarding 
enforcement. If widespread perceptions exist that a law is not being enforced 
against the most obvious transgressors, interest in compliance—and indeed, the 
law’s very legitimacy—could profoundly erode.137  
No account of compliance with the law would be accurate if it focused only 
on individuals’ responses to short-term material costs and benefits. It is just as 
true, however, that administrative enforcement is part of what shapes 
“acculturation,” or the process through which individuals internalize legal 
commitments. The process through which acculturation arises depends in part on 
what other parties are doing and saying about the law. In the case of employer 
sanctions, millions of employers possess substantial economic incentives to 
disregard the law. They could easily describe the paperwork requirements as 
burdensome and observe blatant failures to honor it (particularly among their 
friends, family members, and coworkers hiring domestic labor). As the months 
after IRCA’s passage turned into years and then decades, growing segments of the 
public increasingly viewed the system as poorly designed.138 
B. Organizational Fragmentation #1: Interagency Coordination Costs 
Most statutory authority for regulating migration is concentrated in a single, 
far-reaching statute, the INA. But immigration law functions differently in a world 
where the DHS and DOJ share power over many immigration agencies, and 
where at least three agencies within DHS vie for attention. Without suggesting 
that the fragmentation of authority over immigration is entirely new or responsible 
 
136. See, e.g., Douglas D. Heckathorn, Collective Sanctions and Compliance Norms: A Formal Theory 
of Group-Mediated Social Control, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 366, 382 (1990). 
137. See Thornton et al., supra note 123, at 273 (discussing environmental compliance in the 
private sector). 
138. See Segovia & Defever, supra note 102, at 393 (describing the public’s increasing rejection 
of the existing immigration system and lack of confidence in the enforcement of immigration laws). 
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for every feature of immigration enforcement, consider the distinction between 
the status quo and a world where a single official is responsible for immigration 
services along with enforcement, and that single official reports to the Attorney 
General. In the earlier discussion of regulation’s institutional context, we 
considered how bureaus, cabinet agencies, and other public organizations can play 
a major role in the story of how laws are interpreted or even modified. 
Lawmakers, organized interests, and agencies themselves fight over structure. 
Hence, even if a variety of forces help determine how the INA is implemented, we 
should investigate whether the organizational context helps or hurts the coherence 
and practical viability of immigration policy. 
In the existing system, organizational problems tend to hurt the effectiveness 
of immigration regulations in three interrelated ways. First, the fragmented 
incentives and agendas of different agencies—both within and outside the DHS—
tend to raise the “transaction cost” of implementing policy changes, as the distinct 
agencies can and do resist changes and do not answer to a single senior official. 
Second, the problems implementing immigration law across competing agencies, 
and in particular the swelling backlogs in immigration adjudication, feed the 
widespread perception across the political spectrum that immigration 
policymaking is ineffective. This erodes the federal government’s credibility 
regarding successful implementation of a complex new system involving both 
enforcement of laws and procedural guarantees. Finally, agency fragmentation and 
resistance to outside control raise the cost to the President of exercising authority 
over what appears to some observers to be executive discretion in immigration 
(particularly in an environment where, as explained below, immigration issues 
have become higher-profile public concerns). 
American immigration law is a sterling example of organizational 
fragmentation. One cabinet agency (the DHS) enforces laws, adjudicates 
immigration benefits, and administers national boundaries. Within that cabinet 
agency, three separate agencies with differing agendas and (in some cases) 
profound rivalries coexist. The DOJ, a different cabinet agency altogether, 
prosecutes immigration crimes, defends U.S. immigration policies in court, runs an 
adjudicatory system of immigration law judges, and retains limited rulemaking and 
adjudicatory powers over the small sliver of substantive immigration issues over 
which Congress provided flexibility to agencies. The result is a considerable 
disjuncture between the DHS and DOJ, and even within the DHS. Large increases 
in border enforcement can impact the work of other agencies within DHS, and 
the overall bundle of DHS enforcement activities carries even larger downstream 
consequences outside the department for immigration adjudication (by 
immigration judges), prosecutions, and incarceration functions overseen by the 
DOJ.139  
 
139. The gap between immigration judge resources and DHS resources helps explain vastly 
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Far more than organizational fragmentation drives immigration outcomes. 
But a number of accounts suggest that since the creation of DHS, even the 
bureaus within the DHS entrusted to manage immigration and border policy have 
experienced considerable conflicts.140 Tensions seem especially pronounced 
between the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) over jurisdiction involving domestic investigations, 
and between ICE and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) over the proper 
balance between immigration enforcement and service provision. These 
competitive pressures illustrate the double-edged consequences of seemingly 
straightforward technocratic rationales to split agencies into units with more 
coherent missions.141 The trade-off is that a greater focus on a particular mission 
can exacerbate interbureau tensions over shared policy domains and undermine 
the capacity of higher-level managers to make reasonable accommodations to 
competing needs.  
The lack of coordination almost certainly carries consequences for both 
operations and agency-level policymaking. As noted below, since the DHS was 
created in 2003, the number of unresolved immigration court cases has nearly 
doubled.142 Relations between immigration authorities and many local entities 
have often grown strained.143 Some longtime observers of immigration policy who 
have examined DHS’s early performance on immigration policy and enforcement 
also harbor rising concerns about the agency’s capacity to effectively coordinate 
immigration both within and beyond the department. They conclude that one 
result of the creation of the DHS has been “fragmentation of responsibility and 
weak, largely ineffective immigration policy development and coordination by the 
executive branch.”144 
 
increasing backlogs and greater (more costly) litigation in federal courts, making the DOJ Office of 
Immigration Litigation the largest component of the Civil Division. 
140. See DORIS MEISSNER & DONALD KERWIN, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTION, DHS 
AND IMMIGRATION: TAKING STOCK AND CORRECTING COURSE 92 (2009) (reviewing reasons for 
concluding that the performance of DHS has been adversely affected by “the absence of mechanisms 
for resolving [problems between the three immigration and border agencies] in the new DHS 
structure”); see also e.g., Jay Weaver & Alfonso Chardy, Agencies’ Merger Spawns Tension, Arrests, MIAMI 
HERALD, Mar. 4, 2008 (reporting tension, dissatisfaction, and criminal conduct among employees 
after agencies merged). 
141. See Cuéllar, Coalitions, supra note 81, at 647 (discussing the prescriptive tensions in agency 
[re]organization). 
142. See Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of Wait in Immigration Courts, 
TRAC IMMIGR. (2011), http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog (last updated Sept. 
30, 2011) (graphing pending cases as a time-series data through September 30, 2011).  
143. See, e.g., Jason Buch, States at Odds over U.S. Plan, SAN ANTONIO EXP. NEWS, June 13, 
2011, at 11A.; see also David Raths, Federal Fingerprint Sharing Program Meets Resistance, GOV’T TECH. 
(July 5, 2011), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Federal-Fingerprint-Sharing-Program-Meets 
-Resistance.html (discussing Secure Communities and the lack of compliance with this program at the 
local level). 
144. See MEISSNER & KERWIN, supra note 140, at 86. 
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Beyond the situation within DHS, the condition of the immigration 
adjudication system is especially problematic. Immigration courts within the DOJ 
reconcile the enforcement of immigration laws with process-oriented aspirations 
and limited due process requirements. If immigration adjudication is subject to 
widespread delays and the analyses of immigration judges are routinely questioned, 
stakeholders with a variety of views about immigration can further lose confidence 
in the capacity of the system—or even a reformed system—to enforce laws and 
vindicate individual protections. Saddled with a growing number of cases and 
insufficient resources to address them, the total number of unresolved cases 
before immigration courts has swelled from about 125,000 in 1999 to about 
270,000 by 2011.145 Average completion time for immigration cases has grown 
from 184 days in 1999 to 280 days in 2010.146 Some burdens reflect the 
dissatisfaction of immigration courts with the bases for deportation advanced by 
authorities in cases brought before them. Immigration courts are finding that in a 
growing proportion of individuals brought before them (about ten percent 
nationally, and roughly twenty percent in large districts such as Los Angeles and 
Miami), ICE has no grounds to remove the person in question.147 
Immigration judges review these cases against the backdrop of skyrocketing 
apprehensions and diminishing resources for the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR). The accelerating increase in backlogs since the 
EOIR was created and the immigration enforcement agencies were placed in 
different departments underscores the differing incentives faced by the DHS and 
DOJ as they sit together at the budget policymaking table. Even if individual 
policymakers at the DHS are concerned about the adjudication-related 
consequences of new policies, their department does not own the adjudicatory 
function and is unlikely to approach it with as much concern as the DOJ. Within 
the DOJ, meanwhile, resources for nearly all functions—including immigration 
adjudication—have been squeezed by the redirection of resources toward national 
security functions and prison operations.  
In short, the immigration adjudication system could serve as an example of 
federal capacity to administer immigration laws relatively efficiently. Instead, it is 
an example of how certain laws are enforced in slow motion and procedural 
guarantees are drastically delayed, thus unavoidably raising questions about the 
federal government’s capacity to execute complex changes in immigration laws 
that would also involve adjudication and procedural protections. Little wonder 
that Judge Richard Posner, channeling widespread criticism within and outside the 
 
145. See Growing Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts, TRAC IMMIGR. (2011), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/246/include/pendingG.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
146. See Immigration Courts Taking Longer to Reach Decisions, TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 11, 2010), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/244. 
147. See ICE Seeks to Deport the Wrong People, TRAC IMMIGR. (Nov. 9, 2010), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/243. 
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bench, described the performance of the immigration courts and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) as “depressing.”148 This is not to say that all of the 
problems and limitations associated with the recent performance of these agencies 
are driven by funding problems or by the differing priorities of the DHS and 
DOJ. It is all but impossible to understand those problems, however, without 
considering the resource and caseload constraints of these adjudicatory 
bureaucracies, or the extent to which the DHS and DOJ lack incentives to 
coordinate enforcement, adjudicatory, prosecutorial, and civil litigation capacity. 
These organizational problems may seem paltry in comparison to some of 
the economic and political forces shaping administrators’ decisions to accept or 
challenge existing provisions of immigration law, or lawmakers’ incentives when 
facing organized interests unhappy with the status quo. Still, without some 
attention to organizational factors, it is harder to understand why the agencies 
cope with such a protracted policymaking cycle, particularly since the creation of 
DHS. The glacial pace of policy change is evident, despite considerable effort 
from some quarters, in the problems with immigration courts, in the slow-moving 
reforms of Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds exceptions, and in the 
process for revising agreements between ICE and the Department of Labor 
(DOL).149 Nor can we understand the limits of presidential control over 
immigration—discussed below—without appreciating the competing priorities of 
agencies charged with immigration policy. And in the years following the creation 
of DHS, the reforging of agency responsibilities almost certainly exacerbated 
fragmentation, as it created coordination challenges both within the cabinet 
department as well as with sister departments. So even if organization does not 
explain every shortcoming in immigration law, or even in the law’s 
implementation, policy change is more difficult and costly because of multiple 
agency interests.  
Of course, the presence of multiple agency interests in a given policy domain 
is not unusual. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services 
(encompassing both the FDA and CDC) shares jurisdiction with the Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) over food safety.150 The FDA and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) both play a role in assuring the safety of drinking water, 
with the EPA focused on tap water regulation and the FDA responsible for 
regulating bottled water.151 In these and many other cases, though, agencies 
 
148. See Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir. 2005) (“At the risk of sounding like a 
broken record, we reiterate our oft-expressed concern with the adjudication of asylum claims by the 
Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . . The performance of these federal 
agencies is too often inadequate. This case presents another depressing example.”). 
149. Labor and immigration authorities have long struggled to resolve internal disputes 
involving the coordination of their jurisdiction. For a discussion, see Decker, supra note 7. 
150. See Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety Regulation, 31 
SETON HALL L. REV. 61 (2000). 
151. See Processing and Bottling of Bottled Drinking Water, 21 C.F.R. § 129.1 (2011). 
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(whether by informal arrangement or more explicit legal distinction) split 
responsibilities in a manner that does not require agencies to coordinate on a large 
proportion of individual matters. There is thus a distinction between an 
arrangement wherein the USDA shoulders near-exclusive responsibility for meat 
and poultry safety even as the FDA regulates roughly the other eighty percent of 
the food supply, and the more common situation involving immigration. In the 
latter, a single case may involve an apprehension made by the CBP, an 
investigation by ICE, immigration adjudication within the DOJ or in the federal 
courts, criminal prosecution and eventual imprisonment also under the purview of 
the DOJ, and collateral immigration benefit consequences impacting CIS and the 
State Department.  
In short, Americans have built an immigration system that is profoundly 
fragmented and has become more so in the last decade. It may be tempting to 
think of this motley arrangement as all but inevitable. If so, it is worth recalling 
that the three other advanced industrialized nations with high rates of immigration 
(Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) all have unified cabinet-level immigration 
agencies.152 In contrast, the Homeland Security Act moved American bureaucracy 
even further along the continuum of fragmentation by splitting the INS three 
ways and lodging most of its functions within a new cabinet agency.153 
C. Organizational Fragmentation #2: Limited Presidential Control 
If the agencies charged with executing immigration laws and border 
enforcement policies are fragmented, perhaps presidential control is the answer. 
Yet the President, too, pays a price for the fragmentation, while also facing 
political and institutional constraints arising from heightened public awareness of 
immigration policy. Presidential administrations can, at the margin, pull on some 
of the levers that might shape whether authorities focus on arresting unlawful 
workers or take at least mild steps to target the employers.154 Though a President 
 
152. MEISSNER & KERWIN, supra note 140, at 86. 
153. This is not to suggest that centralization is the solution to every legal implementation 
problem. In many if not most aspects of regulatory governance, centralization of certain functions 
(say, those involving national and homeland security, conventionally defined) inevitably results in the 
fragmentation of other functions (such as agricultural inspections or vaccinations). Sometimes the 
benefits of decentralization and even agency competition may outweigh those achievable through 
greater centralization. Nonetheless, administering immigration with as much fragmentation as exists 
in the American system entails considerable costs, and given the nature of the splits in agency 
responsibility, the system almost certainly suffers a good deal from the transaction costs of routine 
(and often case-by-case) negotiation of common functions plus the difficulty of implementing rational 
policy planning across the system. For a discussion of how the concept of transaction costs can 
inform the analysis of public bureaucracies, including those with a need to forge agreements because 
of overlapping mandates, see John D. Huber & Charles R. Shipan, The Costs of Control: Legislators, 
Agencies, and Transaction Costs, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 25 (2000). 
154. See, e.g., Julia Preston, A Crackdown on Employing Illegal Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, 
at A1. 
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has some influence over these strategic goals of immigration policy and shapes the 
congressional agenda on immigration, in many respects the President has more 
limited control over enforcement and the executive aspects of immigration policy 
than commonly believed.155 
There is, it turns out, a deep irony to the modern presidential role in 
immigration. Where legal scholarship sometimes points out the difference 
between strict rules written into the law on the books and a more fluid, 
discretionary reality reflected in the “law in action,”156 the situation is precisely the 
opposite with regard to presidential control. The law on the books, as it were, 
suggests extraordinary discretion. The reality is strikingly different. 
Legislative changes, including ones favored by presidential administrations, 
expanded responsibilities for removal and reshaped prevailing public expectations. 
In doing so, lawmakers set in motion the now-familiar removal machinery built 
into the agencies responsible for immigration, bringing about a mix of new 
statutory authority, some initial increased budgets (though almost certainly not 
enough to keep up with responsibilities), relationships with state and local 
governments, and engendering of public expectations. The unusual spike in 
removals during the second term of the Clinton administration, as we shall see, 
helped create a new baseline, with new administrations facing elevated political 
costs if they were viewed as fundamentally abandoning or otherwise entirely 
undoing the newly-enshrined efforts to remove the undocumented population. 
Hence, while individual administrations retain some control in reshaping the mix 
of individuals removed (including, for example, the proportion being removed 
after serious criminal convictions), they are not making macro level removal policy 
decisions on a blank slate. The distinctive social and cultural elements of 
immigration law discussed earlier make it harder to rely on the argument that 
systematic changes in enforcement discretion are legitimate instances of executive 
discretion. Meanwhile, constraints from (actual or potential) agency resistance and 
lawmaker interference can play a persistent role in discouraging bold presidential 
reforms using existing legal authority.  
 
155. Cf. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 14 (positing a substantial role for the President in 
shaping immigration policy as a matter of inherent constitutional authority and history, explicit 
statutory authorization, and enforcement discretion). While there is no question that presidents retain 
some capacity to influence how agencies implement immigration law, the argument above explains 
why that capacity is, in practice, more limited than either the full scope of the statutory grants of 
authority to the executive branch or the de facto degree of discretion that law enforcement officials 
must exercise as a result of the staggering gap between their enforcement capacity and the full scope 
of their responsibilities. Cox and Rodríguez are certainly right, however, to point out that the broader 
issue of the presidential role in immigration is one of the most important pieces (if not the single 
most critical piece) of the immigration puzzle. 
156. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT C. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE  
6–9 (1981) (discussing the distinction between the “law on the books” and the “law in action”). 
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We can trace the pattern of increasingly constrained presidential capacity to 
reshape the implementation of immigration enforcement over a long arc of years 
and decades. Just as the organizational structure governing immigration law has 
evolved, so has presidential power. In the process, the relative power of different 
actors evolved as well. Since the period beginning just before IRCA, that arguably 
inaugurated the present chapter in American immigration history, presidential 
administrations have probably faced declining capacity to make stark changes in 
immigration enforcement as immigration has become a higher-profile national 
issue. In general, immigration enforcement reflects how agencies make sense of 
their statutory responsibilities in a politically complicated, resource-constrained 
world. By most accounts, the first lines of the post-IRCA chapter in immigration 
law were written largely by agency actions. The INS and its partner agencies 
already managed an elaborate (if not very flexible) arrangement to implement visa 
allocation schemes and enforcement; IRCA increased this complexity by adding 
new responsibilities for policing the labor market and creating a legalization 
program that required a stark, short-term expansion in the provision of 
immigration services.  
Over time, agencies continued to play a meaningful role in many 
implementation-related decisions about the INA. The INS, after engaging in 
consultation with staff at the Justice Department and other agencies, was in a 
position to decide on early strategies for interior and border enforcement, requests 
for new resources, and how it would manage relations with other bureaus with 
overlapping jurisdiction (as with the then-INS and the Labor Department). If 
anything, these early choices about enforcement priorities and resources 
(including, for example, regarding the broad presumption that employers would 
comply with the law) were made all the more relevant because of the gaps and 
contradictions in the relevant statutory scheme, and as long as public concern over 
immigration remained low relative to other issues, these matters were less likely to 
attract attention from the White House. 
Over time, however, immigration law became a subject of greater public 
concern, and early agency choices had consequences. As agency choices developed 
into larger, more consistent patterns of implementation, initiatives ranging from 
worksite enforcement changes to resource requests for border security developed 
a cluster of political supporters both within and outside the relevant agencies, 
raising the cost of dramatic presidential interference.157 Even more important, 
growing public attention affected both the cost of presidential interference and 
thus the incentives shaping presidential willingness to engage in such interference. 
Adding to other factors limiting the reality of presidential prerogative in this 
domain, what was once a blank canvas became a series of images reflective of a 
 
157. Cf. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Refugee Security and the Organizational Logic of Legal Mandates, 
37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 583, 696–701 (2006) (discussing “locked-in” organizational goals). 
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baseline commitment to enforcing the law and securing the border, which 
Presidents could not easily abandon. A closer look at presidential incentives and 
recent trends bears this out. 
Like agency officials, presidents clearly have a measure of power to change 
certain details of immigration enforcement over time. The Obama administration, 
for example, has reportedly conducted fewer of the high-profile workplace 
enforcement actions that were commonplace in the latter part of the George W. 
Bush administration. The Obama administration also reversed the previous 
administration’s trend toward removing an ever-shrinking proportion of criminals 
relative to civil immigration offenders. Nonetheless, political and organizational 
constraints essentially take off the table certain options that would otherwise, in 
principle, be available to have a systematic impact on the use of discretion in the 
immigration system.  
Indeed, with just a few exceptions and caveats, broad trends in removals, 
investigation, and prosecution (with important but limited exceptions) have 
continued through different administrations and across parties, at least since after 
the second term of the Clinton administration. Thus, while the cumulative 
increase in total annual removals between 1994 and the present is quite striking 
(from about 46,000 removals to about 390,000), the increase occurred over several 
administrations.158 Indeed, the extent and constancy of the increase, even during 
periods where average resources for interior enforcement were declining, is 
consistent with efforts from immigration authorities to pursue enforcement 
activities likely to consistently generate larger numbers of removable individuals, 
even if the specific individuals do not necessarily meet an explicit basis for 
concern (e.g., commission of a serious crime). If there is an exception showcasing 
the (limited but still potentially significant) role of changes in administrations, it is 
in the Obama administration’s greater focus on removals of individuals 
committing crimes. After being on a downward trajectory over the latter half of 
the Bush administration (from 2005 to 2008), the percentage of formal removals 
involving individuals who committed crimes in the United States jumped to over 
forty percent in the first quarter (up from roughly twenty-five percent in 2009 and 
about thirty percent in 2008).159 Even this shift, however, is relatively small in the 
broader context of a mechanism that has provided nearly linear consistent 
increases in removals across presidential administrations.  
The Obama administration offers a further illustration of the constraints 
affecting the prospect for drastic changes in discretionary removal authority. Over 
two years into the presidential term, the administration announced further efforts 
 
158. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 
(2009). 
159. See, e.g., Current ICE Removals of Noncitizens Exceed Those Under Bush Administration, TRAC 
IMMIGR. (Aug. 2, 2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/234. 
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to further focus removals under the controversial Secure Communities.160 While 
the new measures to focus removals on priority targets are likely to have some 
measure of impact, they do not disturb the larger infrastructure allowing 
authorities to remove individuals. The measures instead reflect the considerable 
challenges that senior administration officials have encountered over more than 
twenty-four months in asserting control over the routine actions of lower-level 
enforcers who have increasing access (through state-federal cooperation 
arrangements) even to detained individuals who have not been found guilty of 
committing crimes. Senior officials are left to make a case for focusing scarce 
removal resources on higher-value targets (particularly immigration violators who 
have committed serious felonies). Given that the infrastructure for facilitating 
removal of individuals detained in state and local jails and prisons is in place, 
however, it would be difficult to argue that immigration violators should be 
immune from removal simply because they have not committed serious offenses. 
Meanwhile, it remains politically costly for the administration to dismantle the 
infrastructure for increased removals created in previous Republican and 
Democratic administrations, particularly given the administration’s focus on 
demonstrating a commitment to interior enforcement even as it seeks legal 
changes in immigration reform.161 
In some ways this degree of continuity should not be surprising. The 
presidential appointees who run immigration agencies face pressure from law 
enforcement employees and as a result are apt to resist interference from political 
superiors.162 Lawmakers and agency officials concerned about curtailing discretion 
can leverage relatively widespread public concern about immigration enforcement 
to raise the political cost to a presidential administration of making drastic changes 
in immigration enforcement. While these constraints do not entirely limit an 
administration’s capacity to make changes in its ex post facto enforcement strategy 
or use tools such as humanitarian parole, these constraints exert considerable 
influence over the choice set of a new administration, which can make either 
 
160. See Enforcement and Removal: Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
(July 28, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Jul. 28, 2011) (discussing the 
nature and details of the Secure Communities program). The program relies on coordination between 
local authorities and ICE officials and the use of biometric data and federal database resources to 
identify individuals in local custody that may be subject to removal.  
161. Cf. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003) 
(discussing how the creation of an administrative scheme can make it politically costly for a politician 
to dismantle that scheme at a subsequent time, even when many policymakers no longer support the 
goals of the scheme). 
162. See, e.g., Jerry Markon, Calls for His Resignation ‘Just Part of the Territory,’ WASH. POST, July 
19, 2010, at A13 (describing Assistant Secretary Morton as “apolitical” and noting criticism from 
lower-level ICE employees that he abandoned ICE’s “core mission”); see also Jerry Seper, Agents’ Union 
Disavows Leaders of ICE, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, at A1 (describing a “vote of no confidence” in 
Morton by the union representing rank-and-file ICE field agents, who claimed ICE had “abandoned” 
its core mission of protecting the public to support a political agenda favoring amnesty). 
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legislative reforms or milder changes in emphasis (e.g., raising the priority of 
removals of deportable individuals with criminal records) rather than drastic shifts 
in policy. 
Separate trends involving the implementation and enforcement of 
immigration laws—including, for example, the increase in immigration-related 
federal criminal charges—reflect a degree of organizational inertia and institutional 
incentives that cut across multiple administrations. U.S. Attorney’s Offices are 
receiving a greater number of referrals from the DHS bureaus flush with 
additional border enforcement resources, and they can increase their total cases 
and convictions. As a result, judicial districts along the Southwest border now 
account for just under fifty percent of annual federal prosecutions, even though 
they make up only nine percent of the national population. In Fiscal Year 2010, 
federal prosecutors undertook about 47,000 federal immigration felony 
prosecutions, compared to about 58,000 nonimmigration felony prosecutions. By 
contrast, even just three years ago, the number of federal immigration felony 
prosecutions was about 28,000, compared to roughly 60,000 nonimmigration 
felony prosecutions. During roughly the same period, staff for the CBP increased 
by thirty-five percent, while the staff for US Attorney’s Offices increased by only 
nine percent.163 
Relative continuity in enforcement policies is also evident in the Obama 
administration’s approach to border enforcement. For example, in response to 
Arizona Senator John Kyl’s questioning of the administration’s commitment to 
border enforcement, the White House underscored its support for policies 
continuing, by and large, the ramp-up in border enforcement resources. Even as 
the administration’s communications director emphasized that “securing the 
border will require a comprehensive solution to our broken immigration system,” 
he also insisted that “there are more resources dedicated toward border security 
today than ever before.”164 Examples touted by the administration as of mid-2010 
included 110 new special agents for the Border Enforcement Security Task 
Forces, and 116 new Border Patrol Agents—this after the border patrol itself 
doubled in size in the five previous years (since 2004).165 
Some of the pressures limiting administrations from asserting control over a 
fragmented bureaucracy have originated in the engagement of Capitol Hill. As 
public concern about immigration has grown, Congress has devoted increasing 
attention to border and interior enforcement, with high-stakes consequences for 
the incentives of officials implementing immigration policy. Congress held 
hearings and pressed executive branch officials for commitments, limiting their 
 
163. See Federal Criminal Enforcement and Staffing: How Do the Obama and Bush Administrations 
Compare?, TRAC IMMIGR. (Feb. 2, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/245. 
164. Dan Pfeiffer, The President’s Record on Border Security, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 21, 2010, 
2:51 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/21/presidents-record-border-security. 
165. Id. 
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flexibility on a relatively high-profile issue of some public salience (as reflected in 
news accounts, even ones that focus on the limited changes administrations do 
make). Examples also include congressional appropriations for, among other 
things, worksite enforcement that could—if entirely resisted—implicate 
impoundment-related fiscal jurisprudence.166 
Given the weight of congressional influence, the treatment of Caribbean 
immigrants and the Bracero program seem relatively exceptional as examples where 
executive branch activity appeared to play a more substantial role in driving legal 
and policy change. Even with these examples, however, the story does not directly 
support the idea of preeminent presidential power. The Bracero program 
developed at least in part within the context of a national security emergency, and 
is best understood as an example of agency-initiated policy innovation. In 
addition, Congress soon “ratified” the Bracero program through appropriations.167 
It is also worth noting that the experience of managing Caribbean entrants played 
out against increasing concerns about the reactions of Congress.168 
In response to perceptions of presidential efficacy in immigration law 
implementation, we can now reach the following tentative conclusions. A variety 
of presidential administrations sometimes have resources foisted upon them by 
Congress for particular enforcement activities such as worksite enforcement, even 
though the resources provided are not sufficient to meet public expectations.169 In 
addition, the President and his senior advisors are often constrained in their 
capacity to forge their desired enforcement strategy by lawmakers, subordinate 
officials, and overall public concerns about immigration and national security. 
Accordingly, the broad historical trends—rising removals, a multi-faceted interior 
enforcement strategy heavily focused on some version of worksite enforcement, 
 
166. See, e.g., Mira Mdivani, ICE Worksite Enforcement Chief: ‘We Are Going After Employers,’ 
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (July 23, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/LegalIssues 
/FederalResources/Pages/ICEWorksiteEnforcement.aspx (“[ICE enforcement official Brett] Dryer 
disclosed that fully 90 percent of the ICE enforcement briefing notebook recently presented to his 
director specifically addressed worksite enforcement issues. He said that Congress had appropriated 
$134 million for worksite enforcement this year, and that ‘we fully intend to spend it on worksite 
enforcement.’”). 
167. See generally KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE (1992) (discussing the role played by 
the INS and Congress in constructing the Bracero program). 
168. The experience of managing Caribbean entrants played out against increasing concerns 
about the reactions of Congress and the substantial past involvement of lawmakers. See, e.g., Gilburt 
Loescher & John Scanlan, Human Rights, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Haitian Refugees, 26 J. INTERAMERICAN 
STUD. & WORLD AFF. 313 (1984) (describing the reactions of policymakers in the U.S., including 
lawmakers, to the threat and reality of Haitian migration at the time). Moreover, the lack of 
congressional action—particularly in light of congressional hearings and considerable interest in 
refugee flows among lawmakers—can also be understood as part of an equilibrium where executive 
branch action avoids provoking a sufficiently intense response from lawmakers that would impair 
executive branch flexibility. 
169. See Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (holding that the President may not 
countermand or defeat legislative goals by defunding activities through “impoundment”). 
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and increased use of the Border Patrol—cut across individual administrations. 
Congressional activity shows the extent of continuing lawmaker interest in 
enforcement issues, and even includes specific appropriations for worksite 
enforcement that become difficult for any administration to ignore. Even when 
formal powers may exist to achieve starker changes in immigration policy, the 
practical and political cost of using them can weigh heavily on administrations. An 
administration may be excoriated by lawmakers and members of the public for 
even considering measures to temporarily regularize the undocumented 
population. Within bureaucracies, ICE agents and other law enforcement 
personnel may resist wholesale ramp-downs in enforcement. Thus, while a mix of 
judicially acknowledged discretion and resource limitations leave presidential 
administrations with a measure of control over enforcement, their choices are 
limited by larger forces they are only partially able to affect. How those constraints 
evolve across presidential administrations depends heavily on underappreciated 
connections between statutes, organizations and the public—to which we turn 
below. 
D. Public Attitudes and Polarizing Implementation 
In reflecting on the implications of limited presidential control, it is 
important to recognize that policy changes rarely produce a single type of policy 
response over an extended period of time. Instead, as E.E. Schattschneider has 
noted, policy can create its own politics.170 Earlier, we considered the core insight 
of the “policy feedback” literature in political science and political sociology, 
which builds on the idea that the public and policymakers respond to each 
other.171 Hence, a program that garnered limited initial support can become 
increasingly entrenched as constituencies ranging from the employees who 
implement it to new local beneficiaries begin to respond to the potential 
consequences of losing the new initiative.172 
 
170. See SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 88. 
171. See CANES-WRONE, supra note 90. 
172. See Pierson, Increasing Returns, supra note 88, at 252. Note that the changing pattern of 
responses to the implementation of a new law or policy could be exaggerated by the gain-loss 
valuation asymmetry that has become such a staple of scholarship and theory in economic 
psychology. The classic work here is Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis 
of Decisions Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). One potential implication of the conventional 
“prospect theory” view is that as policy changes arise and are no longer perceived by affected 
constituents as gains but rather as part of a recalibrated status quo, the stakeholders affected may 
expend an even greater effort to defend a subsequent change perceived as a loss than to enact what 
had previously promised a potential benefit. Although some recent work challenges the strongest 
versions of the loss aversion claims associated with prospect theory, individuals and organizations 
may nonetheless continue to reflect a degree of loss aversion under certain conditions. See Charles R. 
Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory 
and Prospect Theory?, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2007).  
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But new laws are just half the equation; administrative implementation is the 
other. A point sometimes passed over in the policy feedback scholarship is the 
potential sensitivity of opinion leaders and the segments of the public they 
influence to the implementation of legal provisions—a process that not only 
implicates the initial legislative compromise and resulting statutory text, but also 
the incentives and value commitments of the officials in charge of turning the 
statute into an administrative program. If statutes and the public statements about 
them (at the time of enactment) create a public narrative about what a policy is 
supposed to achieve, then its implementation generates more explicit benefits and 
burdens among relevant constituencies. In the process, implementation can 
generate its own politics in a different way: by dramatizing gaps (even ones that in 
retrospect should have been anticipated before implementation) between 
expectations and realities that opinion leaders and policymakers then confront, or 
even exploit. 
With this in mind, we can trace a sequence in the recent evolution of 
immigration law amounting to a form of polarizing implementation. The term is 
meant to capture how the creation of an administrative scheme can affect public 
reactions, and even heighten public division and controversy about a statutory 
scheme. The core idea of polarizing implementation concerns the ironic 
consequences of aggressive new enforcement-oriented statutory enactments in a 
world where immigration is becoming a higher-profile issue of widespread public 
concern. Instead of furthering the capacity of agencies to enforce the law, new 
agency responsibilities do not necessarily improve prospects for promoting 
observance of the law and could even make the problem worse. Rather, new 
responsibilities could simultaneously exacerbate existing enforcement and 
implementation problems while raising public expectations for aggressive action in 
response to illicit activity. 
If implementation problems are actually capable of ratcheting up the 
tensions about immigration law, who exactly becomes more polarized? In this 
context, the idea of “polarization” refers to the growing gap between public 
enforcement expectations and agency capacity, coupled with frustration among 
some constituents about the agencies’ enforcement activities. Anger from the 
public, bolstered by reactions from lawmakers, anchor one aspect of polarization. 
At the same time, for some immigrant and civil rights advocates, the extent of 
discretion involved in interior enforcement is enough to emphasize the urgency of 
reform and perhaps discourage these constituencies from supporting piecemeal 
reform (viewed as making comprehensive reform less likely), even if the degree of 
enforcement activity is not sufficient to satisfy the public or change the political 
economy of employers’ calculus. 
What follows is a brief stylized description of how this dynamic might play 
out. (1) In an environment where public concern with immigration policy is 
increasing, low enforcement nonetheless occurs relative to the amount of 
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lawbreaking associated with the existing immigration system. This makes it easier 
for some business interests to tolerate the existing system because they are less 
likely to pay the costs for not complying, which almost certainly erodes the 
legitimacy of the current system. (2) Lawmakers, seeking further changes in 
immigration policy exploit public frustration with enforcement problems.  
(3) Legislative changes since the 1986 IRCA framework expand the scope of the 
removable population. (4) Finally, agencies lack the capacity, resources, or 
incentives to drastically ratchet up enforcement, contributing to further political 
reactions arising from gaps in agency enforcement and further pressures for 
legislation complicating agencies’ enforcement missions. Consider each of these 
elements in turn. 
Greater Salience in Public Opinion and Media Coverage. We will begin 
with the vast change in public concern, media coverage, and lawmaker activity 
concerning immigration. Although mobilized interests continue to affect 
immigration policy, greater public attention to immigration is now commonplace, 
complicating the policymaking process. Specifically, public concern about 
immigration, and frustration with the system, have grown starkly since 1986, 
picking up in the 1990s after nearly a decade of the limited enforcement and 
internal contradictions built into IRCA. One relatively comprehensive review of 
public opinion trends involving immigration published in 2010 succinctly 
summarized the research by noting that “[s]panning what will now be over a 
decade, public opinion indicates an increasing concern over immigration issues in 
addition to a lack of confidence in the ability of the country’s leaders to address 
them.”173 Immigration has of course long been a topic of intense public 
concern.174 But surveys show differences in public attitudes about immigration 
over time, including particular concern about the federal government’s alleged 
failure to enforce immigration laws.175 As a further reflection of the changing 
political milieu in which public opinion develops, moreover, news coverage of 
immigration in major U.S. newspapers indicates stark changes in the number of 
stories about immigration overall. Figure 1 indicates a relatively constant increase 
in the amount of immigration-related news coverage, even when compared to the 
period between 1986 and 1990 during which Congress passed two major pieces of 
immigration legislation. 
 
173. See Segovia & Defever, supra note 102, 375–76 (2010). 
174. John S. Lapinski et al., The Polls—Trends: Immigrants and Immigration, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 
356 (1997) (reviewing survey data). 
175. See Segovia & Defever, supra note 102. Among other things, immigration has almost 
certainly become a topic of greater interest in many communities seeing a new influx of 
undocumented immigrants. See Jennifer L. Hochschild, International Migration at a Crossroads: Will 
Demography Change Politics Before Politics Impedes Demographic Change? (July 13–15, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/International%20Migration%20at% 
20a%20Crossroads.sent_.pdf (discussing the potential consequences of demographic changes on 
debates about immigration).  
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It may be tempting to think about the swelling public concern over 
immigration entirely separately from the content and enforcement of immigration 
laws. But rising public concern and skyrocketing media coverage seem only 
partially explained by changing demographics in certain local areas, since the 
increase in coverage is apparent in national news sources, and rising public 
concern evident even in regions that had long experience with high levels of (legal 
and undocumented) immigration. It is telling, in fact, that public frustration with, 
and concern about, immigration policy has risen fairly constantly in the years since 
IRCA and its resulting enforcement problems. Meanwhile, the structure of 
immigration law essentially turns millions of Americans into lawbreakers by setting 
up labor market requirements that are onerous, yet only occasionally enforced.176 
In addition, politicians’ repeated and intense focus on lack of enforcement—
chronicled below—strongly suggests that such appeals resonate with the public.  
In short, political debates about immigration and perhaps other regulatory 
domains almost certainly evolve in response to how laws are enforced. If 
immigration enforcement was irrelevant to public attitudes, we would probably 
see less focus in political rhetoric on immigration enforcement and more on the 
amount of immigration or other substantive issues involving immigration law. 
Concerns over enforcement, and particularly border security, have gained 
exponentially greater news coverage in recent years, suggesting some evolution in 
the politics of immigration relative to previous decades in the years since IRCA’s 
dysfunctional scheme was implemented. Business reactions could also indirectly 
affect public attitudes about enforcement: a vastly different and more aggressive 
enforcement strategy—absent anything else—would almost certainly create a 
backlash from economic interests, which in turn would change the larger political 
context of debates over enforcement. 
As a threshold matter, the potential for greater public concern about 
immigration does have some tentative implications that shed further light on the 
fate of immigration law reform efforts. When Ronald Reagan worked with 
Democratic and Republican lawmakers to enact a large-scale legalization program 
in 1986, lawmakers and the public were far less concerned about immigration. By 
contrast, immigration reform efforts strongly supported by presidential 
administrations were more likely to trigger the ire of an engaged public when they 
 
176. Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo even makes the case that affluent and middle-class 
Americans are critical players in a vast informal economy at the margins of immigration and labor 
regulation. See Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Affluent Players in the Informal Economy: Employers of Paid 
Domestic Workers, 17 INT’L J. SOC. & SOC. POL’Y 130 (1997). For a brief but interesting discussion of 
compliance challenges, see generally Kathleen A. DeLaney, A Response to “Nannygate”: Untangling U.S. 
Immigration Law to Enable American Parents to Hire Foreign Child Care Providers, 70 IND. L.J. 305 (1994). 
Whether the link between existing U.S. immigration policy and widespread noncompliance becomes a 
significant political axis in public disputes over immigration policy depends in no small measure on 
the future of enforcement and the extent to which illicit labor market bargains become a potential 
trigger for social stigma among affluent and middle class families. 
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were attempted in 2006, 2007, and 2009–2010. Ironically, the greater the public’s 
overall concern about immigration (particularly given a relatively limited grasp of 
all the subtleties), the easier it may be to undermine conventional (elite) bargaining 
that could cement conventional pluralist coalitions supporting reform, as occurred 
during successful rounds of immigration lawmaking in previous generations.177 
Increased Activity From Lawmakers and Policymakers. Politicians have 
been increasingly drawn to the immigration issue as public concern has risen, and 
often focus on popular anger over the perceived failures of immigration policy, 
and in particular the lack of enforcement. In particular, there is a striking trend in 
growing congressional attention to immigration over time. As Figure 2 illustrates, 
the now-familiar pattern of extensive lawmaker interest in immigration was not so 
much the case in past decades. Instead the starkest increases emerged over the last 
twenty-five years, as the limitations of IRCA became increasingly apparent. As 
indicated in Figure 2, the percentage of congressional hearings focused on 
immigration rose fivefold in sixteen years, from just over 0.5% in 1990 to nearly 
2.5% in 2006. Similarly, the percentage of Congressional Quarterly Almanac articles 
(describing single legislative initiatives) focusing on immigration has risen fourfold 
over a similar time period. The percentage rose from less than one percent in 
1986, when IRCA was passed, to nearly four percent in 2006 (and over six percent 
in 2000). These developments show how public concern, news coverage, and 
congressional discussions of immigration all yield a converging picture of 
increasing concern about immigration. One should not overinterpret these figures, 
as they do not highlight the precise nature of congressional concerns. 
Nonetheless, changes in these measures shed some light on how lawmakers make 
decisions about the allocation of two scarce resources capable of driving the 
nature of the national lawmaking agenda—their time (as reflected in decisions 
about the content and frequency of committee hearings), and their willingness to 
introduce legislative proposals that compete for limited public attention.  
The picture comes further into focus when we scrutinize policymakers’ 
stated concerns about the lack of enforcement and the context of public opinion 
fueling such concerns. Specifically, political statements from lawmakers across a 
variety of contexts routinely focus ever-greater attention on the perceived need to 
facilitate removals and increase border enforcement resources.178 Moreover, 
 
177. Accounts of immigration legislation during the 1960s and 1980s emphasize elite 
bargaining rather than mass mobilization of public support. For a discussion of the role of elite 
bargaining in the 1965 Immigration Act and the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, see 
ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 324–33 (discussing the legislative machinations and political deals 
culminating in the 1965 Act), and Tichenor, supra note 84, at 360 (discussing the 1986 Act, and 
concluding that “[b]y insulating policymaking from the views of the public, a constriction of alien 
admission and rights was averted”).  
178. Although mere unlawful presence in the United States was already a civil offense before 
IRCA and the subsequent buildup in border resources, the federal government had yet to implement 
the statutes and resource commitments reflecting the policy goal of policing forcefully against 
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agency failures to live up to public expectations (as demonstrated by criticisms of 
the perceived slow start of Secure Communities, for example) probably contribute 
to a political atmosphere facilitating greater political frustration with the existing 
immigration system, and eventually encouraging further rounds of lawmaking that 
expands agency enforcement responsibilities (discussed in more detail below). 
Even the political rhetoric by itself, however, is likely to have an impact on 
voters. Scholars have examined the impact of political appeals on decision making, 
both in general contexts and in situations implicating immigration. Individuals 
exposed to political information shape their reactions and beliefs in response to 
that information, and in the context of immigration, will often respond to the 
particular mix of ideas communicated by policymakers.179 These results appear to 
reflect not only the potential for information to have a genuinely persuasive effect 
on those exposed to it, but also the ways in which political appeals on subjects 
such as the insufficiency of immigration enforcement can affect the relative 
strength of an individual’s preexisting concerns.180 
The Core of the Process: Statutory Change, (Worsening) 
Organizational Challenges, and Public Frustration. Having documented 
swelling public concern and policymakers’ increasing willingness to engage with 
immigration issues, we can now complete the picture by returning to the 
 
immigration violations. Once those goals were established, politicians could criticize the gap between 
the putative goals of the immigration laws and their reality. Beginning in the 1990s and increasing 
over the last decade, federal, state, and local politicians have done precisely this. The following are just 
a few examples from a variety of contexts: Proposals to Reform United States Immigration Policy, Hearing 
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 103rd Congress (2nd Sess.), 20–22 (1996) 
(statement of Sen. Bob Graham) (proposing various bills aimed at reducing the fiscal impact that 
illegal immigration has had on immigrant receiving states such as Florida), Eric Schmitt, GOP Fight 
with Clinton on Immigrants Splits Party, N.Y. TIMES, at A16 (Oct. 22, 2000) (citing some lawmakers’ 
concerns about legislation legalizing the status of many immigrants given the lack of enforcement of 
existing immigration laws), and Sam Howe Verhovek, Texas Plans to Sue U.S. Over Illegal Alien Costs, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at A10 (describing the strategies of politicians in California and Texas 
supportive of lawsuits against the federal government asking for resources given insufficient and 
ineffective enforcement efforts). Note that sometimes prevailing public attitudes can form an 
equilibrium with political narratives offering a simple explanation for complex phenomena such as the 
changing role of the United States in the world or the causes and effects of migration flows to the 
United States. The prevailing public attitudes and political responses strengthen each other. Cf. 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The International Criminal Court and the Political Economy of Antitreaty 
Discourse, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1629 (2003) (describing “a sort of equilibrium—politicians’ . . . 
rhetoric shapes public opinion, but that opinion in turn shapes what politicians choose to emphasize 
to please key constituencies.”). For just one example from the immigration context suggesting 
widespread public perceptions that laws are not enforced, see generally Fox News Poll: 72 Percent Say 
Government Not Enforcing Immigration Laws, FOXNEWS.COM (July 29, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
us/2010/07/29/fox-news-poll-percent-say-government-enforcing-immigration-laws/. 
179. See Ted Brader et al., What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and 
Immigration Threat, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 959 (2008). 
180. Cf. George C. Edwards III et al., Explaining Presidential Approval: The Significance of Issue 
Salience, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 108, 108 (1995) (discussing how changing issue salience can affect political 
outcomes, even if individuals are not persuaded to change their substantive views).  
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substance of immigration law and the organizations implementing it over the last 
quarter century. That picture is as revealing for what it conveys about the lack of 
fundamental change in the larger architecture of immigration as for what it reveals 
about the consequences of changes involving agency responsibilities, border 
enforcement, and public reactions. 
For agencies operating in an environment of relatively high political scrutiny, 
grants of new authority also tend to generate new responsibility. This is plainly 
true when agencies gain authority to admit a larger number of migrants that 
require adjudication and processing (as under the 1990 Immigration Act), but it is 
also true in the context of enforcement. If some statutory changes expand agency 
powers or relieve agencies of procedural burdens,181 in the immigration realm 
those changes are also coupled with expanded responsibilities and rising public 
expectations. New powers to remove an ever-expanding class of individuals—
including lawful permanent residents—will often leave agency officials with a 
considerable gap between their enforcement capacity and public expectations. 
Even when lawmakers provide agencies new resources to fulfill expanded 
responsibilities, as occurred when lawmakers appropriated resources to fund 
expanded border enforcement efforts authorized in IRCA and subsequent 
legislation, those responsibilities in turn generate additional work for other 
agencies involved in detention, prosecution, and adjudication that have rarely 
received sufficient resources to keep up with the new work.182 Finally, 
extraordinary changes in border enforcement encouraged by each major 
immigration statute since the 1990 Immigration Act appear to have discouraged 
circular migration and thus raised the proportion of longer-term undocumented 
immigrants, further adding to the burdens faced by interior enforcement 
bureaucracies. 
Meanwhile, though agencies have been forced to implement statutes creating 
more expansive enforcement missions since 1986, bureaus often lack the 
resources or incentives to take on the widespread extent of illegal activity in the 
domestic labor market. Doing so would require agencies to incur considerable 
political risks, and agencies lack the resources required—particularly given a 
statute that limits the size of penalties save in narrow circumstances where 
extremely egregious behavior can be demonstrated. From this perspective, it is not 
so surprising that employer-focused investigations as a percentage of total interior 
enforcement investigations declined from nine percent of the total in 1991—early 
in the post-IRCA era, when there was still some uncertainty about the scope of 
employer responsibility—to two percent by 2003, when such uncertainty was 
 
181. See supra Part I.A. 
182. See supra Part III.B (discussing agency coordination problems).  
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considerably minimized and agencies would have incurred greater risks in pursuing 
allegedly intrusive investigations against employers.183  
Among the most striking features of immigration law’s implementation is the 
trajectory of interior enforcement budgets. In fact, the apparent upward trajectory 
in nominal enforcement budgets for interior immigration enforcement is wildly 
misleading. An example, take a closer look at detention and removal operations 
for the critical decade and a half following passage of IRCA, during which 
immigration authorities put in place the modern system for interior enforcement 
of immigration laws. During the 1990s, interior enforcement agencies received the 
major new responsibility of removing a potentially vastly greater proportion of 
aliens because of the expanded criminal-related bases for removal.184 Almost 
overnight, a far larger proportion of aliens—including lawful permanent 
residents—became subject to removal for offenses that could even encompass 
certain misdemeanors.  
Yet if we leave aside these new responsibilities and focus only on the pre-
existing detention and removal tasks that immigration authorities needed to carry 
out, the removal budget did not consistently keep up with increases in the 
undocumented population.185 Figure 3 shows the progression. Between 1988 and 
1993, removal resources per undocumented individual (in constant 1985 dollars) 
dropped nearly fifty percent. While resources began to increase somewhat once 
IIRIRA passed in 1996, by 1999 removal resources per undocumented individual 
were below 1986 levels, even as the scope of removal responsibilities skyrocketed 
because of the new law. Detention and removal resources rose again after roughly 
2005, but only to the point where the most recent statistics barely equal levels 
during the 1980s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183. See MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT SPENDING SINCE IRCA 
6 (2005). 
184. See generally Daniel A. Klein, Validity, Construction, and Application of Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)—Supreme Court Cases, 53 A.L.R. FED. 2D 117, § 2 (2011) 
(discussing how IIRIRA expanded the types of conviction and criminal conduct constituting grounds 
for removal, restricted eligibility for relief, limited procedural rights in removal hearings, and restricted 
judicial review). 
185. See infra Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Immigration Investigation (1985–2002) and Detention and Removal 
Resources (1985–2010) (adjusted for size of the undocumented population, in 
constant 1985 dollars)186 
 
 
 
 
Remarkably enough, the conventional story of staggering resource increases 
for immigration enforcement over the last two decades turns out to be misleading. 
Instead, during crucial periods in the modern history of immigration enforcement, 
new responsibilities and falling budgets exerted an impact on the implementation 
of immigration laws. Among other things, these resource constraints all but 
certainly exacerbated incentives for immigration authorities to execute routinized, 
dragnet-style approaches for removing large numbers of inmates and prisoners 
through initiatives such as the Secure Communities program, which sought to 
leverage coordination with state authorities.187 Although such an approach may 
provide ICE certain structural advantages, given its position as an agency 
struggling to meet public expectations with limited resources, this approach can 
also engender harsh criticism from some jurisdictions craving greater control over 
removals. It also risks further expanding public expectations of ICE’s capacity to 
 
186.  David Dixon, and Julia Gelatt, Immigration Enforcement Spending Since IRCA, MIGRATION 
POLICY INSITUTE 7 (Nov. 2005), available at www.migrationpolicy.org (Office of Investigations 
budget); Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends, 
2010, PEW HISPANIC CENTER REPORT (February 1, 2011), available at www.pewhispanic.org (size of 
the undocumented population); TRACFed (ICE budgets for detention and removal); Dep’t of Labor 
site used for inflation adjustment. 
187. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1823 (1998) 
(discussing dragnet-style approaches to drug enforcement). 
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remove criminal aliens. 
  The federal government’s budget for interior immigration enforcement-
focused investigative functions shows an even starker drop-off compared to the 
removal budget. Amidst burgeoning interest in immigration fraud, removal of 
violent and drug gang members, and alien smuggling operations, the Office of 
Investigations retained the staggering responsibility of policing American 
workplaces. This is a trying task in the best of circumstances, because in principle, 
millions of businesses could be subject to employer sanctions.188 We know from 
the structure of the INA and cases such as Collins Foods that the agency faces limits 
in its capacity to drastically reshape the regulatory environment.189 The agency’s 
capacity to live up to its responsibility thus depends crucially on budgets. 
Assuming a constant amount of resources (and using the existing undocumented 
population as a rough proxy for the challenges involved in policing the labor 
market), domestic enforcement capacity would still be strained by new 
enforcement initiatives involving fraud, and particularly by the expectation that 
after the 1996 passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA authorities could become more 
aggressive in removing aliens involved in criminal activity. What would be truly 
stunning is to assume that law enforcers could realistically have met their 
enforcement challenges as new responsibilities were added, and budgets relative to 
the undocumented population were shrinking.  
That, however, was the trajectory of budgets for the Office of Investigations 
at INS in recent years, between 1985 and 2002.190 Figure 4 also tells this story: in 
constant 1985 dollars, investigative resources relative to the size of the 
undocumented population rose substantially only for about a year immediately 
following the IRCA legalization (owing to the reduction in the undocumented 
population). After that, resources fell precipitously, with the 2002 total at less than 
half the 1987 total. Meanwhile, several pieces of legislation, most notably IIRIRA 
in 1996,191 expanded investigative responsibilities even as resources declined 
further. Of course, these declines hardly diminish the considerable opportunity 
cost implicit in much of the budget allocation to interior investigations and 
removal operations associated with an immigration system that aims in principal 
to remove vast numbers of undocumented individuals. Even adjusted for inflation 
and relative to the size of the undocumented population, removal resources have 
risen sharply during much of the last decade (though in relative terms only to their 
level in the late 1980s). With a different allocation of resources, federal authorities 
 
188. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics About Business Size (including Small Business), available at 
http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
189. See supra Part I.A. 
190. See supra Figure 3. The analysis becomes more difficult after the creation of DHS because 
the Office of Investigations within the newly constituted ICE assumed responsibilities for both 
immigrations and customs violations. 
191. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
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could focus far greater resources on more urgent concerns such as counterterrorism. 
Despite the opportunity cost represented by the current situation, however, it is 
important to recognize that it has nonetheless left agencies in a difficult position 
relative to meeting public expectations engendered by their statutory 
responsibilities.  
 
Figure 4: Percent Change in Formal Removals, by Presidential Term, Since Passage of 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986192 
 
 
Even before IIRIRA, statutory changes foreshadowed the expansion of 
agency responsibilities that would be wrought in 1996 and, indeed, began 
expanding those functions. The 1990 Immigration Act added agency to 
enforcement responsibilities by enhancing IRCA-related regulations. The trend 
continued in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and 
several other pieces of legislation since then.193 Although the most immediate 
impact of border enforcement funding is on the Border Patrol, border 
 
192. DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Table 36 (2009). 
193. See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 28, at 28 (discussing how the Immigration 
Act of 1990 “augmented the regulations enacted by IRCA”); id. at 42 (explaining how the Violent 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1994 increased immigration enforcement authorities’ 
responsibilities through an enlarged definition of “aggravated felony” resulting in a larger removable 
population). 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
A
vg
er
ag
e 
Y
ea
rl
y 
C
h
an
ge
 in
 R
em
ov
al
s
Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete) 4/17/2012  1:22 PM 
68 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:1 
 
enforcement increases also create consequences for domestic law enforcement 
agencies, and specifically for criminal prosecutions undertaken by the Justice 
Department. More Border Patrol agents produce a larger crop of apprehensions, 
which in turn generates domestic investigations and prosecutions. In addition, the 
1994 Act authorized faster removal procedures for some criminal aliens, 
contributing to a trend toward growth in the population eligible for removal. The 
trend became more pronounced as a result of legislation passed just two years 
later.194 
The enactment of IIRIRA created a stark and now-familiar expansion in the 
scope of removal. While some of its statutory requirements could be viewed as 
helpful to immigration enforcers (by facilitating the removal of certain individuals 
through limitations on procedural constraints), the core effect of IIRIRA was to 
expand the size of the removable population. A core element of the INA is the 
definition of a removable alien, including any alien in the United States who enters 
without authorization or overstays a visa.195 But IIRIRA starkly expanded the 
number of lawful permanent residents who were removable (the size of this 
expansion depending on the interpretation of the aggravated felony provisions in 
IIRIRA), and because this has an impact on agency activities and the public’s 
expectations, it is worth briefly reviewing the scope of the changes. Following 
IIRIRA, even some misdemeanors are a sufficient basis for removing lawful 
permanent residents.196 Moreover, recent statutory changes (and particularly 
IIRIRA) drastically restrict immigration judges’ capacity to suspend deportation. 
The effect is a pronounced change, in the form of a vastly larger number of 
people subject to removal.197 What was once the “drastic measure” of deportation 
or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted 
of crimes.198 In the immediate wake of IIRIRA, formal removals jumped to over 
114,000 from about 50,000 in 1995.199 
 
194. See id. 
195. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006) 
(explaining that “an alien present . . . without being admitted or paroled . . . is inadmissible”); 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(A) (explaining that “any alien . . . inadmissible [at the 
time of entry] is deportable”). 
196. See, e.g., Dawn Marie Johnson, Note, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors as 
Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 477 (2001). 
197. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478–80 (2010) (discussing how the 
landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the last ninety years. While once 
there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority 
to prevent deportation, “immigration reforms have expanded the class of deportable offenses and 
limited judges’ authority to alleviate deportation’s harsh consequences.”). 
198. See ARNOLD & PORTER, LLP, ABA COMM’N ON IMMIGR., REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND 
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 4-9–4-20 (2010) (describing the loss 
of judicial discretion in immigration cases and arguing that it should be restored); see also Fong Haw 
Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (describing removal proceedings as “drastic measures”). 
199. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 
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In short, by enlarging the size of the removable population, the 1996 laws 
have exacerbated (even after some increases in resources) public concerns about 
the failure of agencies to carry out their enforcement missions. Consider the 
following: even as the rate of removals skyrocketed from about 70,000 at the time 
of IIRIRA’s passage to 200,000 by 2004 and nearly 400,000 by 2010, increasing 
attention focused on ICE’s perceived failure to efficiently remove criminal aliens 
and other undocumented immigrants from the United States.200 Even with record 
totals of removals, critics blasted the gap between the number of individuals 
removed by ICE and the scope of the removable population. Some lawmakers 
criticized ICE as showing “apathy toward robust immigration enforcement,” and 
other observers decried what they described as a “sense of impunity.”201  
Admittedly, Congress has increased the interior immigration enforcement 
budget in the years since IIRIRA was enacted.202 Yet those increases have not 
come close to enabling immigration authorities to fully meet the public’s 
expectations, given the growth in the overall undocumented population and the 
expansive number of lawful permanent residents and other aliens potentially 
subject to removal in the wake of IIRIRA. Budgets for interior investigations tell 
part of the story. Figure 3 above demonstrates a dramatic decrease in actual 
resources for interior investigation in the critical period between IRCA’s passage 
and 2002, at which point the INS was broken up and its pieces moved into the 
DHS. As the undocumented population has increased, immigration enforcement 
agencies have faced increasing pressure on a relatively meager interior 
 
159 (2004). 
200. Id.; see also News Release, DHS/ICE Reveal Highest Immigration Enforcement Numbers on Record 
in Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.ice.gov/ 
news/releases/1010/101008washingtondc.htm (discussing total removals). For criticisms of ICE 
efforts, see generally Marc R. Rosenblum & William A. Kandel, Interior Immigration Enforcement: 
Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, CONG. RES. SERVICE REP. R42057 30 (Oct. 21, 2011) (“[T]he 
proportions of arrests involving Level 1 criminals declined [between FY2006 and FY2011]”), and U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-67, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ICE COULD IMPROVE 
CONTROLS TO HELP GUIDE ALIEN REMOVAL DECISION MAKING (2007) (recommending expanded 
guidance for ICE personnel to exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis). Such reports also garner 
coverage in the media. See, e.g., House Panel to Subpoena Homeland Security for Information in Illegal 
Immigrants, FOXNEWS.COM, Nov. 2, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/11/02/ 
house-panel-to-subpoena-dhs-for-information-on-illegal-immigrants/ (discussing the Congressional 
Research Service and noting lawmaker concern triggered by the report’s information regarding the 
number of criminals eligible for removal that were not removed). Meanwhile, critics argue that ICE 
has achieved its record of removals only by sweeping into Secure Communities and similar efforts 
individuals with only minor (if any) infractions and even U.S. citizens. See, e.g., Anjli Raval, U.S. to 
Target Criminals in Deportations, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7c0b19b6 
-0a2f-11e1-85ca-00144feabdc0.html.  
201. See Peter Slevin, Record Numbers Being Deported, WASH. POST, July 26, 2010, at A1. 
202. See generally Immigration and Customs (ICE) Enforcement Budget Expenditures FY 2005–FY 
2010, TRAC IMMIGR. (2010), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/224/include/3.html 
(documenting ICE budget trends since 2005). 
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investigations budget (even one that has risen to some degree).203 
Whatever else IIRIRA accomplished, it did not fundamentally change the 
legal regime governing employer sanctions or the architecture of overall 
immigration policy. In contrast, stark changes in border enforcement have been 
easier to achieve. As immigration has become an issue of greater public concern, 
lawmakers have increasingly sought to engage the issue—but for the most part, 
major changes in interior enforcement and even future flows have been more 
difficult to achieve. Instead, the present institutional political economy of 
immigration law favors border enforcement. In the specific context of 
immigration-related lawmaking, border security is different—figuratively and 
literally—from the other three major components of comprehensive reform: 
employer verification, legalization, and legal immigration.204 Because it is simple to 
grasp as a “policy metaphor” and the political costs of enhanced border 
enforcement are lower than those of stepped-up interior enforcement for nearly 
all relevant constituencies,205 enhanced border enforcement policies galvanize 
relatively strong support from the public (only a tiny fraction of whom experience 
the costs) and provoke relatively little interest-group opposition.206  
From an analytical perspective, there may seem to be little fundamental 
difference between regulating migration by raising the costs of entry and doing so 
by decreasing the value of illegal entry. But a distinction almost certainly exists at 
the level of political psychology and public rhetoric. Voters and lawmakers 
routinely assume that the direct costs of entry can be easily affected by ratcheting 
up border enforcement. Notwithstanding some of the less visible complexities and 
unintended consequences, sending a message may be the paramount goal.207 On 
 
203. Admittedly, the staff at ICE has pursued some administrative innovations resulting in the 
creation of initiatives such as Secure Communities to facilitate removal of criminal aliens. Yet even 
these efforts have a two-edged quality, by simultaneously facilitating the removal of large numbers of 
individuals (with the proportion of serious criminals varying on the basis of program capacity and 
priorities) and further raising public expectations that substantial numbers of criminals will be 
successfully removed. See supra Part III.C (discussing Secure Communities). 
204. See MPI TASK FORCE, supra note 47, at 47, 53 (describing broadly accepted elements of 
comprehensive immigration reform). 
205. See generally Richard R. Lau & Mark Schlesinger, Policy Frames, Metaphorical Reasoning, and 
Support for Public Policies, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 77 (2005) (concluding that policy metaphors help 
constrain the beliefs of even the least politically aware members of the general public); Mark 
Schlesinger & Richard R. Lau, The Meaning and Measure of Policy Metaphors, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611 
(2000) (discussing how policy metaphors help guide political reasoning among both elites and the 
general public). 
206. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 125, at 545 (contrasting border enforcement to interior 
enforcement and noting that “[b]order measures, in contrast, step on almost no influential toes. 
Border crackdowns are therefore used to demonstrate enforcement seriousness, alienating few and 
placating many”). 
207. Cf. Kitty Calavita, The New Politics of Immigration: “Balanced-Budget Conservatism” and the 
Symbolism of Proposition 187, 43 SOC. PROBS. 284 (1996) (stating that “in the United States at least [in 
the mid-1990s] immigration is one of the few public policy issues in this contentious period on which 
most political leaders agree, with President Clinton and Newt Gingrich both calling for greater 
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the other hand, decreasing the value of undocumented entry depends on a mix of 
policy tools that include regulatory review of the work authorization process, ex 
post facto interior enforcement, and legal migration avenues to change the 
opportunity cost of illicit migration. Simpler arguments, not surprisingly, tend to 
be more persuasive—particularly among low-information yet emotionally engaged 
members of the public.208 Indeed, voters whose exposure to information about 
seemingly lax enforcement on the border arouses strong negative reactions will 
tend to weigh that information more heavily,209 and may have a far harder time 
accepting the more complex case for interior enforcement and legal immigration 
reform.210 Individuals with strong affective responses often tend to have a harder 
time focusing on the policy nuances of a particular course of action rather than 
the symbolic content of a policy. In a political environment of rising concern 
about immigration and strong affective responses to the perceived erosion of 
sovereignty, the marginally simpler policy argument of fortifying the border is 
likely to have greater resonance among unsophisticated but concerned voters than 
the more complex idea of shaping the demand for migration through multiple 
regulatory strategies.  
By contrast, other pieces of comprehensive reform are a harder sell. 
Lawmakers who are channeling public frustration with the immigration status quo 
are often unwilling to support the more substantial regulatory burdens associated 
with changes in employer verification. Employer verification is increasingly 
popular among the public, but relatively lax enforcement keeps the costs on 
business and individuals manageable. Drastic changes in employer verification—
involving either increased enforcement or greater federal surveillance and 
control—would generate either interest group opposition or concern over civil 
liberties and the centralization of state power. Supporters of legalization include 
immigrant advocates, civil rights organizations, some employers, and a variety of 
constituencies including some representatives of law enforcement, local 
 
control of the borders”). 
208. See Michael D. Cobb & James H. Kuklinski, Changing Minds: Political Arguments and Political 
Persuasion, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 88, 93 (1997). Reviewing a variety of empirical studies and placing their 
own results in context, Cobb and Kuklinski draw a distinction between arguments that are “long and 
complex” and “largely factual and argumentative in content” versus those that are “short, simple, and 
symbolic,” and find the latter far easier for relatively poorly informed voters to assimilate persuasively. 
Though Cobb and Kuklinski do not specifically discuss immigration and border policy, their 
categories readily map onto the distinction between arguments for increased border enforcement and 
those calling for a coordinated approach including regulation of domestic employers, border and 
interior enforcement, and changes in legal immigration opportunities, while also highlighting the 
unintended consequences of more enforcement (e.g., disrupting circular migration and encouraging 
longer-term undocumented stays in the United States). 
209. See Joanne M. Miller, Examining the Mediators of Agenda Setting: A New Experimental Paradigm 
Reveals the Role of Emotions, 28 POL. PSYCHOL. 689 (2007). 
210. Cf. Brader et al., supra note 179. 
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government, and religious groups.211 But a substantial fraction of the public is 
skeptical that this will solve perceived immigration problems, so the larger public 
remains divided. Large-scale reforms of legal immigration pose risks to some 
stakeholders (e.g., those favoring high absolute levels of family-based migration, 
employers losing some control over employment-based migration, and organized 
labor concerned about future flows). Meanwhile, border security increases entail 
fiscal costs rarely borne by a concentrated group with political power in the 
United States.212 The direct costs of increased border enforcement affect only a 
small fraction of residents close to the border, and this is offset by the greater 
interest from some members of those communities who instead favor more 
intense enforcement. 
The legacy of the ramp-up in border enforcement is at least as complicated 
as the idea behind securing the border is simple. As Massey and other scholars 
report, the stark increase in border enforcement resources has coincided with a 
marked increase in the reluctance of Mexican-origin, U.S.-based, undocumented 
immigrants to return to Mexico in the wake of the surge in border enforcement. 
This development has almost certainly added to the cumulative size of the 
undocumented population in the United States.213 More specifically, the border 
buildup appears to have dramatically changed migrants’ willingness to attempt 
returning to Mexico as part of a pattern of circular migration. Based on analyses of 
decisions of undocumented Mexican migrants, the probability of return to Mexico 
within twelve months of undocumented entry fell from just over forty percent 
around 1986 to about twenty-five percent by 2002. Given that the rate of entry of 
undocumented immigrants remained fairly constant, the overall undocumented 
population predictably increased—in part, ironically, because of the border 
buildup’s almost certain impact of discouraging return migration.214 
The border buildup disrupts circular migration because of the costs imposed 
on circular migrants. As Massey puts it,  
Raising the out-of-pocket costs of undocumented migration increases trip 
lengths because migrants have to work longer before the trip becomes 
profitable. [Also] by pushing migrants away from urban areas and into 
more remote sectors, operations Blockade and Gatekeeper increased the 
 
211. See, e.g., Amy Sullivan, Religious Groups Push for Immigration Reform, TIME, Apr. 30, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1986320,00.html; Dennis Wagner, Police Chiefs 
Press for Immigration Reform, USA TODAY, July 23, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/ 
nation/2009-07-23-police-chiefs-immigration_n.htm. 
212. The occasional protests of local cities in the Southwest whose landowners are affected by 
construction of border fencing constitutes an interesting exception that underscores the extent to 
which conventional border enforcement fails to garner concentrated opposition from economic 
interests. See Texas Cities Join Suit Against Mexico Border Fence, WASH. TIMES, May 29, 2008, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/may/29/texas-cities-join-suit-against-mexico-border-
fence. 
213. See Massey, supra note 114, at 136. 
214. Id. 
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physical danger of border crossing. . . . The end result of the border 
buildup has thus been to lower the probability of return migration and 
push migrants toward permanent settlement.215 
Migrants who do cross often end up in different places. A major consequence 
of the ramp-up in border enforcement appears to have been a change in migrants’ 
crossing patterns—away from a high concentration on traditional border-crossing 
points and toward states such as Arizona that subsequently exhibited growing 
concern over illicit migration.216 By driving illicit migrants crossing the U.S.-
Mexico border away from the two historically most common border-crossing 
points (San Diego and El Paso) and toward a greater number of locations, the 
border buildup ironically helped beget the political backlash against immigrants 
that has been so critical in explaining recent American immigration policy.217 
When the ranks of the Border Patrol began swelling in the early 1990s, the 
proportion of U.S.-Mexico illicit border crossers not crossing at San Diego and El 
Paso began to skyrocket (rising to forty percent by 1993, from thirty percent in 
1989). As migrants scattered from the original corridors, they moved toward states 
such as Arizona and New Mexico, where immigration soon became a far more 
prominent political issue. At the same time (whether simply because of new 
economic opportunities, or because the move away from crossing in Texas and 
California moved new migrants into different social and economic networks), 
illicit migrants crossing from Mexico increasingly ended up in different and less 
urban areas that had relatively limited if any previous experience with significant 
migration from Latin America.218 
The relatively high salience of immigration today compared to 1986 is a 
major factor shaping the status quo and complicating policy change. When 
immigrants were more heavily concentrated in large immigrant-receiving states, 
the immigration issue held far less national resonance. Immigration sometimes 
became controversial in such states, as with California and the fight over 
Proposition 187 in the mid-1990s.219 For the most part, however, these states 
tended to have long-term experience receiving large numbers of immigrants. 
Moreover, some states, as with California, were already on a long-term 
demographic trajectory that favored less aggressive policies against unlawful 
immigrants by making the issue less novel and fostering constituencies supportive 
 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 132 (“Operation Gatekeeper, by far the largest deployment of enforcement 
resources, deflected migrants away from California toward new crossing points in Arizona, New 
Mexico, and more dangerous sections of the Río Grande.”). 
217. See id. at 134. 
218. See id. (Changes in the location of border crossing for migrants may have contributed to 
an evolution in their eventual area of settlement. “Not only were undocumented migrants deflected 
away from traditional crossings, but once in the United States they kept on going.”). 
219. See generally Adrian D. Pantoja et al., Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political 
Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos, 54 POL. RES. Q. 729 (2001). 
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of immigrants.220 These states also often received a substantial share of their 
migrants in large, multiethnic cities rather than smaller towns and rural areas. 
E. How Statutory, Organizational, and Macropolitical Factors Interact 
As laws are interpreted by executive organizations, funded and overseen by 
lawmakers, and discussed in the public sphere, each of these activities can interact 
in significant ways and contribute to a larger explanation that could not be 
provided by a more parsimonious account. We can see this by considering how 
each set of factors leaves traces in the details of the immigration system, and how 
each factor blocks some avenues for change that would remain open even if the 
other two factors were present. Different statutory compromises could have 
bequeathed to Americans a very different set of immigrants and labor market 
responsibilities. The country caps and visa limits in the 1965 Act limited flexibility 
to legally accommodate migrants from Latin America, and the IRCA compromise 
carried within it the core of a system that engendered widespread political 
backlash.  
Holding constant the statutory framework, the status quo would also be 
quite different with less organizational fragmentation. The creation of the DHS 
and consequent three-way split of most immigration-related functions within the 
DHS appears to have had some consequences for agency priorities and activities 
(underscoring the reality that organizational changes have consequences).221 
Fragmentation also changed agency incentives to address internal management 
priorities and longer-term issues, such as the shortfall in funding for immigration 
adjudication; these problems, in turn, further eroded support for the immigration 
system among some constituents. And the entanglements of bureaucratic 
jurisdiction and competing agency incentives further complicated presidential 
control by raising the costs of implementing policy changes (which need to garner 
a degree of support from multiple agencies, and can be modified or watered-down 
by a greater number of partially independent entities); limited presidential control, 
in turn, lowered each presidential administration’s capacity to affect the current 
system through the use of enforcement discretion or parole.  
In a different world, moreover, greater presidential control could mean some 
use of humanitarian parole authority and explicit enforcement discretion to 
address the status of the undocumented and to implement an alternative ex post 
facto immigration scheme.222 Indeed, to the extent that smaller-scale 
 
220. In California’s case, the experience with Proposition 187 itself may have accelerated the 
shifting political climate. Cf. Matt A. Barreto & Ricardo Ramirez, Minority Participation and the California 
Recall: Latino, Black, and Asian Voting Trends, 1990–2003, POL. SCI. POL. 11 (2004). 
221. See, e.g., MEISSNER & KERWIN, supra note 140. 
222. See Royce Bernstein Murray & Sarah Petrin Williamson, Migration as a Tool for Disaster 
Recovery: A Case Study on U.S. Policy Options for Post-Earthquake Haiti (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working 
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organizational innovations could make a difference (such as coordinated labor and 
immigration enforcement that puts additional pressure on employers), they are 
less likely to succeed and more costly because of organizational fragmentation 
(e.g., disagreement between ICE and DOL, or between ICE and the CIS, or 
competition over matters such as internal affairs investigative jurisdiction between 
the CBP and ICE). 
Finally, policymakers and the agencies shouldering responsibility for 
executing immigration policy confronted an increasingly polarized and unforgiving 
political context. Far from leaving agencies more capable of meeting public 
demands, the combination of new statutory authority and budget decisions have 
often left agencies in a more difficult position when it comes to meeting public 
expectations for immigration enforcement. Note that the existence of resource 
constraints relative to public expectations and agency goals would never entirely 
extinguish discretion. In recent years, immigration officials have still confronted a 
vastly greater number of removable individuals relative to their capacity to remove 
and detain them. Moreover, internal agency problems such as those encountered 
by the Obama Administration when seeking to focus the Secure Communities 
effort would leave lower-level operators with some room to decide how to set 
priorities. What the resource constraints do create, however, is pressure on agency 
leaders to perfect administrative schemes allowing for the removal (even if 
sometimes relatively free of careful screening) of larger numbers of individuals 
while managing the costs. It is in that context that the much-maligned Secure 
Communities effort developed in order to simplify the process of screening 
individuals detained by state and local authorities. Because most undocumented 
individuals are not detained, however, even the most sophisticated scheme faces 
impossible odds in making anything more than a relatively minor dent on the 
overall number of roughly ten million undocumented individuals in the United 
States.223 
At the same time, as larger numbers of immigrants—particularly from 
Mexico—settled in the Southeast and other regions with little recent experience 
receiving immigrants from Latin America, controversies over immigration became 
more salient to the public. The growing interest in local measures helped mobilize 
immigrants and their supporters, further raising the issue’s profile. As a 
consequence, grand elite-driven bargains marrying legalization, changes in work-
related immigration of interest to employers, and enforcement were more 
susceptible to destabilizing attacks galvanizing otherwise scarce public attention. 
As Figure 2 illustrates, data on congressional hearings and Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac articles suggest that major policy changes on immigration before the last 
 
Paper No. 255, 2011) (discussing the potential economic and humanitarian impact of humanitarian 
parole for the Haitian economy following the January 2011 earthquake). 
223. See text accompanying notes 158–60 (discussing Secure Communities and the difficulties 
faced by the Obama Administration in implementing substantive changes in the program’s operation). 
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two decades were associated with less overall congressional activity and attention 
to the immigration issue. These changes help explain the different political context 
in which IRCA passed in 1986 with a large-scale legalization program, and how 
immigration reform efforts strongly supported by presidential administrations 
were more likely to trigger the ire of an engaged public in 2006, 2007, and 2009–
2010. 
These political developments, of course, did not occur in a vacuum, and in 
any event exogenous political changes do not tell the whole story of recent 
immigration law. Growing political interest in immigration changes 
policymakers’—and organized interests’—incentives to use aggressive rhetoric and 
support approaches appealing to the growing fraction of the electorate that is 
becoming interested in immigration. While a variety of additional factors 
unquestionably affected immigration law in the decades since the landmark 
passage of the 1965 INA amendments, a key element in modern immigration law’s 
story is the process through which policy elites and the larger public have reacted 
to each other amidst growing interest in immigration. On three occasions between 
2006 and 2010, lawmakers, organized interests, and executive branch officials 
made concerted efforts to pursue immigration reform.224 Advocates for reform 
faced widespread and adverse public reactions.225 If immigration issues were less 
prominent national political concerns or public reactions were less skeptical of the 
federal role, lawmakers would have faced a different calculus almost certainly 
favoring substantial immigration reforms. A different political context would also 
change presidential and agency incentives to use ex post facto enforcement and 
discretion, thereby potentially affecting the incentives of employers to comply 
with existing laws or support further changes, and addressing other features of the 
immigration system. 
F. Why Public Responses Complicate Statutory Change 
We can now reassemble the pieces of the puzzle. In part because of 
politicians responding to public anger, particularly in the period since 1990, 
Congress has indeed enacted laws that simultaneously expanded the removable 
population (particularly through IIRIRA in 1996), ran the risk of keeping the 
removable population in the United States through a ramp-up in border enforcement 
disrupting circular migration, and raised public expectations that undocumented 
aliens and lawful permanent residents involved in crimes would be removed. As 
public frustration has grown, lawmakers have had increased incentives to propose 
 
224. See Anthony Boadle, Obama Sees Early 2010 Start on Immigration Reform, REUTERS (Aug. 7, 
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/07/us-obama-immigration-idUSTRE5765Y420090807 
(discussing failed immigration reform efforts in 2006 and 2007). 
225. See Aramark Facility Servs v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 530 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing reactions of policy elites and the mobilization of protest during the immigration reform 
debates of 2007). 
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further enforcement-oriented responsibilities, which have exacerbated the cycle 
and lead to further rounds of lawmaking. Lawmakers not only failed to provide 
increased resources to cope with these problems, they permitted a stark decline to 
occur in resources for interior enforcement during the crucial years following 
IRCA. Paradoxically, these trends have simultaneously exacerbated enforcement 
challenges while engendering a powerful political backlash because of perceived 
enforcement failures. And this, in a nutshell, is the backdrop for contested and 
often divisive legal disputes regarding the implications of IRCA and employer 
sanctions,226 the role of state and local laws in immigration enforcement,227 and 
the operation of programs such as the Secure Communities initiative designed to 
fulfill immigration authorities’ broadened responsibilities for enforcement.228  
Why would greater public frustration and eroding legitimacy for immigration 
law be an important feature of the status quo? More specifically, why would a 
discredited immigration law make it harder to pass reforms? For one, other things 
being equal, public frustration with perceived policy failures erodes trust in the 
government’s capacity to perform such functions.229 Eroding trust almost certainly 
increases the attractiveness of more drastic measures that send a message, raising 
the likelihood that enforcement-oriented measures such as a larger border patrol 
and fence construction would be enacted and supported, even if they do not 
meaningfully address the underlying problem. With lawmakers from different 
states interested in connecting with voters, public frustration about insufficient 
enforcement is thus the fertile soil in which one-sided responses to immigration 
policy develop. Without such frustration, it would be difficult to see how narrow 
and costly policies that do not address the full scope of the problem would be as 
likely to pass. In contrast, restructuring employer verification measures that could 
have a large impact on millions is prone to attract greater opposition from 
interests and stakeholders concerned about expansive federal labor market 
regulation (particularly if it is not coupled with other elements of desired policies, 
such as easier access to visas for high-skilled immigrants or a legalized workforce). 
Moreover, public frustration probably interferes with more far-reaching 
reforms in a variety of subtle ways. Widespread public disappointments with 
federal regulation of immigration, even if sometimes engendered or exacerbated 
by limited information, raises the public profile of the issue and makes it more 
difficult for credible elite bargaining to occur. In addition, to the extent that some 
more far-reaching changes depend on successfully selling to the public the idea 
that new labor market regulations or enforcement measures will be successfully 
 
226. See id. 
227. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010). 
228. See Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 
10 Civ. 3488(SAS), 2011 WL 381625 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2011). 
229. See, e.g., Luke Keele, Social Capital and the Dynamics of Trust in Government, 51 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 241 (2007). 
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implemented, more public frustration about the failures of existing enforcement 
makes the sale more difficult. And swelling public skepticism of the immigration 
system heightens the risk of entirely reopening the statutory bargains over 
immigration; a frustrated public relatively angry about the immigration system 
could entice lawmakers into supporting increasingly far-reaching statutory 
changes, including restrictions on family-based immigration or new limits on 
residents’ progression toward citizenship.  
These concerns helped sink reform in 2007 despite the considerable 
enthusiasm of many policy elites, including the President and his staff. Pivotal 
senators had agreed on a framework but needed to resolve a variety of details, 
such as how to operationalize the precise criteria to be used in allocating the 
majority of immigrant visas in the new scheme. The devil proved not only to be in 
the details, but in the social and political context at work while lawmakers and 
staff rushed to work out those details. In a world where public attention had for 
years increasingly focused on immigration, and Internet technology lowered the 
cost and time required for organizing vigorous public responses, lawmakers faced 
a vastly more politically treacherous environment in the tense hours and days 
during which they were scrambling to nail down the details of the framework 
agreement for a new immigration scheme.230 For all these reasons, we can expect 
rising public frustration with the immigration status quo to contribute a great deal 
to keeping it in place. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS: IMMIGRATION LAW, POLICY CHANGE, AND THE 
NATION-STATE 
The preceding analysis shows how statutes and the organizations that 
implement them play an outsized role in a country defined largely by its capacity 
to weave immigrants into the fabric of its society. Our exploration of the current 
system underscores that it is not entirely without merit and leaves some interested 
parties better off than others. At the same time, many of its consequences are 
both costly and poorly understood—including in particular diminished economic 
opportunities, and a misallocation of resources relative to the country’s 
overarching security concerns.  
A focus on institutions, organizations, and statutes does not deny the 
importance of dramatic, unexpected events such as the September 11 attacks. 
Even if those attacks helped explain why the Bush Administration shelved its early 
interest in comprehensive immigration reform, spurred immigration detentions, 
and sought further legal changes at the intersection of immigration and national 
 
230. See Julia Preston, Grass Roots Roared and Immigration Plan Fell, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, at 
A1 (“[T]he legislation sparked a furious rebellion among many Republican and even some 
Democratic voters, who were linked by the Internet and encouraged by radio talk show hosts. Their 
outrage and activism surged to full force after Senator Jon Kyl, the Arizona Republican who was an 
author of the bill, suggested early this week that support for the measure seemed to be growing.”). 
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security law, the impact of such exogenous shocks on immigration law plays out 
against the backdrop of longer-term trends and institutional realities.231 We have 
seen, for example, how the increase in border enforcement resources was on a 
steady upward trend well over a decade before September. Similarly, the expansive 
removal authority that characterizes much of immigration enforcement today was 
largely created by statutory changes in the mid-1990s.  
To assess the implications of immigration law’s institutional roots, this Part 
begins by connecting the preceding story of institutional constraints in 
immigration to broader themes involving legal and policy change in the United 
States. It then develops the idea that the American experience with immigration 
law may ultimately harbor larger implications involving national capacity to affect 
cross-border flows—particularly among relatively powerful states with a 
recognized ability to shape their broader context. Nation-states are the defining 
feature of our modern legal architecture. As developed below, their relevance to 
each other, and to the lives of individuals throughout the world, depends more 
than commonly acknowledged on bureaucratic safety valves managing the costs 
and benefits of legal commitments that may, for extended periods, appear to be 
worth accepting.  
A. (Negative) Policy Feedback, (Non)Delegation, and Implementation 
Modern immigration law is almost certainly a poor vehicle for serving the 
interests of most Americans. But a variety of simple accounts, rooted in 
conventional or institutional corruption,232 or in a lack of public concern about 
immigration issues,233 also falls short when it comes to explaining the situation 
facing immigration judges, lawyers, agencies, and the public. Subtler dynamics are 
at work, connecting statutory schemes, organizations, and the larger public. 
Earlier, I noted that American immigration law is in some respects a study in what 
political scientists have called “policy feedback,” or the process through which 
legal and policy changes create new political conditions. The progression 
developed here—from statutory contradictions and implementation difficulties, to 
harsh legislative and public reactions, and to further statutory and implementation 
 
231. See Michelle Mittelstadt et al., Through the Prism of National Security: Major Immigration Policy 
and Program Changes in the Decade Since 9/11, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE: IMMIGRATION FACTS 
(2011). While the authors conclude that “the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have molded an 
immigration system that is dominated by security and border-control considerations,” id. at 12, they 
also conclude that a variety of changes, including increases in worksite enforcement, electronic 
employment eligibility verification, and the rise in expedited removals were not changes “directly 
flowing from 9/11.” Id. at 2. 
232. Lawrence Lessig, Democracy After Citizens United, BOS. REV., Sept./Oct. 2010, at 11–29. 
233. Cf. Kathleen A. Dolan & Thomas M. Holbrook, Knowing Versus Caring: The Role of Affect 
and Cognition in Political Perceptions, 22 POL. PSYCHOL. 27, 28–30 (2001) (explaining how emotional, 
affective responses can drive political perceptions, and discussing how affect differs depending on the 
issue). 
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problems—is in some respects quite distinct from the typical policy feedback 
narrative.  
To understand the distinctions, recall that the conventional policy feedback 
story tends to be more focused on stakeholder and civil society reactions, spurred 
by policy changes that foment some mix of social organizing, coalition-building, 
and complementary-policy changes that further entrench the original statute.234 It 
is easy to see how policy entrepreneurs aspire to unleash such a cycle; it should be 
just as clear that nothing guarantees its success. Recently, Eric Patashnik and 
Julian Zelizer explained why this literature needs to better contend with the limits 
of policy feedback—including among others potentially poorly timed or 
insufficient institutional (organizational or financial) resources.235  
While the argument here bears some relationship to the policy feedback 
literature (including the ideas emphasizing the limits of policy feedback advanced 
by Patashnik and Zelizer), it stands out in at least two respects. First, the focus is 
on the entrenchment of a statutory regime bereft of support (and indeed, in some 
respects all the more entrenched because the lack of support generates political 
consequences that exacerbate the difficulty of changing the status quo). Second, 
the focus is on the consequences of the statutory regime that arise as a result of 
enforcement and implementation. By placing the present argument in the broader 
context of the policy feedback literature, we can illuminate some underappreciated 
ways in which statutes and their enforcement shape the political context, which in 
turn makes some chunks of existing law more difficult to change and exacerbates 
changes in other areas.  
In effect, the legacy of modern immigration law spawns a species of policy 
feedback that is created by a heavily maligned and poorly executed mechanism for 
interior enforcement, a political economy favoring attention to and growth in 
border enforcement (without fundamental changes in interior enforcement 
directed toward employers), and an increasingly engaged public. As we have seen, 
these factors ironically make changes to a poorly functioning system more 
difficult.236 With immigration law, entrenchment grows in the sense of the 
regime’s staying power, not because of growing support but for exactly the 
opposite reason—a state of affairs that almost certainly contributes to eroding 
 
234. See, e.g., Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause, supra note 89. 
235. See Eric M. Patashnik & Julian E. Zelizer, When Policy Does Not Remake Politics: The Limits of 
Policy Feedback (December 10–11, 2010) (unpublished paper), http://www.law.yale.edu/ 
documents/pdf/News_&_Events/Patashnik-Zelizer_YaleLawConference_2010.pdf. 
236. One consequence of the impediments to changes in immigration law may be to slow 
down the pace and process through which immigration leads to demographic shifts among voters, 
thereby disrupting the cycle through which immigration has historically impacted the democratic 
process. For an example of how immigration affects (sometimes in subtle ways) the democratic 
process, see generally ZOLBERG, supra note 24, at 10 (discussing the coalition between economic 
interests and “recent ethnics” made possible by immigration flows). For an account of how policy 
feedback could bear a relationship to demographic change, see Hochschild, supra note 175.  
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trust for policymakers and greater interest in measures ill-suited to address the 
problem in question.  
These entrenchment dynamics, in turn, have a variety of consequences that 
begin with the nation’s approaches to border enforcement policy. The border 
buildup is an example of how a system can become partially locked-in even as 
policy change continues to occur. Even the recent changes in border security 
(when combined with new rules since the mid-1990s governing the ease with 
which individuals can be removed) constitute fairly stark changes in policy. What 
this evolution has not accomplished is to drastically modify the overall architecture 
of the system. Thus, stark increases in border enforcement capacity appear to be 
leading many undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States longer, 
thereby playing a role in driving up, or at least keeping high, existing totals of 
undocumented migrants.237 
Sociologists studying this population have documented a relatively 
widespread historical pattern of circular migration involving Mexican 
undocumented immigrants. Before the stark changes in border security policy set 
in motion by the early 1990s, undocumented individuals of Mexican origin 
routinely returned to Mexico with the intention of subsequently reentering the 
United States. Some of these individuals, however, though initially planning to 
return to Mexico temporarily, ultimately decide to remain in Mexico. More 
recently, scholars describe a predictable and growing unwillingness of many such 
undocumented migrants to leave the United States for fear of being unable to 
exercise the de facto (though not the de jure) option of returning. This pattern 
almost certainly helps explain the persistently large size of the undocumented 
population in the United States in the years since the border enforcement ramp-
up, and showcases some of the subtle and potentially perverse links between 
border enforcement and the scope of domestic enforcement activities.238 
Furthermore, the border buildup appears to have had a relatively meager 
impact on the architecture of interior enforcement. Its limited (though 
consequential) effects on patterns of illicit migration are not enough to change the 
larger context of the situation the country faces on immigration.239 Prospects for 
 
237. See Massey, supra note 114, at 136 (discussing disruptions in circular migration). 
238. See id. 
239. Despite the ramp-up in border enforcement and in immigration-related criminal 
prosecution, some recent research suggests these factors have only weak effects on the ultimate 
willingness of migrants to illegally cross the deadly terrain on the border. See generally The Impacts of 
Border Enforcement on Unauthorized Mexican Migration to the United States: Field Hearing on Immigration in San 
Diego, California Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Wayne A. 
Cornelius, Director, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at University of California-San 
Diego), available at http://www.bibdaily.com/pdfs/Cornelius%20testimony%208-2-0 6.pdf (showing 
through interviews with migrants that tightened border enforcement in urban areas has not halted 
unauthorized immigrants from entering the United States, and discussing complex, potentially 
perverse consequences from heightened border enforcement). 
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more substantial change probably depend on disrupting some of the 
circumstances holding the larger statutory scheme in place, including the relative 
lack of interest from many businesses in changing laws that many of them often 
ignore, because these laws are only partially, if ever, enforced.240 Nor will much of 
the public be likely to support larger changes in immigration without confidence 
that the resulting legal arrangements will be more routinely and effectively 
enforced than the status quo.  
In the meantime, public frustration with immigration will spur more state 
and local lawmakers to take action.241 While local immigration power is sharply 
limited, particularly by federal statutes, existing law does leave room for some 
exercises of local control on this issue.242 The evolution of the doctrine here leaves 
states and localities with some choices about their involvement—choices not 
entirely limited by the INA, judicial interpretations of it, or even other aspects of 
federal immigration law. It is difficult to envision a scenario involving substantially 
fewer efforts by state and local authorities to affect immigration policy without 
substantial changes in the federal scheme. Put simply, agencies given all but 
impossible tasks are hard-pressed to earn the measure of broad public support and 
legitimacy capable of forestalling local frustration and national disapproval. 
Widespread cynicism about a bureau’s mission is hardly an inspiring 
outcome for agency officials. Many agencies within the executive branch are not 
powerless in managing the threat of such negative policy feedback.243 They can 
sometimes water down substantive requirements to avoid blatant noncompliance, 
in an effort to reframe public discussion regarding their efficacy in achieving 
popular goals. The implementation of the Adam Walsh Act, a new federal 
initiative designed to leverage federal resources in an effort to change states’ 
supervision of sex offenders, is one example of how the gap between aspirations 
and compliance can engender discussion of whether substantive requirements 
should be made more permissive.244 In other cases, agencies can dramatically 
 
240. See, e.g., Hannah Clark, The Business of Immigration Reform, FORBES (May 5, 2006, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2006/05/04/holzer-immigration-reform-cx_hc_0505QandA.html (noting 
that businesses are not clamoring for immigration reform because “it’s not clear what benefits 
business will get out of it, because business benefits a lot from the status quo, [and] from relatively 
unlimited access to cheap labor”). 
241. See, e.g., Michael W. Savage, 3 Other States Weighing Tough Immigration Bills, WASH. POST, 
July 8, 2010, at A4; Arizona-Style Immigration Bills Emerge in New Legislative Sessions, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 
29, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/29/arizona-style-immigration-bills-emerge-
new-state-legislatures. 
242. See, e.g., Memorandum from Teresa Wynn Roseborough, the Office of Legal Counsel, 
Assistance by State & Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens: Memorandum Opinion for the 
U.S. Att’y, Southern Dist. of Cal. (Feb. 5, 1996). 
243. In this context, the term “negative” refers to a cycle that is capable of contributing to the 
erosion of support for a legal scheme. 
244. See generally Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of Administrative 
Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 993 (2010) (discussing compliance-related challenges associated 
with the Adam Walsh Act, and the role that more realistic compliance requirements could play in 
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change prophylactic measures or penalty provisions, thus creating new incentives 
to spur greater compliance even when faced with constrained resources.245 
These scenarios depend to a large degree on the extent of legislative 
delegations to agencies. Such delegations tend to be commonplace in conventional 
regulatory contexts. In those situations, lawmakers delegate considerable (though 
not infinite) authority to agencies to administer in accordance with one or more 
broad considerations that often allow administrators to consider the dilemmas of 
implementation. Most of the immigration landscape is better described as a 
domain of far more limited, or even nondelegation. Neither agencies nor the 
President have meaningful control over the overall visa allocation scheme or the 
number of visas.246 Outside some fairly circumscribed bounds,247 agencies also 
have a limited capacity to change the regulatory structure governing the 
enforcement of employer sanctions, either by starkly increasing penalties or 
addressing state-of-mind requirements through substantive changes or 
prophylactic rules.248 
Although the relative rigidity of immigration law bears further scrutiny, it is 
almost certainly born from a congressional conclusion regarding the political 
complexity of a multidimensional issue that implicates social policy, labor markets, 
and security-related debates. With an issue harboring such complexity, broad 
delegations of authority may be unlikely to insulate Congress from adverse 
political reactions for agency decisions—thereby altering some of the incentives 
for lawmakers to delegate authority in the first place.249 The result leaves agencies 
 
boosting state-level policy changes in the registration and supervision of sex offenders). 
245. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 693–98 (2003) (discussing USDA and 
FDA Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) regulations as an example of “management-
based” regulations); Margaret O’K. Glavin, HACCP: We’ve Only Just Begun, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
137, 138–39 (2001) (describing the structure of prophylactic HACCP food safety regulatory rules, and 
their initial apparent successes since implementation in the U.S. food regulatory context). 
246. The executive branch does have some limited leeway in defining the scope of particular 
visa categories, and the longstanding compromise that governs the allocation of refugee visas. 
Furthermore, this allocation does involve a proposal from the executive branch to the legislature 
regarding the number of visas that the administration proposes to make available in any given year. 
These authorities are quite limited relative to the ability of the U.S. Department of Agriculture to 
reshape the food safety regulatory environment that governs meat, poultry, and egg processing 
establishments. 
247. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Chertoff, 552 F. Supp. 2d 999 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing 
ICE’s effort to use data from the Social Security Administration to issue “no-match” letters for 
certain employers). 
248. For some examples of agencies implementing prophylactic requirements to advance 
substantive regulatory goals, see, for example, Proposed Rules: Department of Labor, Mine Safety 
and Health Administration—Pattern of Violations, 76 Fed. Reg. 5719 (Feb. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 
30 C.F.R. pt. 104); Rules and Regulations: Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection 
Service–E. coli O157:H7 Contamination of Beef Products, 67 Fed. Reg. 62325 (Oct. 7, 2002) (to be 
codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 417). 
249. See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS (1999) 
(discussing the dynamics of congressional choices to delegate policymaking authority to executive 
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less capable of managing implementation dilemmas, including the potential for 
negative policy feedback dynamics that erode agencies’ legitimacy over time. 
True, agencies and the White House can play an important role in deciding 
on the allocation of scarce enforcement resources or the content of new 
immigration policy initiatives. As we have seen, however, the cauldron of law and 
politics that defines immigration goes a long way toward tying the hands of the 
executive branch.250 This perspective stands in some contrast to the conclusions 
of Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez in their recent work on the presidency and 
immigration. Their illuminating account offers a useful historical perspective on 
the presidential role in immigration, highlighting in particular the long precedent 
for substantial presidential involvement in immigration policymaking through the 
use of inherent or delegated powers. My account, however, highlights the 
somewhat more constrained nature of presidential power in recent decades. Some 
of these constraints simply reflect the congressional reluctance to delegate broader 
formal authority over immigration to either agencies or the President,251 given a 
“polarizing implementation” dynamic, and the extent to which this is explained by 
legal rules and institutional constraints rather than administrative procedures or 
explicit discretionary choices. The ideas developed here show how organizations, 
statutes, and political responses interact to shape the direction of the law. In 
 
agencies); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice 
Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006). 
250. Cox and Rodríguez make a number of interesting arguments about the presidency and 
immigration law. They note that historically, legal doctrines that govern immigration not only 
recognize Congress’s power to regulate migration, but also a robust (and perhaps unique) role for the 
President, stemming from foreign affairs powers and legal domains “incident” to the United States’ 
status as a sovereign nation. In fact, notwithstanding the increasingly widespread view that 
congressional power is preeminent in immigration, the history of the Bracero program and the 
treatment of Caribbean migrants reflects a high degree of presidential control of immigration policy 
(particularly through the ex post facto regulation of removal). Expansions in the size of the removable 
population have exacerbated the trend towards presidential power (in a manner similar to what 
appears to have occurred in the context of criminal law, as substantive criminal law has expanded to 
cover a growing proportion of conduct). Ex post discretion, however, does have drawbacks—such as 
the executive branch’s lack of capacity to change the criteria for admission of lawful immigrants, or 
the association of illegality and immigration among voters who may perceive discretionary 
enforcement choices as essentially condoning illicit activity. Accordingly, there is a case to be made in 
support of more expansive delegations of ex ante screening power to the executive branch. See 
generally Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 483–519 (arguing that the President’s authority to screen 
immigrants through enforcement decisions creates an asymmetry that has consequences which 
Congress could address by formally giving the President the power to adjust quotas and admission 
criteria). 
251. Leave aside for present purposes the extent to which the President can or should play a 
preeminent role in deciding how authority explicitly delegated to executive departments should be 
exercised. Compare Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) (arguing against presidential assumption of responsibility for, and 
assertion of control over, regulatory decisionmaking), with Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (concluding that presidential control of many regulatory actions is 
defensible on accountability and pragmatic efficiency grounds). 
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contrast, legal scholars and lawyers sometimes play down the role of public 
reactions,252 and political scientists who study policy feedback rarely focus on the 
potentially critical role of legal implementation in shaping responses.253 
B. Nation-States and the Control of Cross-Border Flows 
The story of America’s recent immigration law also shows how much nation-
states’ capacity to control transnational forces depends on the organization of 
their laws and public agencies, not on macrolevel national decisions that 
implement themselves automatically. Powerful nation-states can control some of 
the forces affecting immigration. They run risks if they overestimate what they can 
control, however, as this can trigger polarizing implementation, use up resources 
that could have more useful effects, reduce willingness to accept migration that 
can serve as a safety valve relieving pressure for unauthorized migration, and 
signal ineffectiveness to domestic and external players. Ultimately, what they are 
able to control depends on the organization of their laws and public agencies, not 
on macrolevel national decisions that implement themselves automatically. 
Taking a different tack focused on the changing nature of cross-border 
flows, some scholarly observers increasingly question how much the United States 
can control patterns of immigration activity.254 Yet immigration policy does 
explicitly and implicitly shape the direction and global position of the United 
States, a uniquely vast immigrant democracy. Consider just a few examples:  
(1) U.S. immigration policy changes helped spur substantial downward pressure 
on visa admissions to the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks. 
(2) Immigration policy changes affect the number of refugees admitted to the U.S. 
and the terms of their admission. (3) As we have seen, while a variety of factors 
affect patterns of immigration from Mexico, U.S. policy changes in implementing 
the law (including, for example, the dramatic increases in the Border Patrol 
coupled with open-ended discretionary provisions facilitating removal) are 
associated with rising smuggler fees. (4) U.S. immigration policy affects the flow of 
legal immigrants, the mix of family- and employment-based immigrants, and 
therefore the future makeup of the American electorate (as well as the capacity of 
the United States to continue attracting talented, innovative individuals to the 
country). 
 
252. For example, Richard Stewart’s classic treatment of the evolving character of American 
administrative law has relatively little to say about the role of the mass public in precipitating or 
otherwise impacting the changes he described. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). 
253. See, e.g., Pierson, Increasing Returns, supra note 88. Pierson’s otherwise illuminating overview 
of major mechanisms for policy feedback does not devote significant attention to the role of 
bureaucracies responsible for implementing statutes and their potential for shaping the 
implementation process through interpretive and administrative choices. 
254. See Massey, supra note 114 (discussing North American integration and the difficulty of 
managing migration). 
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True, state power to police migration flows across a vast border is not 
without its limits. Those limits are starkly apparent in an advanced industrialized 
country that shares nearly 1000 miles of border, and strong economic and social 
ties, with a developing nation that is experiencing substantial emigration pressures. 
Yet the focus on allegedly inexorable human movements runs the risk of 
understating the practical and human impact of immigration and border 
policymaking, even in a country such as the United States. The degree of activity 
by interest groups and throughout civil society more generally that is aimed at 
shaping immigration policy reflects the stakes riding on the substance and 
implementation of immigration law. Choices about immigration law at the border 
over the past thirty years have had striking consequences for the choices of many 
immigrants, including how much risk of death or serious injury to assume.255 
Policy responses to change the degree of interior enforcement allocate costs and 
benefits to migrants, employers, and others. Meanwhile, a substantial and 
continuing gap exists between the number of people who emigrate to the United 
States (lawfully or not) and those who reportedly want to—a gap reflected not 
only in long queues for visas in some countries but also in the willingness of 
would-be illicit migrants to pay increasingly high sums to evade border controls.256 
Ironically, it is the government’s meaningful, if limited, capacity to regulate 
immigration that generates the dilemma of how to control flows of migrants. 
Instead of showcasing regulatory futility, these outcomes reflect something subtly 
different—a mix of considerable state efficacy hamstrung by political and 
implementation constraints. By showcasing the significance of interactions 
between enforcement choices and public reactions in a pluralist democracy, the 
evolution of the INA and its enforcement emphasizes how much nation-states’ 
capacity to control transnational forces depends on the organization of their laws 
and public agencies, not on macrolevel national decisions that implement 
themselves automatically. Valuable insights emerge from a variety of crisp 
analytical models of immigration policymaking, including among others 
Treibilcock’s account of optimal immigration policy, and Cox and Posner’s 
analysis of the “second-order” structure of immigration law.257 These insights 
should be applied with caution, however, as the presence of political interference 
and implementation constraints can limit a more abstract model’s explanatory 
 
255. See Cornelius, supra note 46. 
256. See supra note 48 (discussing the impact of implementation changes, including changes in 
the price of border-crossing and the proportion of migrants using ports of entries); see also Mexican 
Migration Project, Graph 1: Border Crossing Costs (U.S. Dollars adjusted to 2011-CPI), available at 
http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/001costs-en.aspx. 
257. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 809 (2007); Michael J. Trebilcock & Matthew Sudak, The Political Economy of Emigration and 
Immigration, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234, 235 (2006) (assuming that “emigration and immigration states 
both implement policies aimed at maximizing their domestic social welfare”). 
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power and policy implications.258 Indeed, constraints and implementation 
problems are everywhere in immigration law. They confront the President in 
deciding how (or how much) to enforce immigration provisions. They confront 
agency headquarters in disciplining field offices with their own ideas about how 
aggressively to enforce immigration laws. They confront lawmakers who are 
designing policies that pivot on ambiguous information, or on unrealistic degrees 
of compliance from the public. 
CONCLUSION 
As the United States is a self-described nation of immigrants, it is perhaps 
fitting that immigration law’s far-reaching consequences touch such a vast number 
of lives. The legal allocation of citizenship and migration opportunities touches 
hardworking and occasionally undocumented college students whose parents held 
their tiny hands when they arrived in the United States. It leaves engineers and 
doctors in the clutches of interminable queues for permanent residence that would 
have startled even Kafka. Through its own structure and its subtle effects on the 
international policymaking process, immigration law profoundly affects people 
around the world who dream of moving to an advanced industrialized country and 
believe they have a plausible legal basis for doing so. Among those with seats at 
the table in the national conversation about the fate of immigration law are 
millions of ordinary Americans who do not know a great deal about immigration 
but nonetheless have an opinion about it and feel (even if indirectly and not in a 
manner they can fully articulate) they are subject to its effects. They confront a 
system that is neither particularly coherent organizationally nor especially rational, 
but rather one forged in fits and starts over many decades, slow to change, and 
riddled with internal contradictions. 
This Article explored the deep institutional forces contributing to those 
contradictions. Immigration law remains uniquely important because it continues 
to address foundational questions about the constitution of a national community. 
In the process, that scheme simultaneously allocates benefits and burdens to 
millions of people and the groups who represent them.259 This uniqueness has not 
gone unnoticed in judicial opinions that address matters such as the relationship 
between national sovereignty and immigration,260 and plays its part in the 
preceding analysis. At the same time, while my focus is on the recent structure and 
 
258. Cf. Hiroshi Motomura, Comment, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
857 (2007). 
259. See supra Part II.A; see also ZOLBERG, supra note 24 (discussing the capacity of immigration 
law to shape economic benefits and burdens along with the cultural character of communities). 
260. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an accepted 
maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit 
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”). 
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staying power of immigration law, the case study also sheds light on more general 
questions, such as how statutes and the organizations that implement them affect 
each other as well as the public, and how nation-states wield scarce but meaningful 
power in a changing world.  
In shedding light on those questions my account shows how, for all its 
distinctiveness, immigration law is not unique in two crucial respects. First, the 
substantive core of immigration law reflects a continuing entanglement between 
normative aspirations (concerning values such as orderly continuing flows of 
immigrants, family unity, and a relatively unimpeded path from legal residence to 
citizenship) and the realities of pluralist politics—where political and legal actors 
that harbor competing goals repeatedly engaged in conflict and bargaining to 
shape an often-contradictory statutory core. Second, the relevance of immigration 
law—constituting an elaborate regulatory scheme—is largely forged through an 
implementation process fraught with fragmented agency players, limits in 
organizational capacity, and public frustration. Both of these features help us 
address the puzzle of why Americans are burdened by a self-defeating system that 
has few supporters and almost no defenders. 
By investigating the entrenchment of immigration law in this larger 
institutional context, the Article makes several scholarly contributions. 
Conceptually, my analysis shows the importance of interactions between three 
distinct but related political economies affecting modern American immigration 
law—statutory bargains driven by accommodation among organized interests, 
organizational practices reflecting a fragmented cast of bureaucratic players and 
increasingly weak presidential control, and public attitudes reflecting social 
developments as well as reactions to each of the first two political economies. An 
example of how these domains interact is found in what I have described as 
polarizing implementation: where lawmakers face a nearly irresistible temptation to 
ratchet up border enforcement and internal agency responsibilities while feeding 
increasingly ambitious public expectations that agencies fail to satisfy. Lawmakers 
thus contribute to swelling public expectations while doing little more than 
tinkering with a system incapable of meeting those expectations.  
With fragmented agencies burdened by statutory compromises carrying out 
their missions, the agencies’ relationships to lawmakers, interest groups, and the 
public also shed light on the broader dynamics of statutory entrenchment. On the 
one hand, the Civil Rights Act, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the 
Goldwater-Nickles Defense Department reforms are examples of statutory 
schemes that developed a far-reaching network of roots linking organized 
interests, civil servants, lawmakers, and public perceptions while fostering 
increasing perceptions of public legitimacy.261 Not so with immigration, where the 
story shows how statutory schemes can also become essentially glued to an 
 
261. Cf. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 12. 
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unattractive status quo that is bereft of public legitimacy, through a similar 
entanglement of players and perceptions blocking virtually every practical avenue 
for changing that status quo. In the case of immigration, the increasingly shrill 
responses to a rickety scheme originally born from expansive and unrealistic 
promises have also engendered strong and growing constraints on presidential 
control of immigration policy. In particular, my argument underscores the 
relatively limited control the President can achieve over internal immigration 
enforcement given the aforementioned polarizing implementation dynamic, and 
the significance of legal rules and institutional constraints instead of administrative 
procedures or explicit discretionary choices in explaining this. 
Finally, my account underscores how IRCA and similarly significant 
immigration law changes were easier to achieve than the major immigration 
reforms proposed in 2006, 2007, and 2009–2010, all of which were supported by 
presidential administrations, powerful stakeholders, and substantial segments of 
the general population. In contrast, earlier reforms benefited from lower public 
salience, a more supportive interest group context, and a system not burdened by 
the legacy of a major statutory scheme built to fail.  
Some aspects of that system are undoubtedly shaped by the broader arc of 
American history. But the regulatory bargains struck since the 1980s had powerful 
consequences for agency officials, immigration adjudicators, Article III judges, and 
millions of people every day. Changes from the status quo, in turn, depend on the 
intersecting political economies of lawmaking, implementation, and public 
responses that now drive much of what immigration law has become. In light of 
these dynamics, perhaps hard-fought statutory or implementation changes could 
change the costs of the status quo for organized interests with a stake in 
immigration policy. Perhaps policy changes increasing the public’s perceptions of 
immigration policy’s efficacy and legitimacy could gradually lower the issue’s 
profile and increase the electorate’s inclination to support broader changes in the 
federal role. No doubt further demographic change will also continue to shape the 
political context in which immigration laws are written and evaluated.262 
An evaluation of the present state of the law, however, yields a disquieting 
picture. At the center of it is an emerging cycle of eroding public legitimacy and 
polarized public responses. That cycle renders more difficult the statutory and 
administrative changes that promise greater coherence in immigration law, and 
raises at least the prospect of endangering amidst swelling public frustration key, 
longstanding features of American immigration law, including the relatively large 
number of legal immigrants admitted each year and their routine access (after 
several years) to citizenship. Still, while this interplay of statutory law, 
 
262. See generally Hochschild, supra note 175 (discussing the potential of demographic change to 
drive developments in immigration policy even as it increases the risk of short-term political conflict 
over immigration and related issues). 
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implementation, and public responses reveals much about American pluralism, 
nothing in this account traces its roots to immutable features of American history 
or even the inviolable internal logic of nation-states. Instead, the most recent 
chapters in the story of how Americans regulate our national community harbor at 
their core an irony of laws that simultaneously engender exceedingly high public 
aspirations while making it all but impossible for agencies to live up to them. 
 
